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This study is the seventh
report carried out by the
Palestine Research Unit
(PRU)1 of the Graduate
Institute of Development
Studies (IUED) of the
University of Geneva since
the outbreak of the second
Intifada in September 2000,
on the impact of local and
international aid on the living
conditions of the civilian
population in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (OPT).
The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), which has supported the
reports from the start, has been joined by several United Nations Agencies (UNDP,
UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, OCHA2) and by a local NGO (PANORAMA3) to co-fund
this report.
The period under scrutiny in this report covers the fall and winter 2003-2004. During
the same period, a number of international organizations, NGOs, private and public
local research centers, and Palestinian Authority institutions have published several
important studies on topics that complement the data of our survey. At the end of the
report, several references have been included in the bibliography for the reader to
consult.
As usual, during the phase of preparation of the questionnaire, the team discussed the
content of the new poll with different stakeholders. Due to the prevailing difficult
situation in the OPT, the scope of the questionnaire has been further expanded to
include a substantive number of questions that could offer more specific information
to the interested parties. In this regard, it is the aim of this study to be of use to the
Palestinian Authority, many UN and other international agencies, as well as local NGOs
as the findings provide a wider picture of Palestinian public perceptions on their living
conditions.
1 The PRU is presently composed of seven members: Prof. Riccardo Bocco, political sociologist and
head of the PRU at the IUED; Mr. Matthias Brunner, political scientist, lecturer at the Department of
Political Science of the University of Geneva; Dr. Isabelle Daneels, political scientist, researcher at
the IUED; Dr. Jalal Al Husseini, political scientist, researcher at the IUED and associate researcher
at the Near East French Institute in Amman (IFPO, Jordan); Prof. Frédéric Lapeyre,
economist, Institute of Development Studies of the Catholic University of Louvain
(Belgium); Mr Luigi de Martino, program officer at the IUED; Mr. Jamil Rabah, political
scientist and polls’ expert, researcher at the IUED and SDC consultant in Ramallah
(Palestine).
2 See http://www.undp.org, http://www.unrwa.org, http://www.unicef.org, http://
www.wfp.org, http://www.who.org, http://ochaonline.un.org/.
3 See http://www.panoramacenter.org.
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For the survey conducted for this report, a sample of 1,499 Palestinian individuals was
utilized. The areas affected by the Wall were over-sampled by 299 cases, and the
remaining 1,200 were conducted in all the areas of the OPT. It is important to note that
the results that will be presented hereafter are weighted so as to be representative of
the whole OPT.1
The poll’s questionnaire (see Annex I for the English version and Annex II for the
Arabic version) was drafted by the above-mentioned expert team and reviewed by a
number of stakeholders, all of whom identified the variables pertinent to drawing an
objective assessment of the needs and living conditions of the Palestinian population
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We are particularly grateful to Mr. Fritz Froehlich
(deputy director of the SDC, Gaza and West Bank Office); Mr. Sufyian Mushasha
(UNDP, Jerusalem); Mr. Lionel Brisson (Director of Operations, UNRWA Headquarters);
Mr. Sam Rose (UNRWA Headquarters); Dr. Elena Mancusi (Program Officer, UNRWA,
Jerusalem); Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot (Head of the World Food Program, Jerusalem); Ms.
Monica Awad (UNICEF, Jerusalem); Mr. John Wetter (World Bank, Jerusalem); Mr.
David Shearer (Director of OCHA office in Jerusalem); Ms. Netta Ammar (OCHA,
Jerusalem); Dr. Ambrogio Manenti (Director of WHO office in Jerusalem); and Mr.
Yousef Muheisen (WHO, Jerusalem).
The IUED subcontracted the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) for
conducting the survey in late February 2004. More than 70 fieldworkers interviewed
1,499 people under the supervision of Ms. Manal Warrad.
The teamwork was conducted between Jerusalem, Ramallah, Brussels and Geneva.
We are particularly grateful to the JMCC Palestinian fieldworkers: without their
dedication under difficult circumstances, this study could not have materialized.
In Ramallah, Ms. Charmaine Seitz did a great job on the edition and the layout of the
present report. In Geneva, special thanks are due to the students of the Political
Science Department and of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies both at the
University of Geneva that helped us a lot on data cleaning, standardization and
checking: Mr. Jérôme Begey, Mr. Jean-Marc Binois, Ms. Nadia Boulifa, Ms. Céline
Calvé, Ms. Julie Conti, Ms. Emilie Converset, Ms. Tania Gaulis, Ms. Claudia Hametner,
Mr. Fabien Messeiller, Mr. Sabi Mihalyi, Mr. Jean-David Moynat, Mr. Lionel Ricou and
Ms. Jessica Saulle. We are also very grateful to Mr. Markus Peter of DataDoxa and Mr.
Antoine Mach, head of Covalence.ch for their valuable assistance on the whole
process of data handling and checking. Last but not least, we wish to thank our
program officer at the PRU, Mr. Luigi de Martino for his role in information and coordi-
nation and Mr. Rico Glaus of the IUED for administration and accounting.
The data for this report were collected by the JMCC, but the data cleaning, weighting
and interpretation of the results are the sole responsibility of the authors of this report.
Geneva, September 2004
1 In fact, our file is always weighted except when the data are split between areas
affected and areas not affected by the Wall.
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ARIJ Applied Research Institute
 in Jerusalem
EGP Employment Generation
Programs
GS The Gaza Strip
GSRC Gaza Strip refugee camps
HDIP Health Development
Information Project
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
IUED (French acronym for) Graduate Institute of
Development Studies, University of Geneva
JMCC Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre
MIFTAH Palestinian Initiative for Global Dialogue and Democracy
MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, PNA
NIS New Israeli Shekel
OAPT Occupied and Autonomous Palestinian Territories
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination for the Humanitarian Affairs
OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories
PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction
PA Palestinian Authority
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PRCS Palestine Red Crescent Society
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
UNESCO United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children and Education Fund
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in
the Near East
UNSCO United Nations Special Coordinator’s Office in Palestine
UNWFP United Nations World Food Program
WB The West Bank
WBRC West Bank refugee camps
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MOBILITY & SECURITY
CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION
The escalation of clashes in the OPT
after August 2003 resulted in an increase in
the number of casualties and restrictions
on mobility as compared to the situation in
July 2003.
Both the number of persons killed and
injured has risen since July 2003. Overall,
however, the period under scrutiny
(August 2003 to February 2004) saw fewer casualties than previous periods covered
by earlier surveys. Confirming the now well-established militarized characteristic of
the Intifada, most victims were hit by shrapnel and live ammunition.
While Palestinians generally report that their mobility has improved, especially
access to their places of work or education, restrictions of mobility continue to be
named as the prime cause for business or employment-related problems. During the
period under scrutiny, Israel has eased its closure policy, but roadblocks remain
physically intact and curfews have been re-imposed locally whenever military
incursions are underway.
The Wall is leading to the emergence of a new underprivileged segment of the
OPT community, one which is comparatively more affected by problems of mobility
and socioeconomic difficulties than the rest of the population.
Contrary to fears expressed in the OPT and neighboring Arab countries, the
construction of the Wall has not yet triggered a new wave of Palestinian emigration
abroad.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
This study’s results show a severe deterioration of the business environment in the
Gaza Strip since July 2003. In the West Bank, the situation has slightly improved -
especially inside refugee camps - but the Wall is a growing problem for businesses in
the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Poverty in the OPT remains widespread, with 57% of the population
being poor and 23% of the population being extremely poor. The overall
poverty and extreme poverty rates remained almost the same, as compared
to the rates in July 2003. The poverty rate among respondents living in areas
crossed by the Wall (a rate of 65%) was significantly higher than the average
poverty rate in the Occupied Territories (a rate of 57%).
EXECUTIVE
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One striking finding is the sharp deterioration of the material situation of residents
of Gaza Strip refugee camps where the percentage of extremely poor increased from
36% to 47% between July 2003 and February 2004. This means that that rate of
extreme poverty in Gaza Strip refugee camps is now more than twice that of the
average rate in the Occupied Territories as a whole.
Less than half of respondents reported that they still have means of relieving their
hardship. One-fourth of respondents reported that their means will be exhausted soon.
Among survey respondents, 41% reported that their business had suffered due to
inability to market their products. In villages, this problem is most severe, with 51% of
village residents emphasizing it over other difficulties. Forty percent of city residents
cited the inability to market products, while only 27% of refugee camps cited this
hardship.
Overall, there are signs that the socio-economic situation in the West Bank has
improved. The rate of respondents reporting an inability to market products decreased
from 54% to 49% since July 2003. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, there has been
a deterioration: 21% in July 2003 reported an inability to market products, as com-
pared with 37% today. In East Jerusalem, the situation has not changed.
The Wall has created obstacles for marketing agricultural products, especially for
respondents from the West Bank who live outside refugee camps. Thirty-nine percent
said that the Wall was a problem in marketing produce.
In general, there is no sign of social fragmentation based on a process of income
differentiation. Overall, 69% of respondents have the feeling that the financial situation
of their household is about the same as the people in their community whereas only
16% think it is worse.
LABOR MARKET
The overall unemployment rate decreased from 25% to 23% between July 2003
and February 2004 but still less than half of all workers have access to full-time
employment.
The OPT labor market is characterized by widespread underemployment which is
affecting more than a quarter of the labor force.
The results show a severe deterioration of the labor market in East Jerusalem
where the unemployment rate reached 33%, as compared to 15% in July 2003.
Meanwhile, the rate of full-time employment in East Jerusalem dropped from 51% to
39%.
In the Gaza Strip, unemployment decreased from 27% to 24% inside refugee
camps and from 20% to 16% outside refugee camps, while the proportion of respon-
dents who reported working part-time or few hours a day increased respec-
tively from 27% to 30% and from 29% to 34%.
The results show a significant increase in job precariousness and
underemployment among non-refugees. Overall, the employment situation of
non-refugees is now more precarious than that of refugees, having worsened
between July 2003 (our last survey) and February 2004.
EXECUTIVE
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The unemployment rate is four times higher for the group of respondents with a
low level of education than for those with a high level of education (44% compared to
11%). Moreover, young workers and workers above the age of 50 are particularly
vulnerable to unemployment.
Problems of access to the workplace were much more severe for workers living in
areas crossed by the Wall. Indeed, 15% of respondents from these areas reported that
it was “almost impossible” to go to work, while another 25% reported that it was “very
difficult” to go to work. These numbers are a stark comparison with the 5% of workers
in the OPT as a whole who reported it “almost impossible” and the 11% who reported
it “very difficult” to go to work.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and especially local NGOs, are in-
creasingly playing a role as employers. The proportion of respondents stating that they
work for a local NGO increased from 1% to 5% between July 2003 and February 2004,
while those stating that they work for an international NGO increased from 2% to 4%.
ASSISTANCE DELIVERED IN GENERAL
In the Gaza Strip, around 5% of the population did not receive assistance during
the past six months, while they had received assistance earlier in the Second Intifada.
 The general level of assistance delivery has decreased significantly since the
first half of 2003.
This decrease was more marked in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, in
villages than in cities and refugee camps. The decrease may be partly explained by
delays in the handover of ICRC’s beneficiaries in rural areas to the WFP.
Areas that were affected by the Wall benefit much less from assistance than the
rest of the OPT. It appears that the poor that live in such areas don’t receive enough
assistance.
Although the general level of assistance has declined, targeting of the poor
seems to have improved: the decline is more severe for those above the poverty line
than for those that live below it, especially hardship cases.
Consistently since the beginning of the second Intifada, refugees received more
assistance than non-refugees. Our results hint at a comparative deficit in assistance to
non-refugees.
Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, there was a clear
increase in the overall value of the assistance delivered, which then remained stable
throughout the second half of 2003 and the first months of 2004. While the median
value of food assistance has evolved in a similar manner, one should note the impor-
tant increase in the value of employment assistance since the last poll in July 2003.
Between September 2003 and February 2004, the overall value of
assistance delivered was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. It
was also higher outside refugee camps than inside refugee camps.
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The level of financial assistance has declined less since last summer: only 3%
fewer respondents received it in February 2004. Here, the sharpest decline is ob-
served in refugee camps where it decreased from 25% in July 2003 to 11% this year.
In villages, there was a decrease of 4% from 10% while in cities, financial assistance
increased slightly from 9% to 11%.
Approximately one-sixth of households received financial assistance but only 9%
of the respondents cited this kind of assistance among the two most important types
of assistance they received.
There was a clear decrease in delivery of all assistance types except employment
and coupons. The largest absolute decline was in food: its delivery receded especially
in villages, to a lesser extent in cities, while increasing in camps. Financial assistance
declined much less and essentially in refugee camps.
Huge geographical differences in the level of assistance delivery for the different
places, areas and regions of residence emerge. Food was delivered to two-thirds of
camp residents in the Gaza Strip but only to one-quarter of households living outside
camps in the West Bank. In general, food is more targeted at the refugee camps and
the Gaza Strip where the living conditions are worse. Financial assistance is also
primarily targeted at Gaza but not particularly at refugee camps. Villages get less
assistance of all types.
THE IMPACT OF AID & PALESTINIANS’ PERCEPTIONS
Twenty-seven percent of Palestinians reported that they needed assistance but
did not receive it. This proportion has increased by 7% since July 2003, going back to
levels registered in 2001 and breaking the improving trend in the focusing of aid
towards those who need it most.
 The most spectacular evolution concerns people below the poverty line, among
which those needing assistance have more than doubled from July 2003 to February
2004.
There are an increased number of people needing aid without receiving among
both refugees and non-refugees.
The need for assistance is higher outside than inside refugee camps
Employment is first assistance priority for 47% of Palestinians (an increase of
18% since July 2003).
Seventy percent of hardship cases place employment among their two most
important needs. More than six out of ten Palestinians cite employment as the most
important need for the community.
In villages, fewer people cite employment as a priority, but many more
cite food and education.
More people need food and money in areas crossed by the Wall than
elsewhere.
The most important infrastructure needed is water supply.
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Highest priorities are water in the West Bank, and electricity in Jerusalem.
FOOD
The proportion of the overall food assistance delivered to respondents living
above the poverty line declined from 25% in July 2003 to 15% in February 2004.
Conversely, the proportion of food assistance reaching hardship cases increased from
34% in July 2003 to 42% by February 2004.
There is a sharp decline of 9% in the proportion of Palestinians who said that they
received assistance in recent months. More specifically, whereas 48% of the respon-
dents said that they received some type of assistance in July 2003, the percentage
dropped to 39% in February 2004.
There has been a decline in the number of Palestinians who rely on food assis-
tance as their primary source of food, and a parallel decrease in the number of
households who rely on the extended family for food.
There has been a relative improvement in the dietary intake of food.
The food situation in areas that are directly affected by the Wall is deteriorating
and might need extra targeting in the future.
Food is the second most important priority for the household. The fact that only
10% of respondents said that food is the most important unmet need indicates the
successful effort conducted by food assistance providers in distributing food assis-
tance to the needy.
HEALTH & EDUCATION
 Health, but especially education, have lost importance as needs both for the
household and for the community since the September 2003 report. Compared to
other types of unmet needs of the household, health and education are not high on the
priority list, which might suggest that those needs are already quite well covered.
The main three factors influencing Palestinians’ choice of a health facility are (1)
the health facility being free or cheaper (42%), (2) the distance or availability of a
health facility (23%), and (3) trust in the quality of services (18%). The results showed
that the highest percentages of Palestinians choosing their health facility based on the
first reason can be found in the West Bank, in refugee camps and villages, among the
poorer segments of society, among the low educated, and among Palestinians residing
in areas that are directly affected by the Wall.
Concerning the need for drugs for acute and chronic diseases in the past six
months, 19% of the total sample was prescribed drugs for acute diseases
and 29% were prescribed drugs for chronic diseases. The results point to a
gap of a few percent between the prescription of drugs for both acute and
chronic diseases and the actual provision of the drugs for these problems.
The prescription of drugs for acute diseases was the highest in villages,
among non-refugees, among residents directly affected by the Wall, among
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the poorest in Palestinian society, and among respondents who are 50 years or older.
The discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs for acute problems
never exceeds the 5% mark, except in areas that are crossed by the Wall.
The private pharmacy is the main source of medication, followed by the Ministry
of Health clinic, the UNRWA clinic, and much less frequently, the NGO clinic. The
UNRWA clinic is the main source of medication in the Gaza Strip, among refugees, and
in both West Bank and Gaza Strip camps. The reliance on a private pharmacy for
medication is highest in Jerusalem, in villages, among non-refugees, among the
economically better-off in society, and among the high educated.
The need for any type of care, with the exception of birth care, was consistently
highest in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer segments of society,
and among residents in areas that are directly affected by the Wall. Birth care and
specialized care were most needed in villages, while health care for a sick child was
most needed in cities. Furthermore, concerning restrictions, delays and denials for the
provision of any of the 12 analyzed types of medical care, generally difficulties
occurred most often in the West Bank, in villages (often least frequently in refugee
camps), among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are
crossed by the Wall.
Thirty-nine percent of the total sample of interviewees reported that they had
been forced to find an alternative health facility, with these numbers being higher in
the West Bank, in villages, among non-refugees, and among residents in areas that are
crossed by the Wall. The most frequently reported problems resulting from having to
find an alternative health facility were additional costs, delay in the needed care, and
more suffering.
Considering the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of six different types of
health services, 71% were satisfied with hospital services, 68% were satisfied with
medication, and 78% were satisfied with primary health care. Furthermore, 51% of the
beneficiaries of physical rehabilitation services were satisfied, while 61% were
satisfied with specialized care and 72% were satisfied with ambulance services.
Results indicate that the PA and - to a lesser extent - UNRWA, are the main providers
of health care, except for physical rehabilitation services where UNRWA’s place is
taken in by local NGOs.
Governmental health coverage and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main
heath insurance providers. Although, in general, the percentage of Palestinians
covering their medical expenses from their own pocket has dropped by 5% (26%)
since the September 2003 report, alarmingly, the percentage of households below the
poverty line that cover their own medical bills has increased by 8% (54%) since last
September.
A large majority (87%) of respondents are satisfied with their school services.
The PA and UNRWA are the main providers of such services, with the PA focusing its
attention mostly on the non-refugee population outside camps and UNRWA mainly
targeting the refugee population whether inside or outside camps. Further-
more, the largest portion of Palestinians with high educational levels can be
found among refugees, in refugee camps and in the Gaza Strip. The low- and
medium-educated tend to rely more on the Israeli labor market, while the-
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high educated rely more on the Palestinian labor market. Moreover, the low- and
medium-educated are far less able to maintain their employment than the high-
educated.
WOMEN & CHILDREN
In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December
2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one woman em-
ployed (26%). In fact, the percentage dropped to the level it stood at in the December
2001 report. Interestingly, the percentage of households with at least one woman
employed swells with an increased level of education and is also highest in the house-
holds that fall in the age category of 24 to 35 years.
When women in the household are employed, it has a clear positive effect on the
household’s financial status, as these households tend to have a higher monthly
income level and can more often position their financial status above the poverty line.
Furthermore, those households seem to be in a better position to cope financially in
the future.
Women in the labor market less frequently lost their jobs than their male counter-
parts. However, those women who did loose their employment tried less hard than
men to find alternative employment. Furthermore, although less women than men are
employed full-time in the labor force, women more than men seem to be able to bring
home a regular and full salary. Lastly, men more than women are willing to compro-
mise on their wages as long as they can keep a job and avoid total unemployment.
In general, housewives spend an average of seven hours a day on work at home.
Housewives who also spend time on work not related to the house or children, on
average do so for about three hours and 20 minutes a day.
In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December
2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one child below the
age of 18 employed (11%). The decision to have children work is influenced by the
financial situation of the household.
Albeit that about 30% of the household members of respondents continue to face
difficulties in getting to their place of education, there appears to be a considerable
improvement in the ability of Palestinians to attend school or university since Septem-
ber 2003.
Since the beginning of the Intifada, 36% of parents reported aggressive behavior
among their children, 31% noticed bad school results, 25% mentioned that their
children are bedwetting, and 28% reported that their children have nightmares.
Although the results are striking, they represent an improvement on the answers to the
same question in the September 2003 report. All four types of behavioral problems are
most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among the poorer
segments of society.
A majority of 53% of parents admit to being unable to fully meet the
needs of their children for care and protection. Again, this phenomenon is
most pronounced in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer
elements of society and among refugees.
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The need for children to attend school regularly is the priority for the majority of
parents.
REFUGEES & UNRWA
The survey indicates that the socioeconomic status of refugees improved be-
tween July 2003 and February 2004, with hardship cases in decline and a higher
percentage of refugees reporting themselves above the poverty line.
These findings hide important spatial differences. In terms of place of residence,
only West Bank camps (98% of their residents being refugees) were affected by the
improvement in socioeconomic conditions, perhaps able to benefit from the slight
relaxing of Israel’s closure policy during the period under scrutiny. For instance, the
percentage of hardship cases in the West Bank refugee camps decreased by 12%,
while increasing by 10% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
In absolute terms, however, refugees remained poorer than non-refugees. Our
survey found that the main reason for increased poverty among refugees lies in their
lack of alternative sources of income (availability of land and capital).
Employment and financial aid are among the main unmet needs aired by the
refugee respondents. Refugees are in general more “service-demanding” than non-
refugees, except in sectors where UNRWA distributes free services, such as education
and health, to the entire refugee population.
Refugees have remained the main targets of socioeconomic assistance. The
percentage of refugee recipients was twofold the percentage of non-refugee recipi-
ents. However, responding to the favorable evolution of the refugees’ socioeconomic
situation, the percentage of refugees assisted dwindled by 14% in the July 2003-2004
period, while decreasing by 5% for non-refugees. The only places of residence not
affected by decline in assistance were the Gaza refugee camps where, contrary to
conditions in the rest of the OPT, hardships were on the rise.
Regarding emergency assistance, refugees considered food the most important
item received. Employment was considered as a relatively marginal assistance item
mainly because it was composed mostly of short-term job schemes.
UNRWA remained by far the main source of assistance of emergency and regular
assistance items for refugees. However, likely due to budgetary restrictions, its
importance declined in the July 2003 - February 2004 period from 66% to 60%.
Conversely, the PA saw its share of emergency assistance provision among refugees
increase from 5% to 10%.
Our respondents, refugees and non-refugees alike, underscored the operational
and political salience of UNRWA’s mandate by stating that it should be preserved until
to the settlement of the refugee issue, rather than the advent of a Palestinian state.
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The main objective of this
study is to provide govern-
ment officials, donors and
civil society representatives
with tools for monitoring
conditions and assistance in
Palestine. It relies on polls
that measure Palestinians’
perceptions about condi-
tions and their evolution,
assistance received, its
impact and Palestinians’
satisfaction with it, as well as many other topics relevant for individuals and organiza-
tions involved in assistance in Palestine.
In this part of the report, we will briefly describe the objectives of the study, the
methodology used and a short description of our independent variables will be
provided.
OBJECTIVES
Since January 2001, seven relevant polls have been conducted.1 The fact that most
questions remained the same throughout this period provides a unique wealth of
monitoring information. Whenever possible and meaningful, the analysis in each
chapter will refer to this evolution. This year we also set up a standardized file which
makes it possible to quickly compare the evolution of answers over time. In this report,
instead of using the question number in captions for graphs, we use standardized
variable names (in the form o###). The reader will find correspondence tables for
question numbers at the beginning of Annex I just before the questionnaire.
The results of this standardization can be found at http://www.dartmonitor.org where
the interested reader can find all the relevant information, from the wording of ques-
tions to distribution frequencies, as well as bivariate analysis with our list of indepen-
dent variables. For this reason, no table of frequencies is included with this report.
The questionnaire for the study (see annexes I and II) was elaborated in order to offer
data on Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on nine main topics that
correspond to the nine parts of the report:
1 In January, June and November 2001, in November 2002,  in July 2003 and in February
2004. In April 2002, we conducted a poll in the aftermath of the Israeli army’s
reoccupation of the Autonomous Palestinian Territories. However, due to the difficult
conditions, the data were collected by phone on a sample not entirely random (see
Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2002b). The data from this poll - covering only the
West Bank - were not standardized.
OBJECTIVES &
METHODOLOGY
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 General conditions in terms of mobility and security are presented in the first
part.
Part 1 - Mobility and security conditions
Variables: o031, o034, o093, o113, o114, o115, o118, o140, o161, 0164, o165.
A portrait of socio-economic conditions is offered in the second part of the report.
It is intended to help the reader in assessing changes in the evolution of both poverty
and Palestinians’ strategies for sustaining this hardship.
Part 2 - Socio-economic Conditions
Variables: poverty3, o040, o041, o057, o095, o108, o131, o156, o162, o163,
o174,  o177.
The labor market and employment status (including the place of work, occupa-
tion and the effects of the Intifada on jobs) are under scrutiny in Part 3.
Part 3 - Labor Market
Variables: o008, o009, o011, o012, o013, o014, o015, o017, o018, o019, o063,
o065, o099, o100, o157, o158.
An overview of the assistance delivered according to type, value and source with
emphasis on employment generation programs is offered in Part 4.
Part 4 - Assistance Delivered in General
Variables: o024, o026, o035, o036, o126, o131, o180.
A review of the impact of the assistance delivered for measuring the perceptions
of the Palestinians is also provided in Part 5. This section includes an analysis of the
people’s perceptions of individual and community assistance, aid priorities, as well as
the visibility, importance and effectiveness of the assistance delivered.
Part 5  - The Impact of Aid and Palestinians’ Perception
Variables: o023, o036, o037, o038, o079, o080, o123, o124.
All the questions in Part 6 pertain to food. They cover perceived effectiveness of
food distribution, type and source of food help assistance received, changes in food
consumption patterns and types of food required, the source of food and nutrition, as
well as the perceived price of some basic commodities.
Part 6 - Food
Variables: o074, o075, o077, o081, o107, o166, o173, o181.
Questions related to health and education include assistance received, priorities,
access to basic services and educational attainment, and constitute the bulk of Part 7.
Part 7 - Health and Education
Variables: o056, o089, o102, o126, o167, o168, o169, 0170, o172, o175.
Other questions in Part 8 concern women and children. The effect of the
Intifada on children, parents’ responses, psychological support, child labor
and women’s contribution to the household income are investigated here.
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Region of residence    (o059):
West Bank
Jerusalem
Gaza Strip
Area of residence     (o060):
City
Village
Refugee camp
Place of residence     (place):
West Bank refugee camps
West Bank outside camps
Gaza Strip refugee camps
Gaza Strip outside camps
East Jerusalem
Poverty    (poverty3):
Hardship cases
Those below the poverty line
Those above the poverty line
Refugee Status    (o002):
Refugees
Non-refugees
Education    (educ):
Low
Medium
High
Age category    (agec):
18 – 24 years
25 – 34 years
35 – 49 years
50 years or more
Gender     (o061):
Male
Female
Wall    (wall):
Directly affected by the wall
Not directly affected by the
wall
Part 8 - Women and Children
Variables: o033, o061, o105, o113, o141, o159,
o160, o171.
An assessment of UNRWA’s strategies
during the past months, the type of assistance
provided by the UN agency (in particular food
aid, employment generation and financial
assistance), the patterns of aid distribution and
its effectiveness, as well as the satisfaction of its
beneficiaries are the content of Part 9.
 Part 9 - Refugees and UNRWA
Variables: o002, o144, o145, o146, o147.
METHODOLOGY
A representative sample of 1,499 Palestinians
over the age of 18, was interviewed face-to-
face in late February 2004. There was an over-
sampling of 299 cases in the areas that were
directly affected by the Wall. All the data in this
report are weighted so as to be representative
of the entire OPT. Only those crosstabulations
that involve the variable wall (area affected or
not affected by the Wall) are not weighted.
Nine-hundred and ten Palestinians were inter-
viewed in the  West Bank, ,, 439 in the Gaza
Strip and 150 in East Jerusalem.
The sampling and data collection was done by
JMCC in the same manner as in previous polls
(Bocco, Brunner and Rabah 2001a and 2001b;
Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001;
Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Lapeyre and Rabah
2002; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Lapeyre and
Rabah 2003).
Although each part of this report has its own
logic of analysis, all the questions of the poll that
were analyzed in this report were tested in their
relationship with eight important independent
variables. They are presented in the box to the
right. In addition to these standard
variables, another independent variable “wall” was utilized to distinguish
between the areas that were directly affected by the Wall that is currently
under construction by Israel and those not directly affected by the Wall.
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Results were systematically tested for statistical significance at a 95% confidence
level.1
On the http://www.dartmonitor.org website, the interested reader will find the
bivariate analysis between all of the dependent and the independent variables with
their level of statistical significance and the detailed number of cases. For this reason,
the numbers of cases (N) and significance levels have been omitted in this report.
Finally, whenever possible, consideration was given to data gathered in our previous
polls so as to analyze the evolution of conditions since the beginning of the second
Intifada. The reader will also find the frequencies and analysis for the previous polls on
the http://www.dartmonitor.org website.
Description of the explanatory variables
Palestinian society is rather unique because refugees constitute up to 50% of its
population. The territory is split between areas that are not geographically contiguous,
and this separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip renders coordination
and economic cooperation very difficult. This situation enforces a set of legal and
socio-economic struc-
tures that are not homog-
enous. The split between
the two areas and the
forced detachment of
Jerusalem from both of
them further compli-
cates efforts at attaining
a uniform system
essential prior to devel-
oping a viable and
efficient economic,
social, and political
system. In addition to
the damaging consequences of the occupation, other social and internal barriers such
as a very rapid population growth rate (around 6%) and a large number of dependent
children (almost 50% are below the age of fifteen) supplement the political difficulties
that characterize and influence the living conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip.
The use of nine explanatory variables for analysis in this report is intended to reflect
the specificities of the Palestinian population.
The Palestinians in the OPT are divided in three different areas: the West Bank, Jerusa-
lem, and the Gaza Strip. Place of residence, as shown in Figure 0.1, summarizes these
different geographical areas. Sixty-three percent of the respondents represented in
this poll are from the West Bank and Jerusalem, and 37% are from the Gaza
Strip.
1 For categorical or ordinal dependent variables we used Chi-square tests, for interval
variables one-way analysis of variance.
Figure 0-1: Place of residence (place)
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Figure 0-2: Refugee status
(o002 & o004)
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), more than two million
Palestinians live in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and more than one million in the Gaza
Strip. Refugees constitute approximately one-third of the West Bank population and
over 60% of the population in the Gaza Strip. The number of refugees residing in
camps is estimated at approximately half a million, of which about 130,000 live in 19
refugee camps in the West Bank, and about 370,000 reside in eight refugee camps in
the Gaza Strip.
As shown in Figure 0.2, of all respon-
dents, 45% said that they are refugees
or descendents of refugees; 54% stated
that they are neither refugees nor
descendents of a refugee family.
Throughout Palestine, the majority of
refugees (registered and unregistered)
live in the Gaza Strip (54%, see Figure
0.3). On the other hand, almost two-
thirds (65%) of non-refugees live in the
West Bank.
While 31% of all refugees live in camps, less than 1% of non-refugees do. In both
groups, one respondent out of ten lives in Jerusalem.
According to area of residence, a bit more than one half of our sample (55%, N=818)
live in cities, 16% (N=238) in refugee camps and 30% in villages (N=443).
In the November 2001 report, we introduced the poverty variable to highlight the
economic situation of the Palestinian households. Since November 2002, this variable
not only takes into account the reported income of the respondent’s household but
also the number of adults and children in the household.
In the present report, we use the third revision of the poverty variable. It is based on
the reported household income (o57) but takes into account the number of adults
(adults) and children (children) in the household. In November 2002, according to the
Figure 0-3: Place
of residence
(place)
by refugee
status (o002)
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PCBS figures, the average Palestinian household of two adults and four children was
considered to be below poverty line if its income was lower than NIS 1,600. If it was
lower than NIS 500, they were considered to be hardship cases. Since the PCBS
published a new poverty line at NIS 1,760 at the beginning of 2003, we adjusted to this
evolution: For the sixth poll, we consider the standard household to be below poverty
line if its income is less than NIS 1,760; for the 2002 and 2001 polls, the figures re-
mained unchanged1 in the third and fourth revision.
The evolution of poverty in the OPT can be seen in Figure 0.4. While the percentage of
those below the poverty line remained stable from 2001 to 2004, the percentage of
hardship cases increased in November 2002, then decreased back to its previous level
in July 2003, and increased slightly in February 2004.
This evolution of poverty will be analyzed more thoroughly in Part 2, but it is important
to note that this slight decrease in hardship cases is confirmed by many other ques-
tions of the poll: for example, while in November 2002 two-thirds (66%) of the respon-
dents said their income decreased during the previous six months (o108), this was the
case for only 45% in February 2004.
Education and gender will also be analyzed respectively in parts 7 and 8.
Figure 0-4: Poverty level (poverty3)
1 It must be noted though that, for November 2001, we only recently calculated the value
of poverty adjusted by household size. This is why it was not mentioned in that previous
report.
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From late July 2003 to late
February 2004, Palestinian
daily life in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (OPT)
was marked by the failure of
what became known as the
Roadmap, the international
peace initiative presented in
April 2003 by the “Quartet”
mediators (United States,
Russia, European Union and
the United Nations) and
adopted by the Palestinian
and Israeli governments in
June 2003. Following a spate
of incidents in August 2003 -
including the stakeholders’
inability to agree on the
terms for the handover of
four West Bank cities to
Palestinian security control,
suicide bombings in Israel
and targeted assassination
of Palestinian activists - the
cease fire came to an end.
While the Roadmap has continued to be endorsed internationally, it has gradually
been replaced de facto by an Israeli “unilateral disengagement” policy. Officially
presented by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a necessary step for ensuring the
security of the Israeli population, it has been pursued during the period under scru-
tiny, mainly through the erection of a series of walls, fences, military towers, ditches
and razor wire (hereafter referred to as the “Wall”) through the West Bank and
Jerusalem. In February 2004, Israel’s Likud government announced that it was consid-
ering dismantling most of the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip.
Using our survey and other empirical studies, this chapter will highlight the various
impacts of these events on the Palestinian population.1
The first section of the chapter deals with security issues throughout the OPT, focusing
on two trends: casualties incurred through death and injury, and material
damage to public and private property, including land confiscation.
1 Mainly drawn from the regular surveys carried out by the Palestine Red Crescent
Society (PRCS), the Palestine Monitor, Arij, the United Nations Relief Works Association
(UNRWA) and OCHA.
1 MOBILITY &
SECURITY
CONDITIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION
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The second section tackles the impact of the closure policy imposed by Israel, in both
its socioeconomic and humanitarian aspects.
The third section will discuss, as a case study, the impact of the Wall on the mobility,
morale and migration patterns of the Palestinian OPT population. It will also tackle the
regional dimension of the Wall by examining whether this new development further
encouraged West Bankers to emigrate to neighboring countries or elsewhere.
1.1 SECURITY ASSESSMENT
1.1.1 General feeling of insecurity
The worsening security situation after late July 2003, the date of the last survey,1 is
reflected in a higher percentage of interviewees who admit feeling insecure, up from
72% to 76%. While the West Bank remains in absolute terms the region where respon-
dents feel the most insecure, the increase was more marked in Gaza. This may be a
result of the Israeli military incursions that were taking place at the time of the inter-
views.
Against that background, local advocacy groups have continued to call for interna-
tional protection on behalf of the Palestinian population, arguing that humanitarian aid
alone cannot address Palestinians’ problems within the context of the uprising. These
calls have so far remained unanswered.2
Factors of insecurity relate to the rise in the number of casualties and of destruction of
property that occurred as a result of the escalation in the Intifada in August 2003.
Before looking into such factors, one should also mention the growing
sentiment of helplessness that has pervaded the Palestinian population as a
result of the weakened Palestinian National Authority (PNA) security appara-
1 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI.
2 See for instance BADIL’s press release, “Badil expert Seminar Discusses Urgent Need
to Protect Palestinian Refugees,” February 16, 2004.
Figure 1-1: Percentage of the population who feels insecure (o118)
by region, July 2003 - February 2004
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tus’ inability to enforce the rule of law. Family feuds, gang gunfights, beatings of
officials and other types of internecine violence have become commonplace in the
OPT areas formally under its jurisdiction, adding to the daily hardships caused by
Israeli military activities.1 However, as our survey shows, the PNA’s operational
inability to maintain public order is not seen as the main concern: only 7% thought it
was. Factors more worrying to our respondents were those pertaining to lack of good
governance such as corruption and unaccountability (35% of the sample), nepotism
(19% of the sample), inefficiency in the management of public affairs (11% of the
sample), and inability to deal with international security problems (10% of the
sample) (o178).
1.2 CASUALTIES
1.2.1 General figures
The number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces rose from nine in July 2003 to a
monthly average of 42 between August 2003 and February 2004, and a peak in
October 2003. During that month, 63 people were killed, mainly as a result of Israeli
military operations in the southern Gaza Strip.2 Still, the total number of Palestinians
killed over those six months - 252 people - remained significantly lower than during
the January - July 2003 period, when 444 people were killed (an average of 64 per
month).
The rate of injuries incurred by Palestinians within the context of the Intifada follows
the same pattern. According to Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) figures, the
number of injured Palestinians rose from 34 in July 2003 to a monthly average
of 217 between August 2003 and February 2004. The total number of injured
1 See Lara Sukhtian, “Vigilantes take control of West Bank Streets,” The Daily Star,
February 2004, p.2.
2 PRCS, The human suffering in Rafah continues, January 27, 2004, www.reliefweb.org.
Figure 1-2: Number of Palestinians killed, January 2003 - February 2004
Source: www.palestinercs.org
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1 See for instance Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, Report VI: 25.
2 Bomb fragments and shrapnel are subsumed as “miscellaneous” by the PCRS reports. By way of
comparison, in December 2001, the PCRS reported that injuries were caused more by non-lethal
devices, such as rubber bullets (32%) and tear gas (28%), than by shrapnel (19%) and live
ammunition (21%).
3 “Palestine Red Crescent Society Conflict Related Statistics”, www.palestinercs.org.
4 The Palestine Monitor figure includes as immediate cause of death: prevention of medical
treatment, and miscellaneous causes such as hit-and-run car accidents, stabbings, experiencing a
heart attack after an attack or causes listed as unknown.
5 “Palestinians killed”, www.palestinemonitor.org.
6 See Btselem website information on casualties (www.btselem.org). According to the
same source, 577 Israeli civilians have been killed by Palestinians since September
2000, 198 of them in the OPT (including East Jerusalem) and 377 within the Green Line.
The number of Israeli security forces personnel killed by Palestinians during the same
time frame amounts to 263, of which 183 were killed in the OPT (including East Jerusa-
lem).
Palestinians during the period under survey was 1,301, comparatively lower than the
1,856 injuries incurred between January and July 2003 (an average of 265 per month).
1.2.2 Causes of casualties
The major causes of injury during the August 2003-February 2004 period confirm the
advancing militarization of the Intifada that has been highlighted in previous reports.1
As shown in Figure 1.3 below, the bulk of the victims (about 80%) were injured after
being hit by miscellaneous war devices, such as bomb fragments and shrapnel (555
occurrences), and live ammunition (453 occurrences).2
Overall, the total number of
Palestinians injured from Septem-
ber 2000 to February 2004 were
24,451, of whom 27% were hit by
shrapnel and bomb fragments,
26% by live ammunition, 24% by
rubber bullets and 23% by tear
gas.3
Estimates of the total number of
Palestinians who were killed by
Israeli forces in the OPT since the
outbreak of the Intifada as of late
February 2004 range from a low
2,268 (PRCS figure) to a high 2,775
(Palestine Monitor figure).4
According to the Palestine Monitor, over 80% of the deaths were caused by live
ammunition from Israeli soldiers (88.6%), Jewish settlers (2%) and Israeli police/
citizens (1.1%).5
In addition, according to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories (Btselem), 48 Palestinians within Israel have been killed by Israeli
security forces since September 2000. None of these incidents took place during the
period from July 2003 to February 2004.6
Figure 1-3: Causes of injuries,
August 2003 - February 2004
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1.2.3 Places of casualties
As observed in our previous report for the period of January to July 2003,1 the killing
and injury of Palestinians occurred mostly in regions that were the focus of Israeli
military activity, namely the Gaza Strip (where 58% of the killed and 51% of the
injured were recorded) and the West Bank city of Nablus (where 17% of the killed and
26% of the injured were recorded).2 In these areas, casualties, curfews, destruction of
property and forced evacuations have put the population under heavy strain. Con-
versely, cities previously impacted by a high number of casualties, such as Qalqilya,
Salfit, Jerusalem and Jericho, came out this time relatively unscathed.
1.3 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND LAND CONFISCATION
This sub-section examines damage to Palestinian property caused by the Israeli
military’s major military incursions in the OPT. It does not, however, cover damage
caused by the erection of the Wall in western regions of the West Bank. All issues
related specifically to the Wall will be tackled in Chapter 1.5.
1.3.1 Damage to homes from Israeli military incursions
Estimates of economic damage inflicted by Israeli forces vary according to assump-
tions, methodology, definitions, time frames and availability of data. According to a
statement from the Auditing Bureau of the Islamic Development Bank in Palestine
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, total losses and damage
inflicted on Palestin-
ians (as individuals)
after three years of
Intifada amounted to
US$17,262,500.3
During the period
under scrutiny, most
destruction of prop-
erty took place during
two massive incur-
sions undertaken by
Israeli forces in Rafah
in the southern Gaza
Strip and the West
Bank city of Nablus.
In Nablus, the Israeli
military started
launching limited
incursions in mid-
1 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, Report VI: 23.
2  “Search Palestinian casualties database”, www:palestinercs.org/Database
3 Security Council S/2003/1072, November 11, 2003. This figure does not include the raw
physical damage resulting from the conflict, which jumped in estimates from US$305
million at the end of 2001 to US$930 million by the end of 2002 (The World Bank. Twenty-
seven Months of Intifada, Closures, and Palestinian Economic Crisis – An Assessment, May
2003).
Source: www.palestinercs.org
Figure 1-4: Number of Palestinians killed and injured
according to region,
August 2003 - February 2004
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December 2003. Following a suicide attack on December 25, 2003 in Petah Tikva
(north of Tel Aviv), Israel launched a full-scale operation described as one of the
largest military operations in Nablus since Operation “Defensive Shield” in the spring
of 2002.1 It ended 11 days later and resulted in heavy casualties (six Palestinians killed
and 50 injured) and the destruction of inhabited and historical buildings such as the
Qasr Abdel-Hadi. Overall, three homes were entirely destroyed, 35 residences ren-
dered uninhabitable, and tens of homes partially damaged by explosives or bulldoz-
ers. In addition, 20 to 25 families of the old city (in the Qarioun area) were forced to
flee because their homes were sealed or evacuated and used as military positions.
Another 70 families (400 people) were not allowed to leave their homes.2
In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military undertook two major military attacks, allegedly
for the purpose of unearthing weapons smuggling tunnels. From October 9 to 11,
2003, the Israeli military invaded Tel al-Sultan and the Rafah border (in the southern
Gaza Strip), demolishing or rendering uninhabitable 114 refugee shelters and 6
houses belonging to non-refugee families, and causing some form of damage to 117
other buildings.3 According to UNRWA’s first assessment, over 1,240 individuals were
made homeless as a result of this operation.4 In addition, the water and sanitation
networks were destroyed and many streets rendered unsuitable for travel, hindering
access to casualties and families requiring assistance.5
In the second half of February 2004, the Israeli military carried out a series of military
incursions in the Rafah area. Between January 17 and 22, it demolished entirely or in
part 72 homes, rendering 584 people homeless. These demolitions have led to the
creation of a “buffer zone” stretching several kilometers from the Rafah passenger
terminal to the east and down to the Mediterranean coast; in some places, that zone is
200 meters deep.6 Since October 2000, some 15,000 people have been made home-
less by Israeli military house demolitions. Two-thirds of those affected live in the Rafah
area.7
Aside from these large-scale demolitions, the Israeli military authorities and Jewish
settlers partially or totally damaged Palestinian houses and shelters on a semi-daily
basis. Various pretexts have been utilized to justify those actions: unlicensed dwell-
ings, “antiterrorism warfare”, retaliation, etc.8 In some cases, for example in the
Tulkarem refugee camp in February 2004, the Israeli military also took over inhabited
dwellings, turning them into military barracks.9
1 OCHA. Initial Report: Humanitarian Consequences of the IDF Operation in the Old City of Nablus,
February 6, 2004.
2 Ibid; and “Statistics on the Palestinian Intifada”, Palestine Monitor, February 5, 2004.
3 UNRWA press release, “UNRWA Completes its Assessment of Rafah Destruction,”October 13,
2003.
4 Ibid.
5 PCRS press release, “Palestine Red Crescent Society Responds to Humanitarian Emergency in
Rafah,” October 14, 2003. PCRS figures about physical damage differ from those provided by
UNRWA. According to the PCRS, 107 homes were completely destroyed, leaving 187 families
homeless, and 20 homes were partially destroyed, leaving 20 homes without shelter.
6 OCHA, Report to the LACC on humanitarian consequences of Israeli Defence Forces
operations in Rafah, Southern Gaza Strip, February 28, 2004,.
7 Ibid.
8 For a detailed overview of such attacks, see Applied Research Institute (ARIJ), Monthly
Reports on the Israeli Colonization Activities in the West Bank on the Arij website,
www.arij.org.
9 Arij, “Case Studies archives: February 2004”, www.poica.org.
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International relief and development organizations operating in the OPT have tried to
alleviate the resulting humanitarian crisis by providing immediate housing assistance.
However, that assistance has so far fallen short of meeting the needs of all the home-
less families. As the commissioner general of the United Nations Relief Works Agency
(UNRWA) put it at a UN meeting in November 2003, while major rehousing projects
were under construction in Jenin, Khan Younis and Rafah, the agency was unable to
keep pace with the rate of destruction. In 2002 and 2003, he said, 616 refugee shelters
were demolished in Gaza, and nearly 100 were demolished in the West Bank.1
1.3.2 Destruction of Agricultural Land
Destruction and confiscation of Palestinian land as a means of creating new and
extending existing Jewish settlements and their accompanying bypass roads and
security systems continued throughout the whole of the OPT during the period under
scrutiny outside the context of the construction of the Wall.
In February 2004 alone, in a spate of damage to private Palestinian agricultural lands
unrelated to the erection of the Wall, hundreds of dunums were razed either by the
Israeli military or Jewish settlers in the West Bank areas of Bethlehem (al-Khadr),
Nablus (Deir Balut, 15 dunums), Hebron (Yatta, over 1000 dunums, Idhna, 5 dunums;
Wad al-Nasara; Arab al-Ramadin, 150 dunums) and Jenin (not specified).2  Thousands
of olive and other fruit trees were razed, further aggravating the hardships of the
Palestinian peasantry.
In the Gaza Strip, the areas most affected by damage to lands were Deir al-Balah
(about 200 dunums), Khan Younis (45 dunums), Beit Lahya (tens of dunums), Khaz’a
(two dunums) and Rafah (not specified).3
1.4 THE IMPACT OF CLOSURES AND MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS
ON LIVELIHOOD
During the period under scrutiny, Israel has continued to implement its closure policy
in the OPT, which has resulted in various kinds of restrictions on Palestinian mobility.
This closure policy consists of:
Internal closure within the OPT, be it partial or total, in the form of a network of
military checkpoints, fixed or moving, manned or unmanned. The most severe form of
closure, i.e. curfews placed on the Palestinian population, has at times reinforced the
internal closure.
Total or partial external closure of the border between Israel and the OPT.
Partial external closure of international crossings between Gaza and Egypt, and
the West Bank and Jordan.
Since early November 2003, Israeli authorities have announced that, with the
exception of Jenin and Nablus, the Israeli military would ease restrictions on
movement in order to “preserve conditions for a normal way of life for
1 UN General Assembly; 30/10/2003, Fifty-eighth session, Fourth committee, 17th
meeting.
2 Arij, “Case Studies archives: February 2004”, www.poica.org.
3 Ibid.
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Palestinians who are not implicated in terrorist activities.” In late February 2004,
apparently bowing to US pressure, Israel “softened” the external closure between the
West Bank and Israel by allotting entry permits for between 9,000 and 12,000 West
Bank businessmen and workers (except those from the Jenin and Nablus regions). 1 All
in all, by March 2004 about 33,000 Palestinian workers were allowed to work in Israel,
that is 92,000 less than in January 2000 before the outbreak of the Intifada.2
Concerning the internal closure, observers noted that despite some limited improve-
ments in the southern West Bank and around Qalqilya and Tulkarem, the blockade of
Palestinian towns had not been significantly removed despite Israel’s announce-
ments.3 At best, Palestinians were allowed to pass freely through roadblocks (as in the
north of Ramallah) but the physical obstacles remained intact, and could be - and
actually were - reimposed at very short notice. Accordingly, the Palestinians were not
yet afforded the right to lead normal lives, including planning regular economic
activities or enjoying regular access to basic services.4 In September 2003, 25 foreign
non-governmental organizations, including ANERA, Care International, Save The
Children and World Vision, highlighted Israel’s contravention of key international laws
that were occurring as a result of restrictions on movement and access. They also
called for free and unrestricted movement for all.5
Furthermore, curfew has been frequently imposed on populations living in areas
where the Israeli military was conducting military operations. In Jenin, for example, the
city’s population was under curfew for more than one week in October 2003 after the
Israeli military moved into the city and its refugee camp upon learning the identity of
the Palestinian bomber that hit Haifa on October 4, 2003. Overall, according to the
Palestinian Center for Human Rights, the city most affected by curfews in the last 20
months (June 2002 - February 2004) has been Hebron, which was under curfew 40%
of the time (5,800 out of 14,257 hours) followed by Nablus (32%), Tulkarem (31%),
Jenin (26%), Bethlehem (18%), Ramallah (17%) and Qalqilya (15%).6
Life in the Gaza Strip has also disrupted by mobility restrictions imposed by the Israeli
military. The entire Gaza Strip is sealed off via an “electronic wall” which enforces the
external closure and virtually imprisons the Gaza Strip’s 1.2 million inhabitants. At
times, the Israeli authorities have allayed this external closure by allowing some 15,000
Gazans who possess the required pass documents to work in Israel. This measure has
generally been short-lived, and mobility restrictions re-established with the return of
tensions. Even when it is permitted, passage into Israel has continued to be a dreadful
experience, with workers waiting hours to pass through the extensive security checks.
Gazans were also affected by an internal closure regime. On the one hand, Israeli
checkpoints such those situated at Abu Huli-Gush Qatif (the only passable road
connecting the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip) were frequently closed,
1 “Israel reopens Gaza border crossing to Palestinian workers”, February 27, 2004, AFP.
2 European Institure for Research on Mediterranean and EuroArab Cooperation, Palestinian
Workers in Israel, June 2004, www.medea.be.
3 OCHA, Comment on Israel’s announcement that closure will be eased in the West Bank,
6 November 2003 and OCHA, “OCHA Humanitarian Update Occupied Palestinian
Territories 16 Dec. 2003 - 19 Jan. 2004,” February 19, 2004.
4 Ibid.
5 International aid agencies call for free and unrestricted movement for all,
www.reliefweb.int; September 28, 2003.
6 “Curfew Tracking days/hours by district”, www.palestinercs.org.
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thus disrupting all movement of people and goods. On the other hand, areas of the
Strip situated near Jewish settlements, such as the Mawasi enclave (population 5,000),
have experienced shortages of medication and restricted access to medical services
and schools outside of the enclave.1
The following subsections aim at determining the Palestinians’ own perceptions of their
mobility status during the period from August 2003 to February 2004, in light of
developments in Israel’s closure policy.
1.4.1 Palestinian perceptions of their mobility status
The slight relaxing of Israel’s closure policy has positively impacted on mobility in the
OPT. The percentage of interviewees and their families for whom restrictions on
mobility had created “a lot” of problems in the past six months decreased from 63% in
July 2003, when our last survey was conducted, to 59% in February 2004.
Conversely however, the percentage of interviewees stating that those restrictions
had affected them “a little” increased from 26% to 31%, while the percentage of
interviewees “not affected” decreased from 11% to 10% (o031). By and large, these
findings indicate that Israel’s closure policy during the period under scrutiny was less
harsh than in earlier stages of the Intifada, albeit simultaneously affecting greater
numbers of Palestinians.
On account of the higher number of roadblocks in the West Bank and the spectacular
expansion of the Wall, West Bankers seemed to be more affected by mobility prob-
lems. Indeed, 96% of West Bankers said that they experienced “a lot” or “a few
problems” in that respect, versus 81% in the Jerusalem area and 85% in Gaza who
experienced “a lot” or “a few problems”.
As highlighted in our previous surveys, the inhabitants of villages are those most
affected by restrictions on movement.2 In February 2004, 69% of villagers stated that
they had been affected “a lot” by mobility restrictions versus 56% of city inhabitants
and 52% of the camp dwellers who gave the same response.
1.7.1. The economic impact of closure on individuals
This survey found that access to places of employment had largely improved during
the period under scrutiny.3 The percentage of respondents who declared that they or
their family had found it difficult or very difficult to go to work decreased from 66% in
July 2003 to 47% in August 2004 (o114).
From a regional perspective, difficulty of physical access to respondents’ place of
employment remained significantly more acute in the West Bank than in the Gaza and
Jerusalem areas:
Despite this improvement of access to places of employment, Israel’s closure policy
continued to impact negatively on the economy of the OPT.
1 Ibid.
2 See for instance Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, Report VI: 15.
3 The overall socioeconomic impact of Israel’s closure policy on the economy will be
discussed at length in the chapter of the report on socioeconomic conditions.
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Figure 1-5: Mobility Restrictions
in the West Bank
Source: Applied Research Institute
Jerusalem, www.arij.org
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For example, the
inability to get to
their place of work
was the reason
given by a majority
(51%) of those who
admitted having
lost their jobs or
having to search for
new employment
(235 respondents in
total) in the past six
months, as the main
cause for the
negative change in
their employment status (o012 and o013).1 Likewise, problems related to mobility
restriction, such as difficulty arriving at work, inability to work because of curfew or to
market products in
particular areas, were all
major causes of losses
suffered by private
businesses in the six
months preceding our
survey.
As previously, internal
disruption of movement
and trade was worsened
by external closure of the
OPT’s borders from the
outside world. Access to
the Israeli labour market
remained limited to some
10,000-15,000 workers,
i.e. about 10% of the average number of work permits granted before the Intifada.
Jordan, fearing a new Palestinian exodus, continued to impose on West Bankers
restrictions on their entry in the Kingdom.2 On the more positive side however, the
Jordanian government announced in late December 2003, that it would exempt all
Palestinian products entering Jordan from paying customs. In addition, Palestinian
businessmen would be given VIP status for entering Jordan.3
1.4.2 Closure’s impact on humanitarian intervention
From July 2004 to February 2004, physical access to education, health, and relief
services provided by the Palestinian Authority and other local and international
agencies continued to be undermined by Israel’s closure policy, though to a
lesser extent than in earlier periods of the Intifada.
1 The same variable was at 56% in July 2003.
2 See Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, Report VI: footnote 11.
3 Jerusalem Times, December 25, 2003.
Figure 1-6: Percentage of time under curfew, according to West
Bank municipality, June 2002 - February 2004
Figure 1-7: Impact of mobility restrictions (o032),
July 2003 - January 2004
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1.4.2.1 Relief and health emergency aid
Our last report underscored the political dilemma inherent in relief assistance, namely
that international assistance on behalf of Palestinians living in the OPT could be de
facto construed
as relieving Israel
of its obligations
to provide for the
needs of Palestin-
ians under the
Fourth Geneva
Convention. To
add to the
dilemma, it was
becoming
obvious that
without political
solutions for
lifting the clo-
sures, curfews
and other
restrictions, relief
efforts could only have a limited impact, not least because those restrictions were also
affecting aid agencies’ ability to access needy communities. In this respect, OCHA
and the Palestine Red Crescent Society have continued to chronicle on a weekly basis
the numerous incidents of Israeli military denials and delays of access to medical
teams in the field. Delays usually range from 15 minutes to several hours (in one case
in the Balata refugee camp, medical teams waited seven hours for access on Decem-
ber 26, 2003).1
UNRWA has also
protested to the
Israeli military,
charging it with
serious breaches
of international
law, damage to its
installations
(mainly in the
southern Gaza
Strip) and the
forced entry of
UNRWA facilities.2
On one instance,
Israeli troops
made an incursion
into UNRWA’s Qalqilya hospital, resulting in the disruption of its medical
operations and raising the risk of cross-contamination in sterile areas.
1 See for instance the PRCS’s Weekly Press Releases on www.palestinercs.org and
OCHA’s Humanitarian Updates (Occupied Palestinian Territories) on www.reliefweb.int.
2 Twenty-third progress report October - December 2003, UNRWA, December 31, 2003.
Figure 1-8: Impact of mobility restrictions
(o032) by area of residence
Figure 1-9: Physical access to place of work (o114)
 according to region of residence
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1 “Aid gets political,” Christian Science Monitor, November 26, 2003.
In late 2003, the Interna-
tional Committee for the
Red Cross responded to
the dilemma of providing
aid in the context of
closure by ending the
food aid distribution
scheme it had launched
in mid-2002. The move, it
said, was an attempt to
get Israel to confront its
binding legal obligations
under international law.1
Still, regular complaints
leveled by Palestinians
and members of the
international community concerning Israel’s refusal to abide by the obligations of
occupying powers towards civilians (as stated in the Geneva Convention) have not
succeeded in improving the situation.
1.4.2.2 Education
Our survey found that students’ access to schools and universities had improved
during the period under scrutiny. The percentage of respondents who experienced
various degrees of difficulty in reaching educational facilities decreased by half, from
54% in July 2003 to 29% in February 2004 (o113). Logically, pupils in villages found it
most difficult to get to educational facilities but their conditions also improved: 38%
rather than the 68% recorded in July 2003 said it was difficult or impossible to attend
classes.
While relative improvement in access to educational facilities is a welcome develop-
ment, this improvement should not conceal the gravity of the broad condition of
education in the OPT. Having, as our survey found, approximately one-third of the
population finding it difficult to get access to educational facilities remains a serious
problems that may have serious consequences on the future of the OPT.
1.5 THE WALL AND MOBILITY: LOCAL AND REGIONAL
IMPACTS
Since its inception in June 2002, the Wall that Israel is constructing in the West Bank - a
barrier composed of a series of concrete walls, barbed wire, electrified fencing,
control towers and trenches in some places as wide as 25 meters - has caught the
attention of world media and diplomats.
Officially presented by Israel as a means of arresting Palestinian suicide
attacks, the Wall actually goes deep - at times as deep as six kilometers - into
Palestinian territory, de facto annexing the main West Bank Jewish settle-
ments and Palestinian agricultural land to Israel. Ninety percent of the Wall is
Figure 1-10: Impact of mobility restrictions on economic
activity: changes in employment status (o013)
 and difficulties faced by businesses (o140)
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located in West Bank territory. Once completed, the Wall’s current length of more than
160 kms will ultimately extend over 700 - 750 kms from the north-western Jenin-
Tulkarem-Qalqilya triangle down to the south of Hebron, directly encircling as many as
400,000 people (18% of the West Bank population) and indirectly impacting more
than double that number.1
Among the Wall’s disastrous socio-economic and political side-effects on the OPT
population are the following:
1.5.1 Land confiscation and destruction
The Wall has so far “appropriated” to Israel 107 sq. km (nearly 2% of the West Bank)
including 16 villages and 12,000 residents. Its construction has necessitated the
uprooting of over 100,000 olive and citrus trees and the demolition of 75 acres of
greenhouses and 23 miles of irrigation pipes. In addition, hundreds of buildings,
stores, factories and homes in areas adjacent to the Wall have been destroyed As a
result, the entire regional economy is now under jeopardy. A Palestinian official re-
cently stated that the West Bank city of Jenin was losing $US 4 million monthly due to
the construction of the Wall, and consequently was on the brink of catastrophe.2
1.5.2 Separation from land and resources
As of February 2004, the Wall had severed 115 communities from their land and
resources. Its construction had also isolated 36 groundwater wells and over 200
cisterns from their communities, with an additional 14 wells threatened for demolition.3
1.5.3 Job losses
The combined impact of land confiscation, the destruction of orchards, and restric-
tions on movement caused by the Wall is shrinking the job market for Palestinians and
further undermine their job status. In the Tulkarem area, for instance, unemployment
rates have risen from 18% in 2000 to 78% in 2003.4
1.5.4 Difficulty in accessing educational and health facilities
The Wall’s crippling impact on access to educational and health facilities has been felt
the hardest in Tulkarem, Qalqilya and East Jerusalem. Up to 71 primary health clinics
are gradually being isolated from the rest of the West Bank, although they are also not
fully equipped to serve communities in close proximity. In addition, according the PNA
Ministry of Education, around 3,000 students from the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarem
and Qalqilya are not able to continue their education as a direct result of the Wall.5
1.5.5 Other psychological and political ramifications
Aside from its specific social and economic impact, construction of the Wall has also
been observed as severely undermining the morale of the inhabitants of areas crossed
by the Wall.6 In this respect, separation from relatives and friends may have contrib-
1 Statistics on the Wall Barrier, www.btselem.org; and Palestine Monitor. Fact Sheet - Apartheid Wall”,
www.palestinemonitor.org.
2 Idem, and Jenin City Losses $7 Million a Month due to the Israeli Practices, Information
Palestinian Center (IPC), March 20, 2004.
3 Ibid., Palestine Monitor Fact Sheet.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 “The Psychological Implications of Israel’s Separation Wall on Palestinians,” Palestinian
Counseling Center (PCC).
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uted to worsening other accompanying psychological impacts of the Wall and its
physical effects. From a political perspective, the construction of the Wall seems to be
undermining the advent of a viable state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has also
contributed to spread in the OPT and in the neighboring Arab countries the fear that it
may well trigger a mass migration process to Jordan.
The following section aims at grasping Palestinians’ perceptions of the Wall, particu-
larly in relation to mobility issues. By using the variable of “residence in an area
crossed by the Wall” as the main independent variable, it also tackles the Wall’s
regional dimension and examines whether the Wall is inducing Palestinian emigration.
1.5.6 General perceptions of the Wall
A wide majority of 97% of our total sample expressed some concern about the Wall.
This concern was prevalent across all segments of the OPT population. Virtually all of
the respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall admitted being concerned (90%)
or rather concerned (10%). Percentages of respondents not residing in areas crossed
by the Wall were lower but significant - 80% said they were concerned and 18% said
they were rather concerned (o165). Respondents living in Jerusalem were the most
concerned, ahead of West Bankers and Gazans.
The higher of degree of concern among Jerusalemites may explained by the fact that
construction the Wall near Jerusalem was underway when the survey took place,
whereas sections in the West Bank had already been officially completed (see Map I
which tracks Phase I in the West Bank and Phase II in Jerusalem). Responses from
Gaza Strip respondents may result from two factors. Gazans are certainly concerned
over a scheme that
deeply harms their fellow
countrymen and, more-
over, undermines the
state formation process
in the OPT as a whole.
Gazans’ concern may
also stem from their own
experience of the wall
that surrounds the Gaza
Strip, a border control on
the Strip’s boundaries
imposed by the Israeli
military. In addition, a
new 55 km-long electrified barrier is also been planned for Gaza. Some 10 km of that
fence have already been constructed.1
1.5.7 Insecurity and mobility perceptions: towards a “Wall areas status”
This survey highlights the increased hardships faced by the OPT population living in
areas crossed by the Wall, as compared with the rest of the population. It also
underscores the emergence of a new underprivileged segment of the OPT
community, the “Wall people.” This comparative disadvantage is already
clear regarding heightened feelings of insecurity.
1 Fact Sheet - Apartheid Wall, www.palestinemonitor.com.
Figure 1-11: Concern over the Wall (o165) by region
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This heightened feeling of insecurity appears to reflect a comparatively higher
incidence of problems of mobility for the respondents living in close proximity to the
Wall. Overall, 79% of them admit encountering “a lot” of problems of mobility versus
57% of respondents residing in other areas. More precisely, 75% of them found it
difficult or almost impossible to get to their place of work and 67% suffered losses in
their businesses due to an inability to work under Israeli-imposed curfew. By compari-
son, in areas not crossed by the Wall, 43% of respondents found it difficult or almost
impossible to get to their place of work, and 48% suffered losses in their businesses
due to curfew (o140). Likewise, respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall
reported comparatively more problems in getting access to social services. The
percentage of them who needed hospitalization and ambulance services, but were
denied such services or obtained them after delay, was over twice that of respondents
not living in areas crossed by the Wall. The same disadvantage is apparent in reported
access to educational services.
The socioeconomic repercussions of decreased mobility for inhabitants of areas
crossed by the Wall will be discussed at length later in this report. Suffice it to say that
only 21% of these respondents believed they could sustain themselves financially for
“as long as it takes” - half of those who said the same among other OPT residents.
1.5.8 Scaling problems caused by the Wall
In the opinion of our respondents, what are the main problems caused by Israel’s
construction of the Wall? “Separation from relatives” was named as the main problem
created by the construction of the Wall, and this problem was named well ahead of the
increased price of goods, agricultural problems or forced displacement.
These findings reflect the
situation as it stood in early
2004, and therefore must be
interpreted with care. The
lower percentages ascribed to
agricultural factors such as
separation from water, diffi-
culty in farming or inability to
market agricultural produce
may only indicate that farmers
who could not work on their
lands anymore, especially in
the Jenin-Tulkarem-Qalqilya
triangle where construction of
the Wall was completed early,
had already abandoned agricultural work. As to forced displacement (within the
OPT), one may believe that its choice as the least important result reflects some
degree of “steadfastness” or a Palestinian attachment to the land. This may also
indicate, however, that displacement is not, or is no longer, a practicable
option, or that most displaced have already emigrated abroad (see section
1.5.4).
Figure 1-12: Feeling of security (o118) by Wall
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1.5.9 The Wall as a factor in emigration
Since the start of the Intifada in September 2000, fears have been expressed in the
OPT and the Arab world that the worsening of Palestinian living conditions may lead to
a now exodus from the
OPT to neighboring
countries like Jordan,
where many OPT
residents have relatives,
or elsewhere. That
nightmare scenario has
prompted Jordanian
authorities to impose
since 2001 restrictions
on the entry of OPT
residents.1 Since the
construction of the Wall
and the subsequent
worsening of conditions
in the West Bank,
Jordanians’ fears have
been heightened.
As such, the question must be asked: has the construction of the Wall affected emigra-
tion patterns? At the end of 2001, our survey had found that 8% of the respondents
had an immediate family member who had emigrated abroad. While less than 10% of
respondents were seri-
ously thinking of emigra-
tion, nearly twice that
number stated they may
possibly emigrate in the
future.2 The February 2004
survey shows that this
picture has not changed
significantly. The percent-
age of respondents with
an immediate family
member that had emi-
grated increased slightly
to 9%, but respondents
thinking of emigration in
the future decreased to
7% and 16% respectively
(o094).
Figure 1-13: Problems of mobility
(o031, o114, o140e, o113a, o102b) according to the Wall
1 Kamal Dorai, Jalal Al Husseini and Jean-Christophe Augé, “De l’émigration au
transfert? Réalités démographiques et craintes politiques en Jordanie,” Revue Maghreb-
Machrek, N°176 (été 2003): 75-92.
2 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, and Rabah, Report III: 36.
Figure 1-14:Percentage of the population who report
various problems created by the Wall (o164)
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As to the specific impact of the Wall on emigration patterns, the survey shows that the
independent variable “area crossed by the Wall” is not conclusive for analyzing
migration patterns.1 This is also the case for the “poverty status” independent vari-
able, which reflected that
the poor and non-poor
share similar perceptions
and practice about
emigration. This was not
the case at the end of
2001, when our survey
found that rich Palestin-
ians more often had
relatives that had emi-
grated, but that the
poorest Palestinians
thought more seriously of
leaving.2
Again, this status quo
may be interpreted as
reflecting either stead-
fastness or the lack of
emigration options. The
latter hypothesis is supported somewhat by respondents’ answers when asked their
choice of country of emigration. Probably due to restrictions imposed by the Jordanian
and Egyptian authorities on the entry of Palestinians, emigration (or future emigration)
has since the beginning of the Intifada mainly targeted Europe and the United States,
which are relatively difficult countries to emigrate to, requiring social networks and
enhanced financial means.
1 Chi2 > 0.5 for all question related to emigration.
2 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, and Rabah, Report III: 37.
Figure 1-15: Preferred area for emigration,
December 2001 - February 2004
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2.1 MAIN RESULTS
2.1.1 Objective and subjective
poverty
Since our most recent survey, Israeli
military forces have undertaken re-
peated incursions into the Gaza Strip that
have restricted the population’s mobility,
destroyed civilian property and eco-
nomic capabilities, and introduced new
higher levels of violence.
This study’s results show a severe
deterioration of the business environ-
ment in the Gaza Strip since July 2003. In
the West Bank, the situation has slightly improved - especially inside refugee camps -
but the series of walls, fences, barbed wire, patrol roads and electronic monitors that
Israel is building in the West Bank (hereafter the “Wall”), is a growing problem for
businesses in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) remains widespread, with 56% of
the population being poor and 23% of the population being extremely poor. The
overall poverty and extreme poverty rates remained almost the same, as compared to
the rates in July 2003. But the Wall has impacted levels of poverty in the OPT. The
poverty rate among respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall was significantly
higher than the average poverty rate in the OPT (65% as compared to 56%).
The poverty rate is much higher in the Gaza Strip region, affecting 70% of the popula-
tion there as compared with 54% of West Bankers and 15 % of East Jerusalem resi-
dents. Moreover, the difference between the Gaza Strip and West Bank regions can be
seen in the depth of poverty as well as the proportion of residents who are poor. In
Gaza, 35% of those surveyed were extremely poor, as compared with 18% of those
surveyed in the West Bank and 2% in East Jerusalem.
While the rate of poverty remains relatively low in East Jerusalem, it is an escalating
phenomenon, gradually rising from 9% in November 2002 to 12% in July 2003 to the
most recent rate of 15% in February 2004. Moreover, poverty and extreme poverty is
very likely underestimated in East Jerusalem as a result of the poverty line chosen.
Indeed, 48% of East Jerusalem respondents reported that their income is much less
than required. This self-assessment of poverty has risen significantly from the
35% of respondents who reported the same in July 2003.
One striking finding of this survey is the sharp deterioration of the material
situation of residents of Gaza Strip refugee camps where the percentage of
extremely poor increased from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February
2  SOCIO-
ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
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2004. This means that that rate of extreme poverty in Gaza Strip refugee camps is now
more than twice that of the average rate in the Occupied Territories as a whole.
In contrast, among Gaza Strip residents not living in refugee camps the poverty rate
and the extreme poverty rate decreased from 75% to 67% and 34% to 29%, respec-
tively.
In the West Bank, the number of poor outside refugee camps remained the same,
while the number of poor inside the camps decreased significantly. Since July 2003,
the poverty rate inside West Bank camps decreased from 66% to 55%. This positive
trend appears to have mostly benefited the poorest West Bankers, as the rate of
extreme poverty in West Bank refugee camps dropped from 28% to 16%.
In that context, it is no surprise that the percentage of respondents in West Bank
refugee camps who said they were in “serious” condition and did not know how to
make ends meet decreased from 23% to 5%. The economic situation remains precari-
ous, nevertheless, given that the proportion of those who “can barely manage” in West
Bank refugee camps increased from 30% to 49% during the same period.
An analysis of poverty rates according to refugee status indicates that refugees are
experiencing a higher rate of poverty than non-refugees, at 60% compared to 53%.
But the level of extreme poverty between the two groups remains very similar, with
22% of non-refugees and 24% of the refugees reporting income levels of extreme
poverty.
When compared to our July 2003 survey, the poverty rate among non-refugees has
increased from 51% to 53%, including a significant increase from 19% to 22% in the
proportion of extremely poor. The poverty rate among refugees decreased from 66%
to 60% since July 2003, including a decline in the proportion of extremely poor from
30% to 24%.
2.1.2 Coping strategies
Significantly, less than half of respondents in our survey reported that they still have
means of relieving their hardship and one-fourth of respondents reported that their
means will be exhausted soon.
Moreover, the results indicate that only 40% of the poor (excluding the extremely
poor) and 30% of the extremely poor report still having available means to relieve
hardship, while 32% of both groups reported that their means would be exhausted
soon.
The significance of this finding is that a continuation of the current situation will lead to
dramatic new pressures on those providing humanitarian assistance as the
population’s coping strategies are progressively exhausted.
For example, savings are gradually depleted and subsequently less impor-
tant as a coping strategy with the prolonging of the socio-economic crisis.
Our survey shows that among the extreme poor, the proportion of those who
are using savings to manage their hardship has decreased from 77% to 52%
between July 2003 and February 2004.
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Land cultivation is another important method that has been used to cope with material
deprivation. Twenty-two percent of respondents reported using this strategy. Still, land
cultivation is a strategy used mostly in the West Bank, outside refugee camps, where
34% of respondents reported its use, as compared with 18% in the Gaza Strip outside
camps.
Finally, this survey indicates that 57% of the extremely poor have the sense that their
household is in about the same financial straights as the people of their community
and only 39% think that their household is in a worse situation. When compared with
the findings of July 2003, there is a significant decrease in the proportion of extremely
poor respondents stating that they were in a worse situation than the other people of
their community - from 45% to 39%.
Thus, the growing discontent of the poorest regarding their household’s financial
situation as compared to the rest of their community that was identified in the July
2003 survey has been reversed. And the risk of social fragmentation and social
conflict which may have been aggravated by the persistence of this trend is now less
important.
2.2 BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Mobility restriction, destruction of economic facilities, mass poverty and a high level of
violence and incertitude have all contributed to a severe economic depression in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, which has had dramatic consequences for the
business sector. The private sector’s ability to run businesses and create wealth has
been greatly reduced due to lack of access to domestic and export markets; increas-
ing transportation costs; shortages in raw material; decreasing demand; and the
inability to work or to cultivate land. In this context, private investment has nearly
vanished and the potential for development has been reduced.
Among survey respondents, 41% reported that their business had suffered due to
inability to market their products. In villages, this problem is most severe, with 51% of
village residents emphasizing it over other difficulties. Forty percent of city residents
cited the inability to market products, while only 27% of refugee camps cited this
hardship.
This result reflects a slight deterioration since July 2003 when 38% of all respondents
said that they were unable to market their products. The main factor explaining this
change is the severe deterioration of the business environment in the Gaza Strip
region.
Overall, there are signs that the socio-economic situation in the West Bank has im-
proved. The rate of respondents reporting an inability to market products decreased
from 54% to 49% since July 2003. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, there
has been a deterioration: 21% in July 2003 reported an inability to market
products, as compared with 37% today. In East Jerusalem, the situation has
not changed.
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West Bank refugee
camps show the
most improvement,
with the proportion
of respondents
reporting some
inability to market
products dropping
from 44% to 27%
since our last survey.
Outside the refugee
camps, this de-
creased to a lesser
degree, from 55% to
51%. In the Gaza
Strip, on the other
hand, the percentage of respondents reporting some inability to market products has
increased sharply from 25% to 41% among those residing outside refugee camps,
and from 14% to 28% inside refugee camps.
In another indication of the slightly improved West Bank business climate, the propor-
tion of respondents reporting business decline due to an inability to repay bank loans
decreased from 36% to 25% between July 2003 and February 2004.
Still, our results
indicate that business
investment during the
second Intifada has
been very low. Overall,
only 10% of respon-
dents reported
investing in business
activities. This rate is
higher for the respon-
dents who reside in the
West Bank outside
refugee camps (at
13%), whereas 5% of
refugee camp resi-
dents in the West Bank
and in the Gaza Strip
reported new investments. Nine percent of those living outside Gaza Strip refugee
camps reported investing in business activities. It is also interesting to note the very
low level of business investment in East Jerusalem since the start of the second
Intifada. Only 7% of respondents from that region reported some business
investment.
Others results reflect the growing difficulties of doing business in the Gaza
Strip. For example, the percentage of respondents in the West Bank who
stated that their business suffered due to difficulties in buying raw materials
Figure 2-1: Business decline due to inability to market
products to areas (o140a) according to place of residence,
July 2003 - February 2004
Figure 2-2: Business decline due to difficulties in buying raw
materials or products (o140b) according to place of
residence, July 2003 - February 2004
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or products decreased
from 58% to 50%, as
compared with 22% to
17% in Jerusalem, and
an increase from 26%
to 37% in the Gaza
Strip. The most
marked improvement
in the regard was
found in the West Bank
refugee camps where
the percentage of
respondents reporting
difficulties in buying
raw materials or
products dropped from 49% to 32%. In contrast, a growing number of Gaza Strip
residents reported difficulties in buying raw materials or products; outside refugee
camps, the percentage of respondents increased from 31% to 41%, inside refugee
camps the percentage increased from 16% to 28%.
Mobility restrictions affecting access to the workplace was one of the main problems
confronting the business sector in previous surveys; it was especially an acute prob-
lem in the West Bank. The results of this survey show that this has improved. The
proportion of respondents stating that business declined due to problems in getting to
the workplace decreased from 67% in July 2003 to 50% in January 2004. This overall
showing results from a very impressive drop in the number of West Bank respondents
reporting that problem (a decline in percentage from 80% to 58%).
This trend was very pronounced both inside and outside the refugee camps of the
West Bank. The percentage of respondents stating that business suffered due to
mobility restrictions
also decreased in East
Jerusalem from 38% to
24%, and in the Gaza
Strip both outside
refugee camps from
(59% to 49%) and
inside the refugee
camps (from 53% to
39%).
Curfews were less a
problem for business
than before as the
percentage
of respon-
dents who named it as a problem decreased from 52% to 35% between July
2003 and February 2004. This evolution is a sign of the softening of the curfew
regime in the West Bank. Broken down by place of residence, the proportion
of respondents who stated their business suffered due to inability to work
because of curfews decreased from 83% to 54% in the West Bank outside
Figure 2-3: Business decline due to problems in reaching the
workplace (o140c) according to places of residence
Figure 2-4: Business suffered due to inability to work
because of curfews (o140e) according to place of
residence, July 2003 - February 2004
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refugee camps and from 66% to 45% inside refugee camps. The situation has also
slightly improved in the other places where the curfew regime was less severe such as
in Jerusalem and outside refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it has
slightly worsen in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
The Wall is a growing problem for businesses in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. It has
created obstacles for marketing agricultural products, especially for respondents
from the West Bank who live outside refugee camps. Thirty-nine percent said that the
Wall was a problem in marketing produce.
The results also demonstrate that the Wall has resulted in increased prices for material
and transport. About 45% of West Bank respondents outside refugee camps, and
Jerusalem resident, emphasized this problem. Moreover, villages had the largest
percentage of respondents (nearly half as compared to 31% in the cities) who empha-
sized increasing prices for material and transportation related to the Wall. The main
victims of this situation are the producers in the area crossed by the Wall who have to
pay a higher price for their inputs and consumers who have to pay higher prices for
food.
Among many other problems, access to water seems to be a major concern in the
West Bank; 29% of respondents living outside refugee camps stated that the Wall
severed their access to water. In conclusion, 37% of West Bank respondents living
outside the refugee camps declared that agriculture was now difficult or
impossible as a result of the Wall.
Another important economic finding was the sharp increase in the percent-
age of respondents who reported business losses as a result of damage to
agricultural lands. Thirty-six percent of respondents in February 2004 cited
this problem as compared to 27% in July 2003.
Figure 2-5: The Wall: difficulties in operating business in the agriculture sector (o164)
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This problem was
especially pro-
nounced and had
taken an upward
turn in areas
outside refugee
camps both in the
West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. But
the deterioration
was more severe
in the Gaza Strip,
where those who
cited business
losses as a result
of damage to agricultural land increased from 27% to 42% (as compared to an
increase from 36% to 44% in the West Bank). The results also indicate a significant
increase in the percentage of respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps who
emphasized damage to agriculture lands as a problem for business.
2.3 POVERTY: CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS
2.3.1 Material deprivation
Poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories remains widespread, with 56% of the
population falling under the poverty line. The overall poverty rate remained almost the
same as that in July 2003. These results show that the signs of poverty alleviation that
appeared after June 29 (see Report 6), 2003 dissipated with the return of high levels of
violence and Israeli military operations, especially in the Gaza Strip. The rate of
extreme poverty also remained nearly the same between July 2003 and February
2004, while it had dropped from 28% to 24% between November 2002 and July 2003.
Poverty in the OPT has special features related to region, refugee status, education,
employment, gender and other variations. Some of these issues will be analyzed in
detail in other chapters of this report. We will focus here on general trends regarding
poverty in the OPT.
Figure2- 6: Business suffered due to damage to agriculture lands
(o140f) according to place of residence
Figure 2-7:
Evolution
of poverty,
2002-2004
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One must first
highlight strong
differences in
poverty levels
according to
region. For
example, the
poverty rate is
much higher in
the Gaza Strip
region (at 70%)
than in the West
Bank (at 54%)
and East Jerusa-
lem (at 15%).
Moreover, the differences visible between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are also
characterized by the depth of poverty. In the Gaza Strip, the rate of extreme poverty is
35%, as compared to 18% in the West Bank.
The poverty
rate is relatively
low in East
Jerusalem, but
follows an
ascending
trend, increas-
ing from 9% in
November
2002 to 12% in
July 2003, and
reaching 15%
in February
2004.
A more detailed poverty analysis, according to place of residence, shows that the
highest levels of poverty are found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, where the poverty
rate is 78% as compared to 67% outside Gaza Strip refugee camps, 54% outside
West Bank refugee camps and 55% inside West Bank refugee camps.
A striking result of this survey is the sharp deterioration of the material conditions of
the residents of Gaza Strip refugee camps where the proportion of the extremely poor
increased from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February 2004. This deterioration
means that the extreme poverty rate in the Gaza Strip refugee camps is now more than
two times higher than the average rate in the OPT as a whole.
One of the main reasons for this trend is the resumption and escalation of
Israeli military activity in the Gaza Strip region after August 2003. However,
the subsequent deterioration of conditions only seemed to affect the refugee
Figure 2-8: Poverty according to region of residence
Figure 2-9: Poverty according to place of residence,
July 2003 - February 2004
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camp inhabitants. Outside the refugee camps, the poverty rate and extreme poverty
rate have actually decreased since our last study from 75% to 67% and 34% to 29%,
respectively.
This comparative difference can be explained by the fact that Israeli security forces
undertook in the interim between our studies repeated incursions in the southern Gaza
Strip in a concentrated area of refugee camps. The result has been greater restrictions
on mobility, destruction of civilian property and economic facilities, and added
obstacles before the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, material depriva-
tion is now affecting significantly more people and in a more acute way inside rather
than outside Gaza refugee camps.
In the West Bank, the poverty rate among those living outside the refugee camps
remained the same, while conditions inside the refugee camps improved very signifi-
cantly. Inside the camps, the poverty rate decreased from 66% in our July 2003 study
to 55% in February 2004. Further, this positive trend benefited mainly the poorest
residents, as the rate of extreme poverty dropped from 28% to 16% over the same
time.
There are several
possible explana-
tions for these
trends. In the West
Bank, Israeli military
activity was less
intense and curfews
imposed less
frequently than in
2002 or in the first
semester of 2003.
Therefore, West
Bank refugee camp
inhabitants may have had easier access to income-generating activities. Another
factor that might explain this 50 percent reduction in the number of extremely poor is
the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance agencies in targeting the poorest and
improving their material conditions. The results for the West Bank show that the
poverty rate is about the same inside and outside refugee camps but that extreme
poverty is now affecting a higher proportion of people outside than inside those
camps. This finding is particularly important as aid agencies continue to try to extend
humanitarian assistance towards the poorest Palestinians.
Universally throughout the OPT, refugee camp inhabitants are substantially more poor
than those living in cities or villages. Rates of poverty and extreme poverty in the
refugee camps are 75% and 42%, respectively, as compared to 57% and 24% in
cities.
Comparatively, villages have the lowest rate and least depth of poverty: the
average rate of poverty is 55%, while extreme poverty measures at 17%. The
main explanation for this is a high level of self-sufficiency in rural areas
attained through subsistence farming.
Figure 2-10: Poverty according to area of residence
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When compared
with our July 2003
study, the propor-
tion of extremely
poor villagers
decreased slightly
from 21% to 17%,
whereas the
proportion of
extremely poor
refugee camp
residents increased
sharply, likely as a
consequence of the
deterioration in
Gaza refugee
camps mentioned
above. Conditions
in the cities remained approximately the same over time.
The Wall has also had a notable impact on  poverty in the OPT. The poverty rate among
respondents in areas intersected by the Wall (at 65%) was significantly higher than
the average for the OPT as a whole (at 57%).
When analyzing poverty according to refugee status,1 the rate of poverty among
refugees was higher than that of non-refugees; 60% compared to 53%. However, the
level of extreme poverty is very similar between the two, found at a rate of 22%
among non-refugees and 24% among refugees.
When compared to conditions in July 2003, these results show that the poverty rate has
increased slightly for non-refugees from 51% to 53%. As well, the proportion of
extremely poor among non-refugees increased from 19% to 22% since July 2003. By
comparison, the poverty rate for refugees decreased from 66% to 60% and the rate of
extremely poor among refugees decreased from 30% to 24% over time.
Figure 2-12:
Poverty
according to
refugee
status,
July 2003 -
February
2004
1 Not all Palestinian refugees in the OPT live in refugee camps.
Figure 2-11 : Poverty in areas crossed by the Wall
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This, too, is another
indication of how
humanitarian
assistance might be
better targeted to
reach the poorest
Palestinians.
Finally, the results of
our study show a
direct correlation
between levels of
education and the
risk of poverty. This
correlation is clearest
among those with a
high level of education, where the risk of falling into poverty and extreme poverty is
substantially lower than groups with other levels of education.
2.3.2 Household’s income evolution
Household income distribution as a whole has changed very slightly between July
2003 and February 2004. In our study, respondents were asked to evaluate their
economic situation by placing their monthly income in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) on a
scale. One of the main changes in this study was that the middle income group with a
monthly income of NIS 1,600 - NIS 3,000 decreased in size from 44% to 40%. This
change did not translate into an increase of the low income group (less than NIS 1,600
a month) but rather in an increase from 13% to 17% of the high income group
(monthly income ranging between NIS 3,000 - NIS 5000). Moreover, the percentage of
the very low income group (less than NIS 500 a month) decreased slightly during the
same period from 9% to 8%.
An examination of household income distribution according to place of residence
offers additional information about the dynamic of changes in income distribution. The
most favorable changes took place in West Bank refugee camps where the proportion
Figure 2-14:
Household
income
evolution
(o108),
July 2003 -
February 2004
Figure 2-13: Poverty according to level of education
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of the low-income group (monthly income of less than NIS 1,600) decreased from 55%
to 37%, whereas the proportion of the middle-income group (monthly income from
NIS 1,600 to 3,000) increased from 30% to 53%.
Nevertheless, this positive evolution only benefited the upper fringe of the low income
group (those with a monthly income from NIS 500 - NIS 1,600) and was associated
with an increase of the proportion of households in the very lowest income group
(monthly income less than NIS 500) , which increased from 5% to 9% over time.
One the other hand, household income has deteriorated greatly in Gaza refugee
camps where the proportion of the low-income group (monthly income from NIS 1,600
to less than NIS 500) increased from 49% to 55% as a result of the increase in the
percentage of the lowest income group (less than NIS 500 a month) from 11% to 16%.
These results are a complete reversal of a trend noted in our previous survey, where
the lowest household income group in Gaza refugee camps decreased in percentage,
and the low income group in West Bank refugee camps increased in percentage.
All these results show the importance of guaranteeing households’ access to decent
income as a means of preventing poverty. Where the households’ income has deterio-
rated, as in the Gaza refugee camps, poverty and extreme poverty have increased
sharply.
The prevailing public perception among Palestinians is that their household income
has not improved over the past six months, and that conditions continue in a very
negative vein. Nearly half of respondents declared that their household’s income has
remained the same, while 45% said that it has decreased. In July 2003, by
comparison, 52% of respondents declared that their household income has
remained the same, while 42% said it had worsened. Therefore, for a very
large and growing part of the population, the feeling is that their income is
worsening.
Figure 2-15: Household income evolution (o108) according to place of
residence, July 2003 - February 2004
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In particular, it was the
poor and especially the
extremely poor who felt
that the income of their
household had de-
clined in the past six
months. Indeed, among
the extremely poor
71% reported that their
household income had
decreased, whereas
only 27% of those
above the poverty line
said the same. The
results indicate a
strong feeling of
income deteriora-
tion among the
extremely poor in
February 2004, as
compared to July
2003 when 83% of
respondents
stated that their
income remained
the same. Still,
there are some
signs of stabiliza-
tion for those
above the poverty
line.
When respondents were asked why their household income had decreased, they most
often responded with reasons related to the labor market. This issue will be analyzed
extensively in Chapter 3, but it is interesting to emphasize here that 29% of respon-
dents declared that income loss was the result of job loss, whereas 25% emphasized a
Figure 2-16: Household income in the past 6 months
(o108), July 2003 - February 2004
Figure 2-18: Main
cause of income
decline (o109),
 July 2003 - February
2004
Figure 2-17: Household income evolution in the past 6 months
(o108) according to poverty
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loss in working hours,
and 10% mentioned
damage to business or
land. When compared
to our July 2003 survey,
the results show an
important decrease in
the rate of respondents
giving job loss as the
main cause of their
income loss, and a
sharp increase in those
who named damage to
business or land, or
other causes.
Figures 2.19 and 2.20
show a great diversity
in responses to this
question, when divided
by poverty level and place of residence. Job loss was named as the cause of the
income loss for 44% of the extremely poor, whereas it was the cause for income loss
for only 19% of both the non-poor and the poor (excluding the extremely poor). For
the two later groups, the main cause was a decline in working hours: 23% of non-poor
reported this cause, and 30% of the poor also concurred. When compared to July
2003, the main change has been a great decline in the extremely poor who reported
job loss as a cause
of income decline.
This group
decreased
proportionally
from 71% to 44%,
while the same
group among the
poor (excluding
the poorest)
decreased from
48% to 19%.
In both the Gaza
Strip and West
Bank refugee
camps, job loss
was clearly
considered the
main cause of income decline by 52% of Gaza Strip respondents and 39% of
West Bank respondents. Loss in working hours was the other main cause for
income loss for 22% of Gaza Strip refugee camp residents and 28% of West
Bank refugee camp residents. Outside refugee camps in both the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank, job loss and working hour loss were seen as equally
important but damage to business or land also played a significant role for
Figure 2-19: Main cause of income decline (o109)
according to poverty
Figure 2-20: Main cause of income decline (o109)
according to place of residence
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13% and 10% of the respondents, respectively. Interestingly, 10% of the respondents
in Gaza refugee camps named damage to business or property as the cause for
income loss, while only 3% of their West Bank counterparts said the same.
The survey’s results indicate a sharp decrease in the incidence of job loss as a factor in
income loss in the Gaza Strip both inside refugee camps and outside them. Between
July 2003 and February 2004, the rate of respondents that were emphasizing job loss
as the main cause of income decline has dropped from 72% to 52% inside refugee
camps and from 54% to 22% outside refugee camps. In the West Bank among non-
refugee camp residents, this rate has also decreased sharply from 44% to 26%,
whereas it has not changed among refugee camp residents.
2.3.3 Subjective poverty
Poverty has been defined in our study according to an objective poverty line (a
monthly income of NIS 1,900 for a family with two adults and four children). The
purpose of this section is to give additional information on the respondents’ perception
of their material living conditions. This method gives a voice to the people, as they are
ask to assess for themselves the magnitude of material deprivation that is affecting
their lives.
In order to get this information, respondents were asked to estimate the average
amount of money they need to meet the basic necessities of their household. This
average differs by region of residence, reported as NIS 2,544 in the West Bank and
NIS 2,746 in the Gaza Strip. East Jerusalem respondents gave a much higher average
monthly cost of basic needs due to a much higher cost of living.
Once the respondents estimate what they need to meet the basic needs of their
household, it is then possible to define a subjective financial satisfaction poverty line. It
is important to emphasize that respondents do not tend to exaggerate the minimum
amount they require, but report what they consider a decent income for making ends
meet. Because the official poverty line for the OPT is set at a relatively low level, it is
only logical that the subjective poverty line is on average higher. By gathering this
information, we learn that the perception of poverty among the public is more wide-
spread than the picture offered by official poverty statistics.
Sixty-six percent of
respondents reported
that their income was less
than the minimum
amount they required to
meet basic needs, and
39% thought their
income was much less
than required. Overall,
the perception
of material
deprivation in
February 2004
was not as
severe as that of July 2003 when 50% of respondents stated that their
household income was much less than the minimum amount needed.
Figure 2-21: The average amount needed by the
household to meet basic needs (o040)
according to region of residence
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Meanwhile, the
proportion of
those who stated
that their house-
hold income was
slightly less than
the minimum
amount needed
increased from of
23% to 27%.
Those who
reported that
their household
income was
slightly higher
than the mini-
mum amount
needed in-
creased incre-
mentally from 8% to 11%.
In East Jerusalem, the perception of poverty is the highest; 48% of respondents
reported that their household’s income was much less than required. When compared
to the results of July 2003, only 35% of East Jerusalem respondents reported the same.
In the Gaza Strip and West Bank, subjective poverty is higher among those living
inside refugee camps than those outside. Respondents in the West Bank outside
refugee camps reported least often (at 34%) that their household income was much
less than what’s needed.
When analyzing subjective poverty, conditions in Gaza Strip refugee camps are much
the same as West Bank refugee camps, whereas conditions are overall better outside
refugee camps in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 2-22: How household income compares to what is
required to supply basic needs (o041),
July 2003 - February 2004
Figure 2-23: How household income compares to what
is required to supply basic needs (o041) by place of residence
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The fact that in East Jerusalem the poverty rate is increasing (see above) and the
employment situation is worsening (see Chapter 3) could explain why the proportion
of the respondents who have stated that their household income was much less than
that required increased from 35% to 48% between July 2003 and February 2004. It is
interesting to note that today in East Jerusalem the perception of poverty is the highest
of all OPT areas.
2.3.4 Income Differentiation and Social Cohesion
The social fabric of Palestinian society is under stress as a consequence of the large-
scale socio-economic crisis and the high level of violence that has characterized the
second Intifada. In this context, it is crucial to assess the impact of the growing income
insecurity on social cohesion. In order to do so, interviewees were asked how they
would evaluate their financial situation in comparison with that of others in their
community.
In general, there is no sign of social fragmentation based on a process of income
differentiation. Overall, 69% of respondents have the feeling that the financial situation
of their household is about the same as the people in their community whereas only
16% think it is worse.
More striking is the
fact that 57% of the
extremely poor have
the sense that their
household is in about
the same financial
straights as the
people of their
community and only
39% think that their
household is in a
worse situation. When
compared with the
findings of July 2003,
there is a significant
decrease in the
proportion of respondents stating that they were in a worse situation than others - from
45% to 39%.
Thus, the growing discontent of the poorest regarding their household’s financial
situation as compared to the rest of their community that was identified in the July
2003 survey has been reversed. And the risk of social fragmentation and social
conflict which may have been aggravated by the persistence of this trend is now less
important.
West Bank refugee camp residents report more often that their household’s
financial situation is about the same as that of other households in the com-
munity; 85% reported this equality, whereas only 9% said their household’s
financial situation was worse.
Figure 2-24: Perception of household’s
financial situation (o128)
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At the opposite end of
the spectrum were
respondents living in
Gaza Strip refugee
camps, who reported
more often a feeling of
household income
inequality; only 58%
of respondents
thought that their
household’s financial
situation was about
the same as that of
others in their com-
munity. Nineteen
percent thought it was
worse than the people
of their community and
24% that it was better.
When compared to July
2003, these results indicate important shifts in the feelings of West Bank and Gaza
Strip refugee camp respondents. Since that time, the proportion of respondents who
thought that their household’s financial situation was about the same as others in their
community increased from 63% to 85% in the West Bank and decreased from 71% to
58% in the Gaza Strip.
This result is likely related to both the economic deterioration in Gaza refugee camps
which is more deeply affecting already vulnerable groups, and the improvement of
poverty conditions in the West Bank refugee camps.
In East Jerusalem, on the other hand, the proportion of respondents stating that their
household’s financial situation is worse that that of others in their community increased
sharply from 6% to 16% between July 2003 and February 2004. This process of
Figure 2-26: Perception of household’s financial situation (o128)
according to place of residence
Figure 2- 25: Perception of household’s financial
situation (0128) according to poverty
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income differentiation is the result of both increasing impoverishment and the rise of
unemployment and precarious employment in East Jerusalem.
Other results show that about two-thirds of the respondents who work or use to work
before the Intifada in settlements have the feeling that their household’s financial
situation is worse than that of others in the community. This is a proportion four times
higher than the OPT average.
Finally, the feeling of comparatively worse economic straits was more pronounced
among respondents from the area crossed by the Wall; 21% of this group said that
their household income was comparatively worse than that of their neighbors, as
compared with an OPT average of 16%.
2.4 POVERTY AND COPING STRATEGIES
2.4.1 Available means for relieving hardship
In the context of widespread poverty, mobility restrictions and limited access to
income generating activities, coping strategies play a crucial role in securing the
livelihood of a large part of the population. The risk is that the extent and the duration
of the socio-economic crisis affecting the OPT will progressively exhaust these coping
strategies and lead to a major humanitarian crisis, as well as growing dependence on
humanitarian assistance.
This studies results show no major shift since July 2003. Overall, the proportion of
respondents stating that they are able to cope financially “as long as it takes” has
increased slightly from 34% to 36%. The percentage of those who report that they are
“in serious condition and don’t know how to live” decreased slightly from 19% to 15%.
Conditions have improved the most in this regard in the West Bank outside refugee
camps and in East Jerusalem. The proportion of the respondents who stated that they
are able to cope financially “as long as it takes” increased from 34% to 38% among
West Bank non-camp residents and from 20% to 35% among East Jerusalemites
between July 2003 and February 2004.
In the West Bank refugee camps, financial problems are much less severe than
previously. The percentage of those who reported that they were “in serious condition
and don’t know how to live” decreased from 23% to 5% (coherent with the sharp
decrease of extreme poverty that we have noted above). But the situation is still very
precarious, as the proportion of those who “can barely manage” has increased from
30% to 49% in the same period. In addition, the combined proportion of respondents
who stated they can manage “as long as it takes” or “about a year” decreased from
48% to 40%.
This study also indicates a deterioration of conditions in the Gaza Strip,
particularly among refugee camp residents where the proportion of respon-
dents who stated that they “can barely manage” increased from 33% to 42%
since July 2003. Those who reported that they can manage “as long as it
takes” decreased from 38% to 33%.
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The proportion of
the extremely poor
who are “in serious
condition and don’t
know how to live”
decreased from
41% to 34%
between July 2003
and February 2004.
But the proportion of
those who “can
barely manage” has
increased from 42%
to 47%, which
means that the
problem of coping
financially is less
severe but still affects about 80% of the extremely poor. It is also important to empha-
size that one-quarter of the respondents who are above the poverty line reported that
they “can barely manage.”
Other results show that less than half of the respondents declared that they still have
means of relieving the hardship, and 24% reported that their means will be exhausted
soon. Another seventeen percent reported that their available means were already
exhausted, and 12% said that they had no means of alleviating the hardship from the
beginning. This last group is more prominent in refugee camps and in Jerusalem.
These findings show
that the means
available for
relieving the
hardship have
already been
exhausted for a
large portion of
respondents in the
West Bank. An even
larger group reports
that its resources
will be exhausted
soon. In West Bank
refugee camps,
14% said their resources had been depleted and 20% said their resources would be
exhausted soon. Outside the camps, 21% reported that their means of alleviating the
hardship had been depleted and 27% said that those resources would be
exhausted soon. In East Jerusalem, 22% of respondents reported that they
had already exhausted their means of relieving the hardship.
Figure 2-28: Ability to cope financially (o044)
according to poverty
Figure2- 27: Ability to cope financially (o044)
according to place of residence
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In the Gaza Strip, the
proportion of those
who declared that
their available
means were already
exhausted was
smaller than in the
West Bank, a finding
that fits with the fact
that conditions in the
Gaza Strip were less
severe during the
first stage of the
second Intifada.
The rapid deteriora-
tion of the situation since, however, means that those with no available means of
alleviating the hardship will soon increase markedly, as 24% of the respondents
outside refugee camps and 28% of those inside refugee camps reported that their
available resources will be soon exhausted.
Only 40% of the poor (excluding the hardship cases) and 30% of the extremely poor
stated they still have means of relieving the hardship. Moreover, thirty-two percent of
the poor and of extremely poor reported that their resources will soon be exhausted.
This is a significant finding because it means that the continuation of the current
situation will lead to dramatic pressure on the humanitarian assistance system to
compensate for the progressive exhaustion of coping strategies in the OPT.
2.4.2 Strategies for managing the hardship
Palestinians use various coping strategies for managing their hardship. These strate-
gies vary according to the level of poverty, place of residence or region of residence.
With the continuation of the socioeconomic crisis, some strategies tend to become
exhausted, as for example, in the case of using savings.
The most common
way of coping with
material depriva-
tion is reducing
expenses. Indeed,
77% of the respon-
dents stated that
they had reduced
expenses to sustain
Figure 2-31: Main coping strategies for managing
the hardship (o131)
Figure 2-30: Available means of relieving the hardship (o177)
according to poverty
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hardship. This strategy
is widely used by the
extremely poor; 90%
of them stated they
had reduced expenses
as compared to 83%
among the poor
(excluding the ex-
tremely poor), and
64% among those
above the poverty line.
When compared to our
survey of July 2003,
these findings show
that the proportion of those who stated that they had reduced expenses to sustain
hardship decreased from 89% to 79% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and
from 74% to 64% in East Jerusalem. In other areas that proportion also decreased, but
more slightly.
The other most
common way of
coping with material
deprivation is by
making use of
savings. However,
the results indicate a
drop in the propor-
tion of respondents
reporting the use of
savings to sustain
hardship from 64%
to 49% between
July 2003 and
February 2004.
This evolution is mainly the result of a decrease in the use of past savings in the West
Bank - from 76% to 54% among residents living outside of refugee camps and from
56% to 25% among residents of the refugee camps - and in East Jerusalem, where use
of savings decreased from 54% to 32%. Those results must be related to the results
illustrated in Figure 2.29 above indicating the exhaustion of available means of reliving
hardship in both the West Bank and Jerusalem. In the Gaza Strip the changes are minor
by comparison.
With the continuation of the crisis and ongoing obstacles to income-generat-
ing activities, savings are depleted and to play a less important role as a
coping strategy. Among the extreme poor, 52% stated they were using past
saving to sustain the hardship as compared with 77% in July 2003. Figure
2.34 illustrates this declining trend, which is also visible among the poor
(excluding hardship cases) and among those above the poverty line.
Figure 2-32: Reducing expenses to cope with
material deprivation (o131h) according to
place of residence
Figure 2-33: Using past savings to cope with
material deprivation (o131b)
according to place of residence
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Other common
ways of coping
with material
deprivation are
buying on credit
and not paying
the bills, used by
44% and 42% of
respondents,
respectively.
Buying on credit
is widely used in
West Bank
refugee camps by 69% of respondents. It is used by 47% of respondents living in the
West Bank outside refugee camps, by 36% of respondents outside Gaza Strip refugee
camps, and by 41% of respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps. Moreover, a
small proportion of the respondents above the poverty line are using this coping
strategy (28%) as
compared to the poor
(51%) and the extremely
poor (63%).
Not paying the bills is a
strategy widely used
inside and outside
refugee camps, in the
Gaza Strip as well as in
the West Bank. It is less
common in Jerusalem but
it is important to note that
the proportion of East
Jerusalem respondents
who stated that they were
not paying the bills increased from 15% to 24% between July 2003 and February
2004. Other results show that 24% of the respondents above the poverty line are not
paying the bills to sustain the hardship.
Figure 2-35: Buying on credit to relieve the hardship
(o131j) according to place of residence
Figure 2-36: Not
paying bills (water,
electricity, etc.)
(o131g) to relieve the
hardship,
according to
place of
residence
Figure 2-34: Using past savings to cope with material deprivation
(o131b) according to poverty
     79
Cultivating land is
also an important
way to cope with
material deprivation;
22% of respondents
reported using this
strategy. Neverthe-
less, it is a strategy
mainly used in the
West Bank among
those living outside
refugee camps.
Thirty-four percent of
these respondents
reported cultivating
land to sustain hardship, as compared to 18% of Gaza Strip residents outside of
refugee camps. Elsewhere, the strategy is used by nearly no one.
Selling jewelry/gold is another important coping strategy used by 29% of respon-
dents. In the Gaza Strip refugee camps, 35% of respondents reported using this
strategy as compared with 27% of respondents living outside Gaza Strip refugee
camps, 15% living inside West Bank refugee camps, and 29% living outside West
Bank refugee camps.
These findings show that the proportion of the respondents who had to sell jewelry/
gold have greatly increased in the Gaza Strip refugee camps while simultaneously
decreasing in West Bank refugee camps. These results are likely linked to the sharp
increase in extreme poverty in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. It is the extremely poor
who have the highest tendency to sell jewelry/gold to sustain hardship (39% as
compared to 18% among the non-poor).
Selling real estate is another means used in the OPT to endure hardship, however it
naturally implies that one owns property and is a one-off opportunity. Once property is
sold, it is no longer available for sustaining hardship. Results show that only 6% of
respondents had sold property to sustain the hardship. Most of these respondents
(10%) were living in the West Bank outside of refugee camps.
Figure 2-37: Cultivating land to relieve the hardship (o131d)
according to place of residence
Figure 2-38: Selling jewelry/gold to relieve the hardship (o131i)
according to place of residence
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Finally, there are two other
coping strategies,
injecting more members
of the household into
income-generating
activities, and receiving
assistance from family
and friends.
Regarding the first, results
of our survey show that
18% of respondents
reported that more adults
from their household
entered the labor market to sustain the hardship, and 10% reported that more children
entered the labor market. The former does not reflect any change from July 2003,
whereas the later decreased from 16% to 10%.
Figures 2.39 and 2.40 indicate that the poor tend to put more adults and children into
the labor market than the non-poor. Among the extremely poor, the proportion of
respondents who reported that more adults entered the labor market decreased from
26% to 18% between July 2003 and February 2004. But among the poor (excluding
the extremely poor),
the proportion has
increased from 20%
to 24%. Meanwhile,
the proportion of
respondents who
stated that more
children went into the
labor market de-
creased from 26% to
15% among the
extremely poor and
from 19% to 11%
among the poor
(excluding the
extremely poor).
When considering the use of children’s labor as a coping strategy, the results show
that this proportion is higher in villages (11% as compared to 9% in refugee camps
and cities). This is mainly due to the participation of children in various agricultural
activities in rural areas. Moreover, such coping strategy are hardly used at all in East
Jerusalem, where only 3% of the respondents reported its use as compared to 7% in
West Bank refugee camps, 10% outside West Bank refugee camps, 9% in
Gaza Strip refugee camps and 11% outside Gaza Strip refugee camps.
Fifteen percent of respondents reported receiving assistance from family and
friends living abroad, and 12% reported receiving assistance from the family
and friends living in the OPT or Israel. Those solidarity networks, particularly
assistance from the family and friends from the OPT or Israel, are very
Figure 2-40: More children going into the labor market to
relieve the hardship (o131f) according to poverty
Figure 2-39: More adult going into the labor market to
relieve the hardship (o131e) according to poverty
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important for the
poorest. Twenty-four
percent of the poorest
respondents reported
relying on such
assistance from the
OPT or Israel, while
12% of the poor
(excluding the
poorest) and 5% of
the non-poor reported
the same. Assistance
from family and
friends living abroad
is much more evenly distributed among the different income groups: its use was
reported by 15% of the poorest, 18% of the poor (excluding the poorest), and 12% of
the non-poor.
These results also show that the proportion of those getting assistance from family and
friends living in Palestine or Israel is bigger in the Gaza Strip - 16% in the refugee
camps and 13% outside them - than in the West Bank - 11% in the refugee camps and
8% outside them. But assistance from family and friends living abroad is much more
important as a coping strategy in the West Bank outside refugee camps (reported by
19% of respondents) whereas only 5% of West Bank refugee camp respondents
reported its use and 13% of all Gaza Strip respondents reported its use.
Figure 2-41: Receiving assistance from family and friends
(o163e, o163f) according to poverty
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3.1 MAIN RESULTS
3.1.1 The employment situation
The overall unemployment rate decreased
from 25% to 23% between July 2003 and
February 2004 but still less than half of all
workers have access to full-time employ-
ment.
The OPT labor market is characterized by
widespread underemployment which is
affecting more than a quarter of the labor
force.
The results show a severe deterioration of the labor market in Jerusalem where the
unemployment rate reached 33%, as compared to 15% in July 2003. Meanwhile, the
rate of full-time employment in Jerusalem dropped from 51% to 39%.
The evolution of unemployment has been very different inside the West Bank refugee
camps, as compared to outside them. The unemployment rate decreased from 29% to
25% outside the refugee camps, while increasing from 20% to 30% inside refugee
camps.
In the Gaza Strip, unemployment decreased from 27% to 24% inside refugee camps
and from 20% to 16% outside refugee camps, while the proportion of respondents
who reported working part-time or few hours a day increased respectively from 27%
to 30% and from 29% to 34%.
The results show a significant increase in job precariousness and underemployment
among non-refugees. Overall, the employment situation of non-refugees is now more
precarious than that of refugees, having worsened between July 2003 (our last survey)
and February 2004. This result explains the significant increase in hardship cases
among non-refugees and the parallel decrease of hardship cases among the refugees
that was emphasized in Part 2.
The unemployment rate is four times higher for the group of respondents with a low
level of education than for those with a high level of education (44% compared to
11%). Moreover, young workers and workers above the age of 50 are particularly
vulnerable to unemployment.
3.1.2 The Wall
The Wall has had a great negative impact on the labor market as it dramati-
cally affects the employment situation of Palestinian workers living in areas
crossed by the series of walls, fences, and patrol roads that Israel is con-
structing in the West Bank.
3 LABOR
MARKET
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Problems of access to the workplace were much more severe for workers living in
areas crossed by the Wall. Indeed, 15% of respondents from these areas reported that
it was “almost impossible” to go to work, while another 25% reported that it was “very
difficult” to go to work. These numbers are a stark comparison with the 5% of workers
in the OPT as a whole who reported it “almost impossible” and the 11% who reported
it “very difficult” to go to work. Only one-quarter of the respondents from the area
crossed by the Wall stated that it was “not difficult” to go to work.
3.1.3 Mobility restrictions
Mobility restrictions have greatly improved, with more than half of all respondents
(53%) stating that it was “not difficult” to go to work in the last six months, as com-
pared to one-third who reported such in July 2003. During the same period, the
proportion of respondents stating that it was “very difficult” or “almost impossible”
decreased from 32% to 16%.
Mobility restrictions were much less severe in the West Bank, as the proportion of
those who stated that it was almost impossible or very difficult to go to work de-
creased from 37% to 18% among respondents living outside refugee camps and from
35% to 18% among respondents living inside refugee camps.
In the Gaza Strip among those living outside refugee camps, the situation is much less
severe and has also improved, with 62% of respondents stating that it was not difficult
to go to work as compared to 45% who reported such in July 2003. In the Gaza Strip
refugee camps where mobility restrictions were more pronounced, the situation has
also improved. The proportion of respondents who stated that it was “almost impos-
sible” or “very difficult” to go to work decreased from 35% to 15%.
It was also easer to cultivate land in both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, but
this change was more marked in the Gaza Strip where the proportion of the respon-
dents stating that it was “not difficult” to cultivate land increased from 17% to 48%
while those stating it was “almost impossible” decreased from 21% to 15%.
3.1.4 Occupation
The share of the private sector as employer continues to decline as a consequence of
the economic recession, mobility restrictions and destruction of economic facilities.
The percentage of respondents that reported working in the private sector decreased
from 31% to 24% between July 2003 and February 2004.
The economic recession had a greater impact on private sector employees hiring
workers from refugee camps. The proportion of respondents who reported that their
private sector employer could no longer pay salaries rose to 27% in the West Bank
refugee camps from 13%, and to 26% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps from 16% in
July 2003.
The proportion of the self-employed is much more significant outside refugee
camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip than inside the refugee
camps. Nineteen percent of respondents outside West Bank refugee camps
and 18% outside Gaza refugee camps reported being self-employed, as
compared with 8% of respondents living inside West Bank refugee camps
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and 13% living inside Gaza Strip refugee camps. Self-employment is especially
significant in rural areas, where 24% of respondents report being self-employed, as
compared to 14% in cities and 12% in refugee camps.
One interesting finding was the growing role of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and especially local NGOs, as employers. The proportion of respondents
stating that they work for a local NGO increased from 1% to 5% between July 2003
and February 2004, while those stating that they work for an international NGO
increased from 2% to 4%.
The proportion of respondents who stated that they work for local NGOs reached 13%
inside West Bank refugee camps and 12% inside Gaza Strip refugee camps, while the
proportion of those living in the camps who reported working for an international NGO
was 10% in West Bank refugee camps and 5% in Gaza Strip refugee camps.
3.1.5 Poverty risk
Full-time employment is clearly the best way to escape poverty, according to our
study. Among full-time workers, 68% registered above the poverty line and only 7%
were found to be extremely poor. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the risk of
poverty is extremely high for those who are unemployed: in their ranks, 44% were
extremely poor, and the overall poverty rate was 77% as compared to 32% for those
working full-time.
In a context where Palestinian workers are being excluded from the Israeli labor
market and subject to frequent mobility restrictions, respondents’ location (or last
location) of work had a great correlation with incidence of poverty. The rate of poverty
among laborers who work or used to work in the settlements or in Israel is extremely
high, as high as 90% (in the settlements) and 82% (in Israel). Similarly, the rate of
extreme poverty among these two groups was 33% and 47%, respectively.
The risk of poverty is relatively low when the main breadwinner is able to maintain
access to employment and secure the income. Indeed, 67% of the respondents above
the poverty line stated that the main breadwinner of their household had never been
unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada, while only 14% stated that he
or she had been unemployed more than 12 months. On the other hand, only 21% of the
extremely poor reported that the main breadwinner of their household was never
unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada, whereas 45% reported that he
or she was unemployed more than 12 months.
The rate and severity of poverty are correlated with the duration of unemployment of
the main breadwinner of the household. For example, the rate of poverty for respon-
dents stating that the main breadwinners of their household had been unemployed
more than 24 months was as high as 81% and the rate of extreme poverty as high as
46%.
The type of employer has also had a very significant impact on the incidence
of poverty. The Palestinian Authority, international agencies and international
NGOs guarantee most employees an adequate income level and job security
that staves off poverty.
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The private sector is associated with a high incidence of poverty among workers -
only 43% of the respondents employed in the private sector are above the poverty
line, while the proportion of extremely poor employed in the private sector is as high
as 29%.
However, self-employment (excluding petty trade) is the type of employment associ-
ated with the highest incidence of poverty. Only 22% of the self-employed are above
the poverty line, while 36% are extremely poor.
Finally, the risk of poverty is greatly related to job precariousness. Workers who
regularly and fully receive their salary are relatively preserved from poverty (62%
were above the poverty line whereas 11% were in a state of extreme poverty). At the
same time, 38% of workers who did not receive their salary fully and on time were
extremely poor and only 17% were above the poverty line. Thus the informalization of
the labor market and the increase in self-employment has also aggravated the
vulnerability of workers to the kind of practices that deeply affect their material
condition.
3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR MARKET
This study shows a decrease in the unemployment rate, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The
number of respondents who don’t work and define themselves as unemployed
decreased from 25% to 23% between July 2003 and February 2004. However, the
proportion of respondents reporting full-time employment remains nearly the same -
49% as compared to 48% - which means that less than half of the labor force has
access to the most effective means of reducing incidence of poverty.
Considering that most respondents who work part-time or a few hours a day do so
because they lack the opportunity to work more, one can say that the OPT labor
market is characterized by widespread underemployment affecting more than a
quarter of the labor force. The severity of underemployment may even have increased
since the time of our last survey, as the proportion of those stating that they work only
a few hours a day increased from 15% to 18%, while the proportion of those working
part-time decreased from 13% to 10%.
Another interesting result is the significant increase in the proportion of housewives
when considering respondents as a whole and not only the paid labor force. Figure 3.2
shows that the rate of housewives increased from 28% to 32% between July 2003 and
February 2004.
The main argument to explain this trend is the paralysis in the labor market and the
lack of job opportunities, which has led to the exit of many women from the labor
market. Other results show that the proportion of unemployed respondents who stated
that they did not try at all to find a job rose from 21% in July 2003 to 35% in
February 2004.
One can see a correlation between the proportion of housewives and the
proportion of the unemployed who did not try at all to find a job. One expla-
nation for this correlation could be that 44% of the total respondents who did
  86
not try to find a job
have instead devoted
time to commitments at
home and taking care
of children. Under these
economic conditions,
women are more likely
to report themselves as
housewives rather than
as unemployed mem-
bers of the labor force.
Indeed, the results indicate that the proportion of housewives increased sharply in
Jerusalem (from 21% to 38%) and in the West Bank outside refugee camps (from 27%
to 33%) between July 2003 and February 2004. Figure 3.3 shows that during the same
period the proportion of
unemployed who stated
that they did not try at all
to find a job increased
from 17% to 35% in the
West Bank and from 30%
to 61% in Jerusalem. The
exclusion of Palestinian
workers from the labor
market is particularly
severe in Jerusalem,
where the lack of access
to job opportunities can
explain that only one
quarter of the unem-
ployed stated they tried
hard to find a job despite a growing material deprivation. The lack of job opportunities
is also very severe in West Bank refugee camps where the proportion of respondents
who stated that they did not try at all to find a job sharply increased from 14% to 41%.
But this evolution led a dramatic increase in unemployment rather than respondents’
exit from the
labor market
(the employment
rate remaining
approximately
the same).
Figure 3-1 Employment conditions in the labor force (o008),
2002-2004
Figure 3-2: Current conditions in employment status
(o008), July 2003 - February 2004 (o008)
Figure 3-3: Tried to find a job if unemployed (o014)
according to place of residence
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The fact that extreme poverty was less severe in Jerusalem and the West Bank may
explain the much larger proportion of respondents who stated that they did not search
hard for a job and instead remained unemployed or exited the labor market (i.e.,
conditions are not so severe as to require continued participation). This is very differ-
ent from the Gaza Strip, for example, where the proportion of respondents stating that
they tried hard to find a job increased from 60% to 65% over time. This trend was
especially strong among respondents in Gaza Strip refugee camps where those who
reported trying hard to find a job increased from 54% to 66%. This is very likely a
consequence of the related sharp increase in extreme poverty in these areas that has
resulted in harsh competition for jobs in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
Figure 3.4 indicates that the unemployment rate decreased in all places of residence
except in East Jerusalem and the West Bank refugee camps. Now East Jerusalem has
the highest unemployment rate at 33%, compared to an unemployment rate recorded
at 15% in July 2003. Meanwhile, the rate of full-time employment in East Jerusalem
dropped from 51% to 39%, which means a severe deterioration of the Jerusalem labor
market and a growing incidence of poverty, as discussed in Part 2.
In the West Bank, the rate of full-time employment increased both inside refugee
camps (to 54%) and outside refugee camps (to 50%). On the other hand, it is interest-
ing to note that the evolution of unemployment has been very different inside and
outside refugee camps. Outside refugee camps in the West Bank, the unemployment
rate decreased from 29% to 25%, while inside West Bank refugee camps, unemploy-
ment increased from 20% to 30%. Inside the refugee camps, growing unemployment
is associated with a decline in the number of respondents who report working part-
time or a few hours a day (from 28% to 17%).
In the Gaza Strip, full-time employment remained nearly the same inside the refugee
camps and decreased slightly from 52% to 50% among those living outside refugee
camps. This trend is associated with the rise in underemployment, rather than a rise in
unemployment. In fact, unemployment decreased from 27% to 24% inside refugee
Figure 3-4: Employment conditions of the labor force (o008)
according to place of residence
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camps and from 20% to 16% outside refugee camps. Still, the proportion of respon-
dents who reported working part-time or a few hours a day increased from 27% to
30%, and from 29% to 34%, respectively. Thus, the slight decrease in the number of
full-time employees is matched by the increase in workers taking on part-time labor or
brief periods of hourly labor.
When examining
employment
conditions
according to
refugee status, as
illustrated in
Figure 3.5, results
show a signifi-
cant increase in
job precarious-
ness and under-
employment
among the non-
refugees. The
rate of full-time
employment for
non-refugees decreased from 49% to 43%, while conversely the rate of those working
part-time or few hours a week increased from 25% to 30%. Otherwise, the rate of
unemployment rate remained about the same between July 2003 and February 2004.
On the other hand, employment conditions among the refugees have improved. The
rate of full-time employment increased sharply from 47% to 54%, while the unemploy-
ment rate decreased from 23% to 20%, and the rate of those working part-time or few
hours a day decreased from 30% to 26%.
Overall, employment conditions among non-refugees are now more precarious than
those among refugees, having worsened between July 2003 and February 2004. This
result also explains the significant increase in hardship cases among non-refugees,
and the decrease in
hardship cases among
the refugees that was
discussed in Part 2.
Figure 3.6 shows that
the unemployment rate
is four times higher
among respondents
with a low level of
Figure 3-5: Employment conditions in the labor force (o008)
according to refugee status, July 2003 – February 2004
Figure 3-6: Employment conditions among the labor force
(o008) according to education
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education than among those with a high level of education (44% compared with
11%). The proportion of respondents stating that they work part-time or a few hours a
day is also much higher for the former (39%) than the latter (19%). Employment
conditions among workers with a low level of education are characterized by extreme
unemployment and job instability. Only 16% of those with a low level of education
have a full-time job.
Young workers and
workers over 50 years of
age are particularly
vulnerable to unemploy-
ment. Figure 3.7 indi-
cates that the unemploy-
ment rates among these
respective groups are
32% and 31%, com-
pared to an unemploy-
ment rate of 20% among
workers between the
ages of 25 and 49. Only
36% of young workers
held down a full-time job
while 32% of young
workers engaged in
part-time employment
or worked a few hours a day. The proportion of the employed working only few hours a
day is higher among those more than 50 years of age (23%) compared to young
workers (19%) and the workers between the ages of 24 and 49 (16%).
In the OPT, less than
half of main breadwin-
ners of a household
escaped unemploy-
ment during the entire
period of the second
Intifada. Figure 3.8
shows that about one-
quarter of all respon-
dents were long-term
unemployed (unem-
ployed for more than 12
months) whereas
another 15% were very
long-term unemployed
(without work for more
than two years). Mass and persistent unemployment of family breadwinners
was a dramatic shock to Palestinian society, as income-generating activities
by the main breadwinner were the main source of income. However, the
persistence of unemployment is less severe in this study than it was in July
Figure 3-7: Employment conditions in the
labor force (o008) according to age
Figure 3-8: Duration of unemployment of main breadwinner
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2003, as the incidence of long-term unemployment (more than 12 months) decreased
from 35% to 26%. This means that some respondents who were considered long-term
unemployed found work between July 2003 and February 2004.
When duration of
unemployment for the
main breadwinner is
analyzed by region, it
appears that Gaza
Strip respondents
living outside refugee
camps report a lower
unemployment risk for
the main breadwinner,
as 52% were never
unemployed as
compared to inside
Gaza Strip refugee
camps (46%), Jerusa-
lem (45%), outside
West Bank refugee
camps (44%) and
inside West Bank refugee camps (only 39%)..
The results also show that a significant proportion of main breadwinners in Gaza Strip
and West Bank refugee camps have been unemployed since the beginning of the
second Intifada - 13% and 15%, respectively - as well as in East Jerusalem where this
incidence was as high as 13%.
Our results indicate a stabilization of the employment situation, since 70% of respon-
dents stated that their employment status had not changed in the last six months, as
compared to 60% who reported no change in July 2003. Figure 3.10 also shows that
the proportion of those who lost their jobs in the last six months decreased from 26%
in July 2003 to 20% in February 2004.
This assessment is dramati-
cally different in areas that
are crossed by the Wall. In
these parts, 29% of respon-
dents reported losing their
jobs over the last six months
and 18% said that they were
forced to find a new job. Thus
the Wall has had a significant
impact on the labor
market and is
negatively impact-
ing job stability in
the areas where it is
located, as shown in
Figure 3.11.
Figure 3-9: Duration of unemployment of main breadwinner
(o100) according to place of residence
Figure 3-10: Change in employment situation
over the last six months (o012)
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Figure 3.12, below, compli-
ments Figure 3.4, above, as it
shows that the proportion of
those who lost their jobs
recently increased in Jerusa-
lem (from 10% to 20%) and
in the West Bank refugee
camps (from 13% to 29%)
between the time of our July
2003 poll and this February
2004 poll. Among respon-
dents living outside Gaza
Strip refugee camps, the
proportion of those who had
lost their jobs in the last six
months was the lowest of all
regions at 13%.
According to 98% of the respondents, those who report a change in their employment
status say that the dynamics of the labor market result from the current political
situation. Figure 3.15 indicates the various ways that the current situation has brought
about changes in employment status, according to the respondents. Access to the
workplace was identified as the main problem; it was reported the cause of employ-
ment conditions by 52% of the respondents.
Not surprisingly, inability to reach the workplace was a bigger problem for workers
from the West Bank. The West Bank is subject to various types of curfew, closure and
checkpoint restrictions that are not as pronounced in the Gaza Strip. However, it is
interesting to note that as many as 58% of respondents from Gaza Strip refugee
camps also named inability to reach the workplace as the main cause of their change
in employment status.
Figure 3-11: Change in employment situation
over the last six months, in areas crossed
by the Wall (o012)
Figure 3-12: Change in employment status over the past six months (o012)
according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004
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The other important
problem facing 20% of
respondents was that
employers could no longer
pay the salaries of their
workers. Another 27% of
respondents reported that
the lack of jobs was the
cause of current employ-
ment conditions.
When considering this
question according to place
of residence, results show a
deterioration of the financial
situation in the private sector that employs workers from the refugee camps. Indeed,
the proportion of the respondents who stated that their employer could no longer pay
their salary rose from 13% to 27% in West Bank refugee camps and from 16% to 26%
in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
3.3 Mobility restrictions and access to workplace
Israeli-imposed restrictions on mobility have greatly disrupted the OPT labor market.
However, Figure 3.15 shows that the situation has improved since July 2003. More than
half of respondents (53%), as compared with one-third of respondents in July, re-
ported that it was not difficult to go to work over the last six months. Over the same
period, the proportion of respondents reporting that it was very difficult or almost
impossible to go to work decreased from 32% to 16%.
Figure 3.16 shows that problems of access to the workplace were much more
severe for workers in areas crossed by the Wall. Indeed, 15% of these
respondents reported that it was “almost impossible” to go to work while
25% said it was “very difficult”, as compared to 5% who said it was “almost
Figure 3-13: Main cause of job change related to the
current situation (o013)
Figure 3-14:
Main cause
of change in
employment
status
(o013)
according to
place of
residence
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impossible” and 11%
who said it was “very
difficult” in the OPT as a
whole. Only one-quarter
of the respondents from
the area crossed by the
Wall stated that it was
“not difficult” to get to
work.
The Wall is mainly a
problem for workers
from the West Bank and
East Jerusalem - and
especially for workers
from rural areas of the
West Bank - when one
considers the geographic
location of the Wall.
Figures 3.17 A and B
show that 47% of respon-
dents from the West
Bank, and 22% from East
Jerusalem, reported that
the Wall was preventing
their access to jobs.
Moreover, 47% of
respondents in villages
reported that the Wall
was an obstacle to
employment, as com-
pared to 22% of respondents from cities and 18% of respondents from refugee
camps.
Figure 3.18 indicates that mobility restrictions were much less severe in the West Bank
in this most recent poll, as the proportion of those who stated that it was “almost
impossible” or “very difficult” to go to work decreased from 37% to 18% outside
Figure 3-17: Wall
as obstacle to
job access
(o164c)
according to
region and area
of
resi-
dence
Figure 3-15: Ability to go to work over the
last six months (O114)
Figure 3-16: Ability to go to work over the last six months
(o114) in the area crossed by the Wall
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refugee camps and from 35% to 18% inside refugee camps. In the Gaza Strip outside
refugee camps, conditions have also greatly improved, as 62% of the respondents
stated that it was “not difficult” to go to work compared to 45% who said this in July
2003. In Gaza Strip refugee camps, where mobility restrictions were more marked, the
situation has also improved as the proportion of respondents who reported it was
“almost impossible” or “very difficult” to go to work decreased from 35% to 15%.
Mobility restric-
tions are also
affecting
farmers’ ability
to cultivate land.
Figure 3.19
shows that
conditions have
improved in this
respect in both
the West Bank
and the Gaza
Strip. Changes
were much more
Figure 3-18: Ability to go to work over the last six months (o114)
according to place of residence
Figure 3-19: Ability to cultivate land over the last six months
(o0115) according to region of residence
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impressive in the Gaza Strip, however, where the proportion of the respondents who
stated that it was “not difficult” to cultivate land increased from 17% to 48%, while
those reporting it was “almost impossible” decreased from 21% to 15%.
3.4 TYPES OF OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYER
Employees are the
largest group of work-
ers, representing 41%,
while the self-employed
are the second largest
group of workers,
representing 17%.
Figure 3.21, below,
indicates that the
proportion of self-
employed is much more
significant outside
refugee camps in both
the West Bank (19%)
and the Gaza Strip
(18%) than inside
refugee camps in the
West Bank (8%) and
Gaza Strip (13%).
Self-employment is especially developed in rural areas where 24% of the respondents
report being self-employed, as compared to 14% in the cities and 12% in the refugee
camps. Simultaneously, the proportion of employees in West Bank refugee camps is
larger than in other places, reaching 53% as compared to 41% of employees in the
OPT as a whole.
Figure 3-21:
Occupation or
most recent
occupation for
the unemployed
(o009)
according to
place of
residence
Figure 3-20: Occupation or most recent occupation for the
unemployed (o009)
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Workers with a low level of
education were mainly
unskilled workers or self-
employed, representing
45% and 36%, respec-
tively. Figure 3.22 shows
that there were very few
employees among respon-
dents with a low level of
education. On the other
hand, the group of workers
with a high level of educa-
tion was characterized by
many employees (61%),
and the proportion of
professionals (21%) was
also much higher than in
other groups.
Figure 3.23 indicates some important changes in the composition of employers in the
OPT. The Palestinian Authority remains the main employer, with 29% of respondents
stating that they work for the PA; this share has barely changed since July 2003. The
share of the private sector in the distribution of workers continues to decline as a
consequence of the
economic recession,
mobility restrictions and
destruction of economic
facilities. The private
sector has shrunken,
decreasing from employ-
ing 31% to 24% of
respondents in the time
between July 2003 and
February 2004. Another
one-third of respondents
report that they are self-
employed (including
10% in petty trade
activities).
An interesting result is the growing role of NGOs, particularly local NGOs, as employ-
ers. The proportion of respondents stating that they work for a local NGO increased
from 1% to 5% between July 2003 and February 2004, while those reporting that they
work for an international NGO increased from 2% to 4%. Considering that NGOs
activities are mainly concentrated in refugee camps and that mobility
restrictions are a reason for employing people living in the camps, the impact
of this change has been much stronger in the refugee camps. The proportion
of respondents who reported working for a local NGO was as high as 13% in
West Bank refugee camps and 12% in Gaza Strip refugee camps. The same
can be seen in respect to international NGOs, with 10% of respondents in
West Bank refugee camps and 5% of respondents in Gaza Strip refugee
Figure 3-23: Type of employer (o063)
Figure 3-22: Occupation or most recent
occupation for the unemployed (o009)
according to level of education
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camps reporting working
for international NGOs.
Moreover, the share of
international agencies in
the employment structure
was also significant, as
high as 10% in West
Bank refugee camps and
13% in Gaza Strip
refugee camps. Figure
3.24 illustrates this very
specific structure of
employment in the
camps and emphasizes
the immense impact of
humanitarian activities in
providing employment.
3.5 EMPLOYMENT AND RISK OF POVERTY
Since the start of the second Intifada, the evolution of the labor market has had
profound effects on living standards and household welfare. The rapid increase in
unemployment, job precariousness and underemployment have led to a decline in
overall income associated with employment and also contributed greatly to an
increase in poverty.
Figure 3.25 shows
that full-time
employment is the
best way to
escape poverty.
Among full-time
workers, 68%
were above the
poverty line and
only 7% were
extremely poor. At
the opposite end
of the spectrum,
the poverty risk is
extremely high for
those who are
unemployed, as
44% were extremely poor and their overall poverty rate was 77% as com-
pared with 32% for those employed full time.
Figure 3-24: Type of employer (o063)
according to area of residence
Figure 3-25: Risk of poverty according to
employment status (o008)
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The results indicate also that material deprivation is also widespread among workers
who only work few hours a day. The income generated by workers working a few
hours a day is too low and uncertain to secure their livelihood. Thus, the poverty rate
was as high as 71%, and the extreme poverty rate as high as 31%, among this group
of workers.
The results indicate a strong link between the employment status of the main bread-
winner and the risk of poverty. As illustrated in Figure 3.26, the risk of poverty is
relatively low when the main breadwinner is able to maintain access to employment
and secure the income.
Indeed, 67% of the respon-
dents above the poverty line
stated that the main bread-
winner of their household
had never been unemployed
since the beginning of the
second Intifada, while only
14% stated that he or she
had been unemployed more
than 12 months. On the other
hand, only 21% of the
extremely poor reported
that the main breadwinner of
their household was never
unemployed during the
Intifada, whereas 45%
reported that he or she was
unemployed more than 12
months.
Figure 3.26 also indicates that a large proportion of poor respondents stated that the
main breadwinner of their household were unemployed from 7 to 12 months. This
situation may lead to added material deprivation if they are unable to get out from the
unemployment trap and
become long-term
unemployed. Indeed, the
rate and severity of
poverty are correlated
with the duration of
unemployment of the main
breadwinner of the
household. For example,
the rate of poverty for
respondents stating that
the main bread-
winners of the
household had
been unem-
ployed more than
Figure 3-26: Duration of unemployment of the main
breadwinner (o100) according to poverty
Figure 3-27. Risk of poverty according to place
(or most recent place) of work (o011)
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24 months was as high as 81% and the rate of extreme poverty as high as 46%.
In a context marked by the exclusion of Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor
market, as well as mobility restrictions, the place (or most recent place) of work has a
great correlation with the risk of poverty. Figure 3.27 shows that the rate of poverty
among workers who work or used to work in the settlements (89%) or in Israel (78%)
is extremely high, while the rate of extreme poverty was 33% and 44%, respectively.
These are the big losers in current conditions, as there is very little hope of returning to
pre-September 2000 employment levels inside Israel and the settlements. These
conditions put great pressure on the OPT labor market and require an aggressive
employment component to a political solution in order to compensate for the massive
exclusion of Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor market.
The type of employer also has a very significant impact on the risk of poverty. Figure
3.28 shows that the PA, international agencies and international NGOs guarantee most
of their employees an adequate level of income and job security, thus warding off
poverty. The extreme poverty rate is only 5% for the workers employed by the PA, 6%
for those employed by international agencies and 10% for those employed by interna-
tional NGOs. Local NGOS also secure livelihood for more than half of their employees,
placing them above the poverty line, but the rate of extreme poverty is as high as 26%
among those employed by local NGOs.
The private sector is associated with a high risk of poverty, as only 43% of respon-
dents employed in the private sector are above the poverty line and the rate
of extreme poverty is as high as 29%. Self-employment (excluding petty
trade) is the type of employment that has the highest risk of poverty. Only
22% of the self-employed are above the poverty line, while 36% are ex-
tremely poor. The results also show that manufacture petty trade appears to
allow adequate means for escaping poverty; 64% of respondents employed
in manufacture petty trade activities are above the poverty line, while 17%
Figure 3-28: Risk of poverty according to the type of employer (o063)
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are extremely poor.
Agricultural petty
trade is not so
profitable, as extreme
poverty among its
practitioners reached
32%. Still, it is a better
means of warding off
poverty than those
who are otherwise
self-employed.
Finally, Figure 3.29
shows that the risk of
poverty is greatly
related to job precari-
ousness. Workers who
regularly and fully
receive their salary
are relatively preserved from poverty (62% were above the poverty line and 11%
were in a state of extreme poverty). At the same time, 38% of workers who did not
receive their salary fully and on time were extremely poor and only 17% were above
the poverty line. The informalization of the labor market and the increase in self-
employment has also aggravated the vulnerability of workers to the kind of practices
that deeply affect their material condition.
From a policy perspective, figures 3.30 and 3.31 demonstrate that any policy in-
tended to fight poverty should emphasize the development of long-term jobs, which
are shown here to considerably reduce the risk of poverty and guarantee a basic
income. Short-term jobs, as shown here, do not ward off poverty.
Our results
indicate that 69%
of respondents
that reported that
their household
received a salary
from a long-term
job were above
the poverty line.
Only 16% of
workers who
reported that
their household
Figure 3-29: Risk of poverty according to
receipt of salary (o099)
Figure 3-30: Respondents reporting a salary from a long-term job
in their household (o163a) according to
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received a salary
from a short-term
job were above the
poverty line.
Moreover, 19% of
respondents
reporting the
receipt of a salary
from a long-term
job in their house-
hold were ex-
tremely poor, while
35% of workers
reporting the
receipt in their household of a salary from a short-term job were extremely poor.
Figure 3-31: Respondents reporting a salary from a short-term
job in their household (o163b)
according to poverty level
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This chapter of our report focuses on
the strategies used by local and
international organizations in re-
sponse to the present crisis, specifi-
cally general assistance delivery.
In his excellent book on the “very
political” economy of peace building
and foreign aid, Brynen (2000:10)
analyzes donor responsiveness to
war-to-peace transitions along four
dimensions: the mobilization, coordi-
nation, delivery and allocation of
assistance. In this chapter we will
analyze the perceived delivery of
assistance to Palestinian households
and in the next, the perceived allocation of assistance. It must be made clear that the
scope of these chapters do not extend beyond the perceptions of the Palestinian
households: Only a small part of the general assistance picture will be analyzed here.
To help better situate this smaller picture within the broader, it is worthwhile quoting
UNCTAD’s July 2003 report according to which international support to the Palestinian
people amounted to $2.297 billion between 2001 and the first quarter of 2003: an
average of more than $1 billion per year. Of this total amount, almost 46% went to
budget support for the PNA, 27% for development assistance and 28% for emer-
gency assistance (UNCTAD, 2003:2-7).
The Palestinian people see only the visible part of the iceberg:
 They can’t, for instance, view directly the huge effort in budget support for the
PNA of which 77% comes from the League of Arab States and 21% from the European
Union (UNCTAD, 2003:9). On the other hand, they might well benefit from a job in the
PNA, as does almost one third of the employed population (see Part 3).
Development assistance, because of its important goal of fostering local capaci-
ties, is very often not recognized as such by the people.
Much of the disbursed assistance, even emergency assistance, flows through the
PNA and local NGOs and, in many situations, the real donor is not visible to the end
beneficiaries. Also, some organizations may mandate others to deliver assistance to
particular areas as was the case when the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) delivered food assistance for the World Food Programme
(WFP).
4 ASSISTANCE
DELIVERED IN
GENERAL
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In this chapter, we will first analyze the distribution of assistance by looking at the
percentage of people who say they received assistance (Section 4.1). The value of the
assistance received will be briefly analyzed in Section 4.2. The different types of
assistance will be the object of Section 4.3. Section 4.4 will focus on employment
assistance, and finally, in Section 4.5, we will briefly review the sources of assistance.
More detailed analysis of other important types of assistance can be found elsewhere
in the report: food in Part 6, health and education in Part 7, as well as aid delivered to
the refugees in Part 9.
4.1 ASSISTANCE DISTRIBUTION
4.1.1 The assistance received and its evolution since 2001
A first indicator of the assistance delivered in general can be found in the answers to
question 40 of our questionnaire:
Q.40 Looking back since the Intifada started, have you, or any of your household
members received any type of assistance? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job,
financial assistance, educational assistance etc.)
According to our respondents, 48% of the Palestinian households received
assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada.
In the next question, those who said they received assistance since the
beginning of the second Intifada were also asked whether they received
assistance during the past six months.
 Figure 4-1: Yearly average international support for Palestine
by type, average 2001-2003
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1 The marked increase of assistance in West Bank refugee camps should be situated in
the aftermath of Operation “Defensive Shield”.
Q.41  Have you or your family received any assistance from any party in the past six
months? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, financial assistance, education
assistance etc.)
Of the 711 respondents who answered “yes” to question 40, 82% also answered “yes”
to question 41. This means that 39% of Palestinian households received assistance
during the past six months.
In the questionnaires of the previous polls conducted since February 2001, we only
asked about assistance received during the past six months, and not since the
beginning of the second Intifada.
As shown in Figure 4.2, the number of people who received assistance during the past
six months is low compared to July 2003 when the figure was 48%. In Part 2, we saw
that there has been no decrease in poverty since July 2003; so the extent of assistance
delivery should not have decreased, especially not by an amount of 9%.
Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of the percentage of households who received
assistance during the past six months for the general population and for each place of
residence. It shows that since July 2003 the distribution of assistance has decreased
sharply in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank, especially in refugee camps.1 In the
Gaza Strip, where the assistance level is generally higher than in the West Bank
because of the more difficult situation, this decrease is only felt outside camps and
even there, it is a smaller decrease than that visible in the total population. Gaza
refugee camps have received the highest level of assistance among all areas of
residence since the beginning of the second Intifada, but underwent a marked decline
in assistance of
14% between
November
2002 and July
2003; since
then, assis-
tance in this
area has
remained
stable.
Figure 4-2: Assistance received during the past six months (o035) in general and
by place of residence, 2001 - 2004
Figure 4-3: Percentage of the total population who received
assistance during the past six months (o035)
by region, 2001-2004
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4.1.2 Geographical trends in assistance delivery
Figure 4.3 confirms these results: there was a 13% decrease in the assistance deliv-
ered to the West Bank since July 2003, while a similar decline of only 5% was seen in
the Gaza Strip. In East Jerusalem, where the general assistance level is much lower
(5%), the relative decrease has been very marked (only -4% in absolute but -45% in
relative terms).
Certainly, the design in which we ask first about the assistance received since 2001
and then for the last six months has an influence on the answers. If respondents were
asked immediately about assistance received during the past six months, they might
ask themselves “Did I really receive this assistance during the past six months?”
Nevertheless, as can be seen in Figure 4.4, which compares these two proportions, the
general logic of the responses is similar:
 In the Gaza Strip, around 5% of the population did not receive assistance during
the past six months, while they had received assistance earlier in the Second Intifada.
 This difference amounts to around 14% in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank
(14% outside camps and 12% in refugee camps).
These results clearly confirm the marked decrease in assistance delivery throughout
the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as opposed to the Gaza Strip.
The analysis in Figure 4.5 shows that the decrease in assistance distribution affected
the villages much more than the cities and refugee camps. This might indicate access
problems in some regions: the West Bank in general but especially villages suffer a
great deal from restrictions on mobility and access.
On November 20, 2003, the ICRC officially ended its large-scale relief distribution for
Palestinians in the West Bank. The press release for this new strategy for the West Bank
reads as follows:
The ICRC’s large-scale distributions of relief aid to several hundred thousand
Palestinians living in the towns and villages of the West Bank came to an end in
mid-November 2003. Since June 2002, the ICRC had provided urgently needed
aid to about 50,000 families (roughly 300,000 people)
Figure 4-4: Percent-
age of the total
population who
received assistance
since the beginning
of the second
Intifada (o035b)
and during
the past six
months
(o035)
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struggling to make ends meet. However, humanitarian aid is no longer the best
way to help them. It is essential that the West Bank Palestinians’ basic rights
under international humanitarian law are respected.1
ICRC handed over its beneficiaries of relief assistance to WFP. But, according to WFP’s
second emergency report of January 2004, there seems to have been some delays in
the negotiations with the Ministry of Social Affairs concerning the rural areas, although
the handover of the urban voucher program was effective in a very short time:
The ICRC has officially terminated its operations in the West Bank; the Urban
Voucher Program (UVP) and Rural Relief Program (RRP). WFP has finalized the
negotiations with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) to start the hand-over in
the urban areas. The MSA will be looking for new warehouses in Jericho and
Ramallah since current ones have failed to meet WFP criteria. The negotia-
tions between WFP and the MSA on supervising the distribution of food
rations to Hardship Social Cases in rural areas are still in process.2
Another striking finding illustrates the problems of delivery in some areas. As can be
seen in Figure 4.6, Palestinians who live in areas crossed by the Wall received much
less assistance than the remainder of the OPT. Hardship cases and those living below
the poverty line are particularly poorly targeted when they live in areas affected by the
Wall.
In this section, it is notable that the decrease in assistance delivered in East Jerusalem
and the West Bank is sharpest in villages and in areas that directly affected by the
Wall. Part of the decrease in assistance in West Bank rural areas might also be ex-
plained by delays in implementing the handover of ICRC’s beneficiaries to the WFP.
1 www.icrc.org.
2 WFP, 2004 “Emergency Report n.2”, 9.1.04, www.wfp.org.
Figure 4-5: Percentage of the population who received assistance during
the past six months (o035) by area of residence, 2001-2004
     107
4.1.3 Targeting the
poor and refugees
The above-mentioned
decrease in assistance
delivery is much less
significant for hard-
ship cases; as can be
seen in Figure 4.7, the
decrease is highest for
those who are better
off. It appears clear
that, although assis-
tance delivery has
declined since July
2003, targeting of
needy sectors of society has improved.
Refugees received more assistance than non-refugees. Fifty-four percent of refugees
received assistance during the past six months, as compared to 27% of non-refugees.
In other words, the level of delivery is double for refugees. While a higher level of
assistance delivery to refugees seems logical, because they are poorer on average
than the rest of the population, such a large difference may also hint at a deficit of
assistance to non-refugees.
As we can see in Figure 4.8, 84% of refugee hardship cases received assistance
between August 2003 and February 2004. Hardship cases that were not refugees
made up 55% of the assisted. It also appears that the decline in assistance since July
2003 has been more marked for refugees than for non-refugees.
Figure 4-6: Percentage of the total population who received
assistance during the past six months (o035), by wall and by
poverty, 2001-2004
Figure 4-7: Percentage of the total population who received assistance
during the past six months (o035), by poverty level, 2001-2004
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Figure 4.9 further breaks down assistance delivery by place of residence. It appears
that the visible gap in assistance delivery between refugees and non-refugees living
outside refugee camps is more marked in the Gaza Strip (32%) than in the West Bank
(10%). In East Jerusalem, the difference is small in absolute terms (7%) but high in
proportion (3.3 times higher).
The results in figures 4.8 and 4.9 may indicate a problem in delivering assistance to
non-refugees living outside of camps.
In conclusion, the following findings concerning assistance distribution are worth
highlighting:
Figure 4-9: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance
during the past six months (o035) by place of residence
Figure 4-8: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during
the past six months (o035) by refugee status and poverty level, 2002-2004
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The general level of assistance delivery has decreased significantly since the first
half of 2003.
This decrease was more marked in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, in
villages than in cities and refugee camps. The decrease may be partly explained by
delays in the handover of ICRC’s beneficiaries in rural areas to the WFP.
Areas that were affected by the Wall benefit much less from assistance than the
rest of the OPT. It appears that the poor that live in such areas don’t receive enough
assistance.
Although the general level of assistance has declined, targeting of the poor
seems to have improved: The decline is more severe for those above the poverty line
than for those that live below it, especially hardship cases.
Consistently since the beginning of the second Intifada, refugees received more
assistance than non-refugees. Our results hint at a comparative deficit in assistance to
non-refugees.
4.2 THE VALUE OF THE ASSISTANCE DELIVERED
After analyzing the percentage of the population who received assistance, it is
important to consider the value of the distributed assistance, in general, and then by
the most important types of assistance.
The objective of this section is not to analyze the real value of the assistance disburse-
ments made in Palestine. Our focus is limited to the perceived value.
In our questionnaire, we did not ask for the value of all assistance types received by
the household. Only in question 42, respondents are asked to indicate the value of the
two most important assistance types received in their household during the past six
months.
Figure 4-9: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received
assistance during the past six months (o035) by place of residence
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The value will be analyzed in NIS (New Israeli Shekels). At the time of writing, June
2004, currency rates were as follows:
NIS 100 = USD 22 (US dollars) = EUR 19 (Euros) = CHF 28 (Swiss Francs)
4.2.1 The median value of various
assistance types and their evolution over time
In Figure 4.10, the median values of the reported assistance types that appeared in
Question 42 are presented for the six polls that were done between February 2001 and
February 2004. The figure gives the median values of food, financial, in kind, employ-
ment and coupon assistance as well as for all of those combined (“any type of
assistance”).
The median was used instead of the mean because it is much more robust for the
extreme values that were sometimes reported. The medians are calculated only in the
case of those respondents who did give a value for given assistance types. For
example, half of the 420 respondents who cited food assistance and gave it a value
received NIS 200 or more; in fact the lowest reported value for food assistance was
NIS 15 and the maximum NIS 3,650.
A few important findings are as follows:
The median of the total value of the assistance received has increased
almost constantly since February 2001. The total value of what was distrib-
uted is similar in February 2004 and July 2003.
Figure 4-10: Median value of the assistance received
 by type (o036), 2001 - 2004
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Despite punctual variations, the value of food assistance also increased since the
beginning of the second Intifada. Half of the people who received food assistance
during the February 2003- February 2004 period received NIS 200 or less.
Although it decreased in the course of 2001, the median value of financial assis-
tance has been steady at NIS 500 since November 2001.
There was a slight increase in the value of in kind assistance such as clothes and
blankets since July 2003.
The value of employment assistance underwent a sharp decline in the first half of
2003 but seems to increase sharply during the second half: the median distributed
value increased from NIS 300 to NIS 900.
It must said that these values rely on respondents’ estimates and should not be
considered rock solid estimates. Respondents may under-value some types of
assistance and over-value others. The important result is not so much the actual value
than its evolution across time and groups of respondents.
4.2.2 Differences according to geographic area and poverty
There does not seem to be significant differences in the total reported value of assis-
tance between refugees and non-refugees. The same applies to reported value of
assistance among various education levels.
There are slight differences across age groups: The youngest report a median value of
NIS 250, the oldest NIS 350 while the two middle age groups are situated around NIS
290.1
The total value of assistance does differ significantly according to region. In the West
Bank, the median value of assistance was NIS 378 (N=211) while it was only NIS 260
(N=306) in the Gaza Strip.2
 According to place of residence, the differences are also significant:
The total value of assistance delivered is highest in the West Bank outside refugee
camps at NIS 400 (N=184).
In the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, the median of the total value was NIS
300 (N=188).
Inside refugee camps, the value is consistently lower than outside the camps but
the regional pattern is similar: NIS 300 (N=28) in the West Bank and NIS 200 (N=119)
in the Gaza Strip.
These results are confirmed when reported value is broken down by area
(o060) of residence: The median distributed value in refugee camps is only
NIS 200 (N=146) while it is NIS 350 (N=85) in villages and NIS 358 in cities
(N=289).
1 In fact, the 25-34 age group reports a median of NIS 300 while the 35-49 are at NIS 282.
2 In East Jerusalem, the N is too low (3).
  112
In Figure 4.11, which
depicts the median
value of assistance by
level of poverty, the
continuing improvement
of the assistance
targeting is clear. In
2001, the hardship cases
received less than those
below the poverty line.
In 2003, those below the
poverty line received the
lowest value of assis-
tance, much less than
those above the poverty
line. In 2002 and 2004,
the differences in the
median values are
logical. The hardship cases receive the most while those above the poverty line receive
the least. But we can see that the general level of assistance is higher (and thus
preferable) in 2004 than in 2003.
For each poverty level, Figure 4.12 presents the distribution of the value of food
delivered, compared to population distribution. The results indicate good targeting of
the value of the assistance distributed: hardship cases, which are 23% of the total
population, receive 36% of the total value delivered; those below the poverty line also
receive a larger share of the total value (38%) compared to their population weight
(33%); those above the poverty, which account for 44% of the population, receive only
26% of the total value.
If the median
values of the
different assis-
tance types are
analyzed sepa-
rately, the results
differ significantly
among assistance
types and com-
pared to the
overall value. But
such analysis
would go beyond
the scope of our
report
and not
add
much to
Figure 4-11 Median value of assistance received
in general (o036v) by poverty, 2001-2004
Figure 4-12: Distribution of the value of assistance (o036) and
of levels of poverty
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its results because they would repeat findings made when we analyze specifically the
percentage of people who did receive assistance of each type.
Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, there was a clear
increase in the overall value of the assistance delivered, which then remained stable
throughout the second half of 2003 and the first months of 2004. While the median
value of food assistance has evolved in a similar manner, one should note the impor-
tant increase in the value of employment assistance since the last poll in July 2003.
Between September 2003 and February 2004, the overall value of assistance deliv-
ered was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. It was also higher outside
refugee camps than inside refugee camps.
During this period, there was also a marked improvement in the targeting of assis-
tance: Hardship cases received the highest value of assistance, while those below the
poverty line received more than those above the poverty line.
4.3 NATURE OF ASSISTANCE DELIVERED
Having analyzed the distribution of assistance as well as its perceived value, this
section will concentrate on the type of the assistance delivered. In our questionnaire,
several queries can be used to assess the distribution of various assistance types:
In Question 42, which follows question 40 and 41 concerning assistance delivery,
respondents were asked to cite the two most important assistance types they had
received during the past six months. We will use this question in the present section.
Many questions deal specifically with food assistance. They will be analyzed in
Part 6 of the report. Because of different wording and perspective, these questions
reaped slightly different percentages of respondents who received food assistance:
According to Question 45, for example, 36% of the population received food assis-
tance. Using Question 42, however, 33% of the population received food assistance,
while Item 8 of Question 64 results in 39% of the population reporting food assistance.
Financial assistance can also be analyzed with several questions that produce
slightly different results. According to Item 10 of Question 64, and also Question 26 on
income sources, 16% of the Palestinian households have received financial assistance.
On the other hand, only 9% of the respondents mentioned financial assistance among
the two most important types of assistance they received.
Question 19 offers the greatest detail on employment assistance. Accordingly,
22% of respondent households received jobs or unemployment funds. In Item 9 of
Question 64, 17% of the respondents reported employment assistance in the house-
hold during the past six months. Because employment assistance is not always
perceived as such, and because its duration is not very long, only 3% of the
sample mentioned employment assistance in Question 42 (see Section 4.4).
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Health services are an important topic in the questionnaire. Although many health
services substantially rely on foreign or local aid, Palestinians don’t perceive most of
this as a form of assistance. Less than 2% of our respondents mentioned medical
assistance in Question 42.
 Other types of assistance such as assistance in kind (clothes, blankets...) or
coupons do exist but according to our analysis, they are minor compared to food,
employment and financial assistance.
As mentioned above, in Question 42, the people that received assistance were asked
to specify the nature, value and source of the two most important assistance types
they received as well as their level of satisfaction with it. The emphasis of the present
section lies on the type of assistance; for this reason, we will analyze the nature of the
assistance mentioned. The source of the distributed assistance as well as Palestinians’
satisfaction with it will be analyzed respectively in Section 4.5 and in Part 5 of this
report. The value of the assistance was briefly presented in the previous section.
As can be seen in Figure 4.13,
993 valid responses (580 on
the first assistance type and
413 for the second) were
received from Question 42:
71% of these responses were
related to food assistance;
14% to financial assistance;
5% to employment; 3% to in
kind assistance, coupons and
medication; and less than 1%
to other types of assistance.
Figure 4.14 depicts the
percentages of respondents
who mentioned one of these
types of assistance among
their two most important.
Food assistance was received by one third of the households in Palestine; financial
assistance by 9% of the population. Apart from food and financial assistance, no other
type of assistance was received by more than 5% of the respondents during the past
six months.
The percentage of distribution for all assistance types except employment and
coupons decreased since July 2003:
The largest absolute decline in assistance was of food assistance, which declined
by 8% since July 2003. Further analysis shows that there was a much more
pronounced decline since 2003 in villages (where food assistance was
reported by 39% in July 2003 and only 20% in February 2004) than in cities
(where food assistance was reported by 38% in July 2003 and 34% in
February 2004). In refugee camps, the percentage of people receiving food
Figure 4-13: Types of assistance as reported by the
interviewed (o36a, o036b)
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assistance increased from 51% to 55%. These results support our hypothesis that
assistance in rural areas was hampered by the delays in the handover of the rural
beneficiaries of ICRC to the WFP (see Section 4.1.2).
The level of financial assistance has declined less since last summer: only 3%
fewer respondents received it in February 2004. Here, the sharpest decline is ob-
served in refugee camps where it decreased from 25% in July 2003 to 11% this year.
In villages, there was a decrease of 4% from 10% while in cities, financial assistance
increased slightly from 9% to 11%.
In kind assistance also declined by 1%, while the levels for employment assis-
tance and coupons remained stable since last July. The small number of cases of these
types of assistance prevents any further analysis.
When we break down these results for February 2003 according to place of residence
(Figure 4.15) and region, several interesting results appear:
While one-third of all respondents reported receiving food assistance, by region,
food assistance was received by 52% of respondents in the Gaza Strip; 27% of
respondents in the West Bank; and 3% of respondents in East Jerusalem. As can be
seen in Figure 4.12, the food assistance distribution rate is 14% higher in camps than
outside camps for both regions.
Financial assistance levels are also higher among Gazans (13%) than
among West Bankers (8%) and Jerusalemites (1%); but financial assistance
in refugee camps is 1-2% lower than in the rest of the territories.
Figure 4-14: Type of assistance received (o036), 2001-2004
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According to our respondents, hardly any employment assistance was delivered
in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem (1% or less). In Gaza, where employment
assistance is significant (7%), more employment assistance was delivered outside
camps than inside.
Clothes and blankets were distributed only in camps, and more frequently in the
West Bank than in Gaza.
The importance of coupons was confined to the Gaza Strip, slightly more often
inside rather than outside refugee camps, where they are mainly exchanged for food
aid parcels at UNRWA or local institutions’ distribution centers.1
Figure 4.16,
which shows the
type of assis-
tance delivered
according to
area of resi-
dence, does not
offer much more
new information,
but does
encourage a
few observa-
tions:
Villages propor-
tionally received
less of all
assistance types
than cities. The distribution of employment assistance does not appear to differ
significantly across areas. For financial assistance, the difference is hardly significant.
For remaining assistance types, distribution was higher in refugee camps than in other
areas.
Figure 4-15: Type of assistance received (o036)
according to place of residence
1 Coupons as vouchers that can be exchanged at certain stores for food, like the ones the
ICRC used to provide until late 2003, are not used any more, except by some Islamic
NGOs.
Figure 4-16: Type
of assistance
received (o036)
according to area
of residence
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The analysis
of the
distribution
of assistance
according to
refugee
status that
appears in
Figure 4.17
shows that
food aid is
targeted at
refugees:
46% of them
benefited
from food
assistance, compared to only 23% of non-refugees. The same trend exists concerning
financial assistance. While 11% of refugees receive financial assistance, only 7% of
non-refugees do. For employment, coupons and in-kind assistance, the focus on
refugees, al-
though lass
pronounced, is
also clear.
Consistent with
our results, an
analysis of
assistance and
the level of
poverty of
Palestinian
households given
in Figure 4.18
points to sharp
differences in
assistance:
Respondents with a household income below the poverty line received three and
a half times more (43%) food assistance than those with a household income above
the poverty line (12%); almost two-thirds (62%) of hardship cases received food
assistance.
The same trend can be observed for financial assistance. The general level of
distribution is, of course, lower but the relative differences are comparable for those
above and below poverty line; only hardship cases receive almost twice as
much money than those living below the poverty line.
The same trends can also be observed for assistance given in the form
of clothes and blankets, employment and coupons, albeit less pronounced.
Figure 4-17: Type of assistance received (o036)
according to refugee status
Figure 4-18: Type of assistance received (o036)
according to poverty
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When we break down the types of assistance by level of education, it appears that
39% of the low and medium educated received food assistance, while this is the case
for only 25% of those with higher education. Conversely, those with a lower level of
education more often received cash assistance (16%) than those with a medium level
of education (10%) or a high level of education (6%). Employment, coupons and in-
kind assistance do not differ significantly across educational levels.
Also worth noting is that there no significant relationship between the types of assis-
tance delivered and the various age groups or gender.1
Section 4.5 of the present chapter will deal more thoroughly with employment assis-
tance and Part 6 of the report is entirely devoted to issues related to food.
A few important results for this section can be underscored:
More than one-third of Palestinian households received food assistance during
the past six months.
Approximately one-sixth of households received financial assistance but only 9%
of the respondents cited this kind of assistance among the two most important types
of assistance they received.
There was a clear decrease in delivery of all assistance types except employment
and coupons. The largest absolute decline was in food: its delivery receded especially
in villages, to a lesser extent in cities, while increasing in camps. Financial assistance
declined much less and essentially in refugee camps.
Huge geographical differences in the level of assistance delivery for the different
places, areas and regions of residence emerge. Food was delivered to two-thirds of
camp residents in the Gaza Strip but only to one-quarter of households living outside
camps in the West Bank. In general, food is more targeted at the refugee camps and
the Gaza Strip where the living conditions are worse. Financial assistance is also
primarily targeted at Gaza but not particularly at refugee camps. Villages get less
assistance of all types.
Refugees are the largest beneficiaries of food assistance.
All types of assistance are targeted at the poorest Palestinians. The differences
according to poverty level are most pronounced in the case of food assistance, where
those above the poverty line receive assistance five times less frequently than hard-
ship cases.
1 There’s only one exception to this rule: employment assistance differs significantly
across age groups. The youngest Palestinians (18-24 years, 1%) and those between 35
and 49 years (3%) receive less than those between 25 and 34 (5%) and the 50+ (4%).
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4.4 EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
The coming chapter, Part 5, emphasizes that employment generation is a top priority
for Palestinians and their struggle to stave off poverty. In Question 19, our sample was
to state if they received employment assistance personally or in their households,
while also
reporting the
nature of that
assistance. In
February 2004,
according to our
interviewees,
10% of the
Palestinian
population
benefited from
personal
employment
assistance, while
21% have at
least one person
in their house-
hold who
received such a
benefit (see
Figure 4.19).
Figure 4.19 also clearly shows an increase in employment assistance delivery since
2001. The proportion of households that received employment assistance during the
past six months increased from 7% in June 2001 to three times more (21%) in Febru-
ary 2004. This evolution is a consequence of the progressive receding of the labor
market in the OPT since the beginning of the second Intifada.
To say that more than one-fifth of Palestinian households report having received
employment assistance may seem quite high when weighed against the 3% of
respondents who named employment assistance among the two most important
assistance types. Even compared to the 9% who reported receiving financial assis-
tance, the figure seems very high.
In fact, when we examine this in more detail, it appears that those who said they
received employment assistance or unemployment funds personally cite more often
employment assistance among the two most important types of assistance than those
who received it in their household. Also, long-term jobs are more likely to be cited
among the two types than short-term jobs or unemployment funds. Finally, the ques-
tion on employment assistance (Q19) is located much earlier in the question-
naire than the one about the two most important assistance types: Some
respondents may have decided not to mention employment assistance
already mentioned when asked for the two main assistance types.
Figure 4-19: Employment assistance received by the household
(o026) and personally (o024), 2001 - 2004
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In other words, it appears that
many employment assistance
beneficiaries did not cite
employment assistance
among the two most impor-
tant assistance types received
during the past six months.
Some of them thought that
they had already cited it in
Question 19. Others seem not
to have considered this
assistance very important
because they were not
personally the beneficiaries or
because its value was objectively not high (it came in the form of a very short-term
job or small unemployment funds).
Figure 4.20 presents the differential evolution of household employment assistance
according to place of residence. It appears that employment assistance has dimin-
ished since November 2002 in West Bank refugee camps; it was stable in the West
Figure 4-20: Employment assistance received by
the household (o026) by place of residence,
November 2002 - February
Figure 4-21: Types of personal (o024) and household (o026) employment
assistance, July 2003 - February 2004
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Bank outside camps while clearly increasing a great deal in Jerusalem and the Gaza
Strip, especially in refugee camps where as much as 43% of households received
employment assistance, especially unemployment funds, during the past six months.
Figure 4.21 gives a better insight into the nature of employment assistance: In Febru-
ary 2004, only 11% of household beneficiaries received a long-term job; 40% re-
ceived a short-term job, while almost one-half of beneficiaries received only unem-
ployment funds. Still for February 2004, the same general result is found for personal
employment assistance, the only difference being a relatively smaller proportion of
long-term jobs.
A comparison of the results for 2004 and 2002 in Figure 4.21 shows that the proportion
of long-term jobs almost tripled (4% to 11% for the household) among employment
benefits. On the other hand, the proportion of short-term jobs also diminished in favor
of unemployment funds.
Figure 4.22 gives the detailed story. It shows the proportion of households who
received long-term jobs, short-term jobs, unemployment funds or resources for the
self-employed household during the past six months. The differences in the breakdown
by place of residence and time are also highlighted. A few interesting observations
can be made:
The delivery of long-term jobs and unemployment funds has substan-
tially increased since November 2002. In relative terms, it might be said that
three times more households report a long-term job now.
Long-term job distribution is far more common in East Jerusalem and the
Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In West Bank refugee camps, no respon-
dents reported receiving a long-term job in their household.
Figure 4-22: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026)
in general and by place of residence,
 July 2003 - February 2004
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Short-term jobs appear to be in decline. This decline is only found in the West
Bank. In East Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip, especially in camps, the delivery of
short-term jobs has increased since 2002.
Although the general level of unemployment funds delivery has increased by 4%,
there was a marked decrease in the West Bank.
Resources for the self-employed were received by 5% of camp households in the
Gaza Strip. Outside refugee camps and all over the OPT, only 3% of households report
receiving them. The figures are lower in West Bank refugee camps (2%) and in East
Jerusalem (1%).
After this brief analysis of the geographical distribution of employment assistance, our
focus will be poverty and targeting. Figure 4.23 presents the percentage of house-
holds who received employment assistance during the past six months.
Generally,
resources
appear to be
well-targeted.
Almost four
hardship cases
out of ten
received some
kind of employ-
ment assistance,
as did slightly
more than a
fourth of those
living below the
poverty line and 11% of those above it.
The delivery of short-term jobs and unemployment funds or resources for the self-
employed are also well-targeted. It is interesting to note that hardship cases receive
proportionally more unemployment funds than short-term jobs, while those below the
poverty line (excluding hardship cases) more frequently receive short-term jobs over
funds. This
reflects the fact
that there are
more unem-
ployed among
the very poor
than among the
less poor.
Figure 4-23: Types of employment assistance received by the
household (o026) by poverty
Figure 4.24 Types of employment assistance received by the
household (o026)  by education
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Finally, the delivery of long-term jobs does not follow the same pattern. These are
delivered most often to those below the poverty line. This striking fact is related to the
higher delivery of long-term employment to those above the poverty line than to
hardship cases.
This incongruous finding is explained by two factors. First, many of the households
who received a long-term job were able to exit poverty and rise above the poverty
line. Second, as seen in Figure 4.24, it appears that long-term jobs are less often
delivered to people with a low level of education.
This section on employment can be summarized by the following:
The delivery of employment assistance increased since the beginning of the
second Intifada, especially throughout 2003.
The level of employment assistance delivered to West Bank refugee camps
underwent a sharp decline. In the West Bank, the level remained stable since Novem-
ber 2002, while in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem there was a clear increase.
Almost half of the provided employment assistance consisted of unemployment
funds. Long-term jobs represent only 11% of this amount, but their relative proportion
doubled since November 2002.
The delivery of long-term jobs and unemployment funds increased since Novem-
ber 2002, especially in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Short-term jobs were less
frequently distributed in the West Bank, but more in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
4.5 SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE
In our introduction, we pointed out that Palestinians only see the “visible part” of the
assistance iceberg. Namely, they don’t see the real donor in many situations. In this last
section, we will briefly analyze the perceived sources of the assistance delivered.
The analysis in
sections 4.2 and 4.3
relied on Question
42 about the two
most important
assistance types
that the donor’s
household received
during the past six
months. Figure 4.25
shows the distribu-
Figure 4-25: Main sources of the assistance received
(o036t), 2001 - 2004
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tion of the sources of this assistance. For example, 20% of Palestinian households cited
the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) as the source of at least one of the
two named main assistance types.
From the graph, a few observations can be made:
UNRWA was always the most cited single source of assistance. Since November
2002, our respondents cite UNRWA less frequently. Between the February - July 2003
period and the August 2003 - February 2004 period, the percentage fell from 25% to
20%.
Perceived support from the PNA decreased in a very substantive way throughout
the first year of the second Intifada; it fell from 17% in January 2001 to 7% in Novem-
ber 2001. Since November 2002, support from the PNA has again increased to 10% in
February 2004 so as to make the PNA the second most cited source of assistance.
Perceived support from trade unions has only been included in our survey since
November 2001. After rising sharply throughout 2002, it declined steadily until
February 2004.
International organizations are not cited a great deal by our respondents; around
6% cited them in 2004. It must be noted, though, that the perceived support for
international organizations rose from 1% by the end of 2001 to 7% in July 2003. This
increase is certainly attributed to the gradual shift from development assistance to
humanitarian aid that most international organizations underwent (UNCTAD 2003:3).
Other assistance sources such as NGOs, Islamic organizations, Arab governmen-
tal or private sources were less cited. Their evolution over time is also harder to
narrate.
Figure 4-26: Source of personal employment assistance (o024s), July
2003 - February 2004
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Turning to employment, Figure 4.25 shows the sources mentioned when assistance
was delivered personally to the respondent.1
Municipalities account for 21% of the mentioned sources in 2003 and for only 11% in
2004. In 2004, the PNA and UNRWA are both cited by one-fifth of the respondents. But
while the PNA has been stable in our survey since 2003, UNRWA’s presence has
increased by 4%. Trade unions were the single most important source mentioned in
2004; there was also an increase of 4% since 2003. In 2004, NGOs accounted for 11%
of the responses. Like municipalities; they also saw an increase of 3% since 2003.
Private sources are mentioned almost as often as NGOs. Islamic organizations were
mentioned by 5% of the 2004 respondents while international organizations were the
least mentioned source garnering 2% of responses.
Having briefly analyzed the main sources of assistance, we will now, in the remainder
of this section, perform a series of composition analysis by poverty, region and area of
residence, as well as refugee status. For this, we will again use Question 42 and
consider the sources mentioned for all types of assistance, be it food, financial or
employment.
Figure 4-27: Composition of the beneficiaries of the main sources of assistance
(o036t) by poverty
1 In July 2004, the question used (q20, o024s) asked for general employment assistance
received, not only that received during the past six months as in the later survey of in
February 2004. As can be seen in the graph, it is still possible to compare the sources of
this assistance.
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In Figure 4.26, we
see, for instance,
that roughly two-
thirds of the
interviewees that
mentioned trade
unions or Islamic
organizations as
the source of their
two main types of
assistance are
hardship cases.
Although the
percentage of
hardship cases
who report them as
sources is lower,
the PNA, UNRWA
and international
organizations share
a common pattern, with roughly 40% to 49% of their beneficiaries living below the
poverty line. Finally, it appears that NGOs are concentrating their resources on those
living below the poverty line, as this group counts for 59% of their beneficiaries.
Figure 4.27 presents the geographical distribution of the main sources’ beneficiaries.
Trade Unions, UNRWA and, to a lesser extent, Islamic organizations seem to have
more beneficiaries in the Gaza Strip, while international organizations concentrate on
the West Bank. The resources of the PNA and NGOs are more evenly distributed
between the two regions.
According to area
of residence, we
can see that trade
unions and NGOs
have more urban
beneficiaries than
UNRWA, which
counts almost four
beneficiaries out of
ten living in refugee
camps. Interna-
tional organizations
and, to a lesser
extent, the PNA are
the only
very
significant
sources
reported in
villages.
 Figure 4-28: Composition of the beneficiaries of the main
sources of assistance
(o036t) by region
Figure 4-29: Composition of the beneficiaries of main
sources of assistance (o036t) by area
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The reader won’t be
surprised to see, in
Figure 4.29, that
89% of those who
cited UNRWA were
refugees. Also,
77% of interna-
tional organiza-
tions’ beneficiaries
are not refugees.
Beneficiaries are
more evenly
distributed by
refugee status
among other
sources, although
refugees are
represented a bit
more proportion-
ally.
Figure 4-30: Composition of the beneficiaries of main sources
of assistance (o036t) by refugee status
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The previous chapter discussed
assistance delivered to the Palestin-
ians, analyzing its coverage, nature,
value and source. This chapter will
cover the impact of this assistance on
the Palestinian population, as well as
the people’s priorities concerning
assistance that should be delivered
to the OPT.
In the first section, gaps in the
distribution of assistance will be
highlighted in order to identify
Palestinians that are in need of
assistance and are not receiving it.
Section two and three will thoroughly
analyze the public’s perceptions
regarding the assistance that should
be delivered in the OPT: assistance priorities for the household and for the community
will be discussed separately.
The fourth section concerns satisfaction with the assistance provided in general, while
the last section will provide a more detailed analysis of satisfaction with the employ-
ment assistance delivered to the Palestinian population.
5.1 INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR ASSISTANCE
In Question 50 (see Annexes I & II), those who did not receive assistance were asked if
they were in need of it. Of these, 45% reported to be in need of help (February 2004).
This proportion has risen since July 2003 (39%), indicating a slowing of the improve-
ment that was observed from 2001 to 2003 in the targeting of aid.
What follows in this section considers those who need assistance in the total popula-
tion, and not only among those who did not receive it. This will provide a broader
picture in the actual gaps in the distribution of assistance.
In Figure 5.1, while 40% of the population received assistance during the past eight
months, 27% did not receive any and are still in need of it. This is the highest
level observed since the first study in February 2001 (32%), confirming the
impression of a changing trend in the improved focusing of aid towards those
who need it.
5 THE IMPACT
OF AID &
PALESTINIANS’
PERCEPTIONS
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At this point it is useful to take a
closer look at the evolution of the
need for assistance according to
the level of poverty.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the evolu-
tion of the need for assistance
according to poverty level. In
February 2004, an increase of the
proportion of people who
needed assistance and didn’t
receive it was observed in all
three categories of economic
status: hardship cases (from 24% to 26%), below the poverty line (from 19% to 33%)
and above the poverty line (from 18% to 25%). The most spectacular increase con-
cerns people below the poverty line, among which those needing assistance have
increased by 14% from July 2003 to February 2004.
The following chart concen-
trates on people who need
assistance and did not
receive any. While the
proportion of refugees in this
situation has been gradually
decreasing since February
2001 (from 23% to 9%), in
the last 6 months it has gone
up to 20%; more than
doubling. Non-refugees are
also more frequently in
February 2004 (34%) than in
July 2003 (28%) among those
who needed assistance and
did not receive any.
Figure 5-1: Need for assistance (o38r),
 2001 - 2004
Figure 5-2: Need of assistance (o38r) according to
poverty, 2001 - 2004
Figure 5-3: Need of assistance for those who did not receive it
(o38r) according to refugee status, 2001 - 2004
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These results, and the need for assistance, can be further explained by taking into
consideration the place of residence:
The highest proportion of people who needed assistance and did not receive it is
found in East Jerusalem (50%), and the lowest proportion in Gaza Strip refugee camps
(8%). Although it is generally seen as an environment where people are much better-
off, East Jerusalem is characterized by marked under-assistance. When the standard
of living is higher in a place of residence, the needy appear to be harder to reach.
In the West Bank, more respondents living outside refugee camps (33%) than
those living inside refugee camps (25%) are in need of aid without getting it, illustrat-
ing the difficulties of delivering assistance to isolated parts of the West Bank.
In the Gaza Strip, although figures are lower, the tendency is similar: the need is
higher outside than it is inside refugee camps (16% outside, 8% inside).
In Figure 5.5 below, the analysis is taken further by combining place of residence and
level of poverty. Whenever the data allow it, the segments of the population who need
aid most are identified. The findings on the poorest Palestinians are quite impressive:
In the West Bank outside camps, 39% of the hardship cases are in need of
assistance but did not receive it (an increase of 1% compared to July 2003)
The same is true for 24% of the hardship cases living in the Gaza Strip outside
refugee camps (an increase of 5% compared to July 2003).
In Gaza Strip refugee camps, this percentage has gone down to 1% (a decline of
5% compared to July 2003).
Considering those who live below the poverty line (excluding the hardship cases), the
following results appear:
In the West Bank outside refugee camps, 44% of poor people who
reported needing assistance did not receive it. This is almost half of this
group. In July 2003, the result for the same question was “only” 28%.
Figure 5-4: Need
of
assistance
(o38r) according
to place of
residence
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In the Gaza Strip, although the percentages are lower, an increase in the need of
assistance was also observed in recent months: 17% of respondents living outside
refugee camps (an increase of 6% since our last poll) and 12% of respondents living
inside refugee camps (an increase of 8% since our last poll and three times more in
relative terms) reported needing assistance and not receiving it.
These results indicate
that refugee camps
and the Gaza Strip in
general are much
better covered for
assistance than the
West Bank, especially
outside refugee
camps. Therefore, the
latter should again be
seen as a priority
target for future
assistance delivery.
Twenty-seven percent of Palestinians reported that they needed assistance but
did not receive it.
This proportion has increased by 7% since July 2003, going back to levels
registered in 2001 and breaking the improving trend in the focusing of aid towards
those who need it most.
The most spectacular evolution concerns people below the poverty line, among
which those needing assistance have more than doubled from July 2003 to February
2004.
There are an increased number of people needing aid without receiving among
both refugees and non-refugees.
The need for assistance is higher outside than inside refugee camps
In the West Bank among those living outside refugee camps, 39% of hardship
cases and 44% of those below the poverty line did not receive assistance.
5.2 PALESTINIANS’ PRIORITIES FOR THEIR HOUSEHOLD
In Part 4, we have taken a look at what kind of assistance is being distributed through-
out Palestine. The object of this section is to examine Palestinians’ priorities regarding
the types of assistance that should be delivered to their household. Following,
we will analyze their priorities for their community.
Figure 5-5: Need of assistance for those who did not receive
it (o38r) according to place of residence
and level of poverty1
1 East Jerusalem residents and West Bank respondents living outside refugee camps
could not be incorporated in this analysis because there were too few cases in those
places to have significant results.
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As it would have
been too difficult to
ask every respon-
dent an open
question about the
type of assistance
that his household
needs, we chose to
ask the respondents,
in Question 50, to
give their first and
second priority from
a list of six broad
assistance types:
education, employ-
ment, health, food,
money as well as
housing and re-
housing.
When we ask about the household’s needs, it is important not to take into account the
answers of those who have no needs. For this reason, the remainder of the section will
not include the answers of those who said they were not in need of assistance.1
Figure 5.6 indicates that 47% of the Palestinians say that the first assistance priority
for their household is employment. This impressive response underwent a very sharp
increase (+18%) since July 2003 where the figure was, as can be seen in the bottom
part of the graph, only 29%. Six Palestinians out of ten chose employment assistance
either as the first or the second priority for their household.
Food assistance is the first priority for slightly more than one-sixth of Palestinian
households. This type of assistance also increased significantly (+5%) as the first
priority selected by respondents when compared with the results from 2003, and there
were also many more respondents (+11%) who cited it as the second priority. Pales-
tinians’ prioritizing of financial assistance increased only marginally (+1% as the first
priority and +2% as the second) and is ranked third after employment and food.
Compared to July 2003 when it was the most frequently cited first priority (ex aequo
with employment), education is now cited by almost four times fewer respondents as a
first priority (-21%). The proportion of those who selected education as the second
priority did not change much. Apparently, most of those who did not cite education
again in 2004 valued employment as more important. The same downward prioritizing
can be observed for health. This type of assistance is the first priority for less than
10% of the households. Housing and re-housing are cited as a first or second priority
by less than 10% of the households. This figure has remained constant since
July 2003.
Figure 5-6: Assistance priorities for the household (o079) of
those who receive or need assistance,
July 2003- February 2004
1 In previous reports, we analyzed the entire population including those who did answer
but were not in need of assistance; the reader should be cautious when comparing with
previous results. If we analyze the priorities of those who are not in need of assistance,
they choose mainly education, health and housing assistance.
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In interpreting
these results,
one could say
that nearly half
of Palestinians
are asking to be
given jobs so
that they might
earn a living.
This is consis-
tent with our
other polls.
Approximately
another third of
the households
need food or
money above all
else. Less than
one-fifth of our
respondents put
a first priority on education, health or housing which are, in an emergency relief
perspective, less immediate needs.
The evolution since July 2003 clearly shows that the situation is worse this year: many
respondents who did cite secondary needs (education and health) as the first assis-
tance priority for their household last year shifted back to basic needs (employment,
food and money) this year.
At this point, it is important to consider the priorities of assistance needed by house-
holds according to their level of poverty. In Figure 5.7, it appears that income has a
clear influence on the priorities for assistance.
Employment appears to be the most important need for almost 60% of the
hardship cases. Seven out of ten respondents in hardship place employment among
the two most important needs. All other needs are minor for this group as they set their
first priority but food and money are cited almost two times more often than education
and health. Housing needs are minor.
The results for those living below the poverty line are comparable in global terms:
Employment is the most important need while health and education are cited less
often. The first difference resides in the much higher proportion of people putting food
assistance as their first priority (23% compared to 14% among the hardship cases).
The second difference resides in the higher percentage who report housing needs as
the second most important priority. Finally, it must be mentioned that, globally, the
differences among the assistance types are a bit less pronounced for those
living below the poverty line than for the hardship cases.
While the relative importance of education assistance for those living
above the poverty line is not much higher than for the poor, the most impor-
tant difference is observed concerning the priority of financial assistance:
23% of those who are better off view it as their first priority, but less than
Figure 5-7: Priorities for the household (o079) of those
who received or are in need of assistance
by level of poverty
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12% of the poorer
Palestinians report the
same. There are also
many more respon-
dents in this group
citing health as their
first priority (two
times more than
those living below
the poverty line and
almost three times
more than hardship
cases).
The analysis shows
that the distribution
of assistance
priorities also differs
significantly accord-
ing to area, region and place of residence. Only area and region will be analyzed here,
because the trends observed in those two variables perfectly reflect what can be
found when analyzing place of residence.
There is not much difference between the priorities of assistance between residents of
cities and refugee camps (Figure 5.8). Compared to cities, slightly more people in
refugee camps cite employment as the first priority; this is understandable as camps
are home to the poorest of Palestinian society. Also money is prioritized bit lower in
refugee camps.
Priorities in villages are quite different: less people cite employment as a priority, but
many more respondents cite food and education. This important result invites one to
think about problems in accessing villages as well as the delay in handing over ICRC’s
beneficiaries to the WFP (see Part 4, Section 1).
In Figure 5.9, it appears very clear that priorities for assistance vary across regions. In
the Gaza Strip, jobs are the first priority for assistance. In the West Bank almost all
other types of assistance are, comparatively, higher priority: 6% more respondents
cite food, 4% more cite education, 3% more cite money and 2% more cite health. Only
housing needs are similar in both regions. Again, these differences seem to implicate
mobility problems in the West Bank.
In East Jerusalem, priorities differ substantially: much less importance is given to
employment assistance, which is cited by two times fewer respondents than in the
Gaza Strip, for example. On the other hand, twice as many Jerusalemites cite
financial assistance as their top priority. Food and health are minor problems
in East Jerusalem as compared to the rest of the OPT, but housing is cited as
the top priority by 18% of respondents. Almost 40% cite housing and re-
housing needs among their two most important priorities. Housing assistance
is the second most important need if we consider both the first and the
second priority of respondents.
Figure 5-8: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who
received or are in need of assistance
according to area of residence
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Figure 5-9: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received
or are in need of assistance
 according to region of residence
These results on
East Jerusalem
should be
considered in
light of the 50%
of Jerusalemites
who reported
being in need of
assistance
(Figure 5.4).
Section 5.1
emphasized that
this is the highest
percentage of
needy people
among all
regions. Financial
and housing
assistance seem
to be the two
specific types of assistance needed in this region.
The impact of the
separation wall on
assistance priorities
is evident in Figure
5.10: many more
respondents
prioritize food
(+16%) in areas
crossed by the Wall.
Also, more people
need money. In fact,
the results point to
the growing
difficulties faced by
Palestinians living in
areas crossed by
the Wall, difficulties where food is lacking due to mobility problems.
Employment is first assistance priority for 47% of Palestinians (an increase of
18% since July 2003).
Seventy percent of hardship cases place employment among their two most
important needs.
Many people shifted back to basic needs when citing first assistance
priority, after a period in which those needs were met.
In villages, fewer people cite employment as a priority, but many more
cite food and education.
Figure 5-10: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who
received or are in need of assistance according to whether the
area is crossed by the Wall or not
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More people need food and money in areas crossed by the Wall than elsewhere.
5.3 PALESTINIANS’ PRIORITIES FOR THE COMMUNITY
The preceding section offered an overview of Palestinians’ priorities for themselves
and their household in terms of assistance. The present section describes priorities for
the community.
The analysis will be made easier in this section by the fact that even those respondents
who personally did not need assistance have answered the question of what they
consider their community’s greatest priorities.
5.3.1 General assistance needed by the community
In Question 51, respondents were asked to list the two needs they perceived to be the
most important for their community. Results in Figure 5.11 below confirm what has
been stated previously by setting employment assistance as top priority for assistance
in the OPT: more than six Palestinians out of ten cite it as the most important need for
the community and three quarters of the population cite employment among the first
two priorities.
Compared to July 2003, the relative priority given to employment underwent a very
sharp increase; the proportion of people viewing it as top priority rose by 25%. This
denotes a worsening of the situation for many households.
Financial and food assistance are each prioritized highly by some 10% of respon-
dents. Both types of assistance are viewed as first or second priority by roughly one-
third of the population each. Figures did not change much on financial and food
assistance as first priority since July 2003, but increased on financial and food assis-
tance as second priority. This evolution also demarks a degradation of economic
conditions in the OPT.
Health, education
and housing
assistance are less
important needs
for Palestinians,
while still being
considered first or
second level
priorities by
roughly one-fifth of
the population
Figure 5-11: Priorities for the community (o080), July 2003 -
February 2004
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each. The importance given to health and particularly to education decreased in a
substantial way since 2003. In fact, as the situation worsens, the public’s needs get
more basic.
As respondents were asked about priorities for their community, it might be expected
that there would be no significant relationship between priorities and whether or not
respondents received or needed assistance. However, this happened not to be the
case. Priorities of those who received aid differed slightly from those who did not
receive it, whether they needed it or not. This effect is easily explained by considering
the respondent’s location: as discussed before, far more people receive assistance in
refugee camps and community needs are clearly different there (see below). For this
reason and because those differences will be highlighted when analyzing standard
independent variables, priorities will not be broken down according to the need for
assistance as in the previous section.
Figure 5.12 shows
community needs
vary considerably
according to the area
of residence:
* In refugee camps,
employment is seen
as the first priority for
assistance by a larger
share of the popula-
tion than elsewhere.
When considering
first and second
choices, 84% of camp
dwellers cited this
type of assistance. Educational, health and food assistance are proportionally less
cited in camps while financial assistance is slightly more important. As seen in the
previous chapter, these services are mainly provided by UNRWA in refugee camps.
Because of mobility problems, education and especially health are prioritized
more highly in villages.
In cities, the relative priority for financial assistance is slightly higher.
Housing and re-housing needs do not vary much according to area of residence.
In areas crossed by the Wall, priorities differ from the rest of the OPT: the proportion of
respondents citing food as their first priority is almost double in those regions (17%
versus 9% in areas not crossed by the Wall). Also, the first and second level
prioritization of financial assistance is higher in those areas (54% versus
30%).
Figure 5-12: Priorities for the community (o80) according
to area of residence
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In Figure 5.13, the
evaluated needs of the
community are pre-
sented for each region
of residence:
In absolute terms,
the Gaza Strip is
characterized by the
highest percentage of
respondents saying
their community first
needs employment
assistance. Education
is mentioned in the
same proportion as in
the West Bank, while
health assistance
seems less important
in the Gaza Strip which has a more unified territory than the West Bank and therefore
better access. While housing needs are a bit higher than in the West Bank, money and
food are less frequently priorities.
In the West Bank, employment is also the first priority, but slightly less than it is in
the Gaza Strip. Proportionally, the need for food, financial and health assistance is
higher.
In East Jerusalem, where fewer people need assistance, the situation is quite
different: Jobs are much less needed than elsewhere, while financial, housing and
education assistance are prioritized much more highly.
A detailed analysis
of the relationship
between community
assistance priorities
and place of resi-
dence brings us to
figures 5.12 and
5.13.
When analyzing
results according to
the level of poverty,
it appears in Figure
5.14 that
employ-
ment
assistance is more needed among hardship cases than in the rest of the
population. Food assistance is more needed by those living below the poverty
line rather than hardship cases, certainly because of the good targeting of
Figure 5-13: Priorities for the community (o080)
according to region of residence
Figure 5-14: Priorities for the community (o080)
according to level of poverty
     139
food assistance that we highlighted in the preceding chapter. Other types of assis-
tance, namely education, health, money and housing, do not vary much across levels
of poverty.
5.3.2 Infrastructure assistance needed by the community
In the present questionnaire, we asked respondents about their household’s connec-
tion to infrastructures: electricity, water, waste and sewage disposal, phone network
and even satellite TV. As shown in Figure 5.15, it appears that electricity and water are
distributed to almost everyone. Seven Palestinians out of ten have a solid waste
disposal service and satellite TV. Fewer are connected to the sewage disposal net-
work. According to our data, mobile phone network’s coverage is very close to that of
fixed lines. One household out of ten has a permanent internet connection.
In Question 55,
we asked our
respondents’
their priorities in
infrastructure. As
shown in Figure
5.16, the most
important facility
needed by the
community is
water supply;
more than half of
the population
ranks it as the top
priority.
While a great deal fewer Palestinians view electricity as their first priority, almost half
view it as the second.
Access to the sewage disposal network is more important than institution of a solid
waste disposal service -
but both are less impor-
tant than water and
electricity.
Other types of infrastruc-
ture such as phone,
internet or TV are viewed
as much less important.
Priorities given to various
other types of infrastruc-
ture assistance don’t vary
much according to
poverty levels but they do
vary sensibly according
to geographical differences.
Figure 5-15: Connection to infrastructure networks (o174)
Figure 5-16: Infrastructure priorities for the
community (o124)
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As results for area
and region can be
deducted from those
for place of resi-
dence, we chose to
only display the latter
in the following
tables.
Interestingly, needs
are prioritized by
what is lacking in the
West Bank and
provided in East
Jerusalem. Villages of
the West Bank are
usually those areas
still not connected to
water and electricity
networks (Table 5.1
above) ; higher
priority is given to
water outside refugee
camps in the West
Bank (See tables 5.2
(detailing first
priority) and 5.3
(detailing first and
second priorities).
For electricity, the
picture is different: in
East Jerusalem,
where all respon-
dents prioritized
being connected to
the electricity
network, the highest
percentage of the
population cited this type of assistance as its first or second priority.
According to Table 5.1, many people in Gaza Strip refugee camps do not have access
to solid waste disposal services, while sewage disposal networks seem much less
available in the West Bank outside refugee camps. Also, quite logically according to
the size and the urban nature of the area, one observes the better condition of the
infrastructure in East Jerusalem where, for example, almost 30% of all
households are connected to the Internet.
Table 5-1: Connection to the infrastructure networks (o174)
by place of residence
Table 5-3: First & second priorities for infrastructure assis-
tance (o124) by place of residence
Table 5-2: First priority for infrastructure assistance (o124)
by place of residence
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In Tables 5.2 and 5.3, many interesting results appear:
In the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, priorities are similar to those in Jerusa-
lem. Water is relatively less important than elsewhere but electricity is more of a
priority. The size and urban nature of these places are certainly an explanation for this
similarity.
Refugee camps in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank also share common priori-
ties: for instance, communications infrastructure is a bigger priority in the camps. Still,
electricity and sewage disposal are more important in the Gaza Strip, while solid
waste disposal is more important in the West Bank.
Water and sewage networks are top level priorities in the West Bank outside
refugee camps.
More than six out of ten Palestinians cite employment as the most important need
for the community.
Eighty-four percent of refugee camp residents cite employment as a first or
second priority.
Education and health are badly needed in villages.
The most important infrastructure needed is water supply.
Highest priorities are water in the West Bank, and electricity in Jerusalem.
5.4 SATISFACTION WITH ASSISTANCE PROVIDED
Palestinians’ priorities for the assistance that they would like to be receiving are one
thing; their satisfaction with assistance they have received is another. Information
provided in this section should be useful for evaluating past efforts.
In the first section, we will analyze satisfaction with the assistance delivered in gen-
eral. The second section will specifically address employment assistance.
5.4.1 Satisfaction with assistance received in general
In Question 42, respondents who received assistance during the past six months had
to indicate the two most important items of assistance they received. As we saw in the
preceding chapter, the nature, source and value of these items were included. The
interviewees also had to evaluate their satisfaction with this assistance. In Question 43,
these respondents were asked more broadly about their satisfaction with the assis-
tance received during the past six months.
The evolution of respondents’ general level of satisfaction (Question 42)
since the beginning of the second Intifada is presented in Figure 5.17. It is
quite clear that general satisfaction with the assistance provided has im-
proved steadily since February 2001; the proportion of recipients that are not
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satisfied decreased from 70% to 42%. In February 2004, a majority of beneficiaries
are satisfied with assistance received during the past six months, and nearly 10% of
respondents are even very satisfied with it.
Satisfaction is clearly related to the level of poverty. Results in Figure 5.18 clearly
indicate that across all levels of poverty, a majority of respondents is satisfied with the
assistance provided. However, it is worth noting that satisfaction is highest among
those who live below the poverty line. The least satisfied beneficiaries are those
categorized as hardship cases.
Apart from poverty, no other independent variable is significantly related to general
satisfaction with assistance. The level of satisfaction is uniform across places, regions,
areas, refugee status, education and age.
A better understanding of the causes of dissatisfaction can be very helpful in improv-
ing assistance programs. Thus, the analysis of Question 44 will focus on the percent-
age of respondents who declared themselves dissatisfied with assistance received.
According to Figure 5.17, in February 2004, the proportion of respondents who
received assistance during the past six months was 41% of the population.
Figure 5.19 below confirms the growing general satisfaction with assistance;
60% complained about the frequency of delivery and a minority criticized
the quality and quantity of assistance received.
When the reasons of dissatisfaction are broken down according to place of
residence in Figure 5.19, it appears that respondents living outside of refugee
camps in the West Bank complain much more frequently about the quality,
Figure 5-17: Satisfaction with the assistance provided (o037), 2001 - 2004
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and, to a lesser extent,
the quantity of assis-
tance provided;
throughout the Gaza
Strip almost 70% of
those who are not
satisfied complain about
the frequency of
assistance.
Finally, still in Figure
5.19, an analysis by
poverty level puts the
frequency of aid as the
most often cited reason
for dissatisfaction
among all three catego-
ries of Palestinians.
Frequency is the main
reason of dissatisfaction for almost three-quarters of hardship cases. Under two-thirds
of respondents living below and above the poverty line cite frequency of aid as the
reason for dissatisfaction.
While quantity
is more impor-
tant than
quality as a
reason for
dissatisfaction
among hard-
ship cases and
those who live
above the
poverty line, the
relationship is
inverted among
those living
below the
poverty line; for
them, quality is
cited more
often as a
problem.
In sum, hardship cases are the most dissatisfied aid recipients; they wish to
see aid given more frequently and in a greater quantity. Those who are below
the poverty line have the same concern about the frequency of assistance
distribution but in their opinion, quality is more important than quantity.
Interestingly, those above the poverty line are more similar to the hardship
cases in their reasons for dissatisfaction.
Figure 5-18: Satisfaction with assistance provided (o37)
according to level of poverty
Figure 5-19: Reasons for dissatisfaction with the provided
assistance (o123) in general and according to
place of residence and poverty
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In Figure 5.20, it
appears that food and
financial assistance
are slightly less
appreciated by their
beneficiaries than
assistance in kind
such as clothes and
blankets: while
around two-thirds of
those who received
the former are
satisfied, more than
three-quarters of
beneficiaries of the
latter are.
On the basis of the above
analysis, it can be
concluded that the
majority of the popula-
tion receiving assistance
was satisfied with it,
regardless of the type of
assistance received.
As far as food assistance
is concerned, satisfaction
varies significantly
although not much
according to area of
residence: in villages,
respondents are less
satisfied (57%) than in
refugee camps (61%),
while respondents in
cities are the most
satisfied (71%). Also, refugees are less satisfied (61%) than non-refugees (73%).
Still for food assistance, the biggest differences are related to level of poverty, as can
be seen in Figure 5.21: 42% of hardship beneficiaries are not satisfied with food
assistance, while this proportion is only around 30% for the richer part of the popula-
tion.
1 Some respondents mentioned a particular kind of assistance twice. In this case, we
computed the mean of their responses concerning their satisfaction and recoded the
result in the extreme value. For example, if someone mentioned food two times and was
“very satisfied” one time and “satisfied” the second, we would have recoded his answer
to “very satisfied.” In case the final value was between “dissatisfied” and “very dissatis-
fied,” it was recoded as the latter. If the mean ended between “satisfied” and “dissatis-
fied,” it would have been considered a non-response.
Figure 5-20: Satisfaction with food, financial and in-kind
assistance (o036)1
Figure 5-21: Satisfaction with food assistance (o36)
by level of poverty
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For financial and in kind assistance, there is no significant relationship with any of our
independent variables. This could be partly explained by the small number of benefi-
ciaries of these types of assistance, but more broadly, it seems that satisfaction with
the assistance provided does not vary much according to geographic or socio-
demographic differences. The biggest determinant for satisfaction seems to be the
economic situation of the household.
Respondents dissatisfied with assistance decreased from 70% to 42% since our
last survey.
Satisfaction is clearly related to the level of poverty.
Respondents living outside refugee camps in the West Bank complain more about
the quality and the quantity of assistance provided.
Frequency of aid is the main reason for dissatisfaction.
Food and money are slightly less appreciated than clothes and blankets.
5.4.2 Satisfaction with employment assistance
As noted in the preceding chapter and in sections about Palestinians’ priorities,
employment assistance is of central importance: it is widely distributed and viewed as
a top priority by the population. In the present section, we will see whether this kind of
assistance is appreciated by its beneficiaries.
Figure 5.22 depicts a very positive evolution during the past six months: 53% of the
beneficiaries of employment assistance are now satisfied with it; in July 2003 and in
November 2002, this proportion was over 20% lower.
Further analysis shows that there are no significant differences in employment assis-
tance satisfaction for any of our independent variables: the level of satisfaction is
similar over the various socio-demographic characteristics, but also across geo-
graphical areas and even levels of poverty.
Figure 5-22:
Satisfaction with
employment
assistance (o101)
2002 - 2004
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As can be seen in Figure
5.23, when asked to specify
the reasons for their disap-
pointment with employment
assistance, some two-thirds
of the interviewees re-
sponded that employment
period was too short. Three
respondents out of ten
thought that the amount of
assistance was too little and
fewer than 8% of the
respondents gave other
explanations.
Again, reasons for dissatis-
faction do not vary when
analyzed by any of our independent variables. They also have not varied significantly
since July 2003.
A very positive evolution during the past six months: 53% of the beneficiaries of
employment assistance are now satisfied with it.
Two thirds answered employment period was too short.
Level of satisfaction is comparable over socio-demographic characteristics but
also across geographical areas or even levels of poverty.
Figure 5-23: Reason for dissatisfaction with
employment assistance (o120) in general,
according to region and refugee status, July 2003 -
February 2004
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Food security has often been regarded as an
important need for Palestinians living under the
Israeli occupation. The harsh economic realities
and the constant deterioration of living conditions
resulting from restrictions on movement, strict
closures, lack of jobs, destruction of agricultural
land and dismantling of agricultural sector
infrastructure were reasons behind the concentra-
tion of international and local assistance providers
engaging in food assistance to the Palestinian
population, primarily to economically disadvan-
taged households.
In the next few pages an effort will be made to examine Palestinian public perception
towards food and food assistance, and to gauge which households are the neediest
households, and what attitudes exist towards food assistance and food assistance
providers. It is hoped that such analysis will provide a glimpse at the evolution of food
need and food assistance over the past six months according to a set of independent
variables such as poverty, area and place of residence, and according to the impact of
the Wall on areas that are directly affected by its construction.
Figure 6-1: The two most important needs of Palestinian households (o079), July
2003 - February 2004
6 FOOD
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6.1 NEED FOR FOOD
The need for food, as a first priority, has increased from 10% in July 2003 to 16% in
February 2004. In fact, it is the second most important priority after employment. As
indicated in Figure 6.1, when respondents were asked to select the second most
important priority for their household, food was the first choice, with 23% saying that
it is the second most important priority.
When respondents were asked about the most important unmet need of their house-
holds, 10% of the respondents reported needing food. As indicated below in Figure
6.2, below, the highest percentage of people who said food was an unmet need is
found among those below the poverty line (13%), village respondents (13%), as well
as respondents living outside refugee camps - both in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. However, the fact that only 10% said food was an unmet need indicates rela-
tively good distribution of food assistance, given the importance of food to the
household.
While 16% of respondents reported that food is their household’s main priority, only
10% of them said that food is the main priority of the community they live in, as
indicated below in Figure 6.3. However, when queried as to the second most important
priority of the community, food was the most important according to 24% of respon-
dents.
Figure 6-2: Most important unmet need of Palestinian households (o180), in
general and by poverty, refugee status, area and place of residence
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The need for food is highly influenced by a number of factors such as education, age,
poverty, refugee status, and the area and place of residence of respondents. Figures
6.4 and 6.5 clearly
show that food
becomes more
significant to
respondents who
are below the
poverty line (not
hardship cases
who are often
covered by food
assistance from
various providers),
non-refugees,
lower educated
and older respon-
dents. For ex-
ample, whereas
food is a priority
for 12% of the 18 -
24 age group, this
percentage climbs
to 18% among
respondents who
are above the age
of 50.
It is also clear that
respondents
residing in
areas that
are not
primarily
covered
by
UNRWA’s
Figure 6-3: The two most important needs of the community
Figure 6-4: Food as a first priority (o079) according to poverty,
education, age, and refugee status
Figure 6-5: Need for food (o180) according to region, area,
place of residence, and the Wall
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food assistance are more likely to state food as their household’s main priority.
Whereas 15% of city and refugee camp residents named food as their priority, among
village respondents, the proportion is 18%. Also evident is that the need for food is
higher among non-refugee camp areas in the West Bank. While 13% of Gaza Strip
respondents living outside refugee camps named food as their main priority, the
figures increase to 18% among non-camp respondents of the West Bank.
It is also interesting to note that 3% more respondents residing in areas directly
affected by the Wall (18%) than respondents in areas that are not directly affected by
it (15%) consider food as the main priority of their households.
6.2 CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION
While the need for food as a priority has increased in the past six months, there are
indications in this survey that the dietary intake has been relatively better over the
past six months than it was in the months prior to July 2003. As shown in Figure 6.6,
below, 23% of respondents said that their consumption of dairy products increased in
February 2004 compared to only 18% who said that in July 2003. Similarly, the per-
centage of people who reported that their households’ consumption of meat products
increased grew from 5% in July 2003 to 11% in February 2004.
The relative improvement in the situation is also reflected in the percentage of respon-
dents who said that the consumption of specific food items has decreased. Whereas
respectively 36% and 49% of households reported in February 2004 that their con-
sumption of dairy products and meat products decreased, the percentage of respon-
dents who reported thus was slightly higher in July 2003. At that time, the decrease in
consumption of dairy products and meat products amounted to 39% and 57%,
respectively.
6.3 CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION
ACCORDING TO POVERTY
Further examination of the data reveals, however, that the increase in the
consumption of dairy products and meat occurred more among the eco-
nomically better-off than among those who are disadvantaged. This is
Figure 6-6: Change in the consumption of various food items in the household
(o081), July 2003 - February 2004
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particularly true
regarding meat
products. As
indicated in
Figure 6.7,
below, only 6%
of hardship
cases and 7% of
respondents
below the
poverty line said
that their
consumption of dairy products has increased in the past six months, compared to
18% of respondents who are above the poverty line. In the previous report of Septem-
ber 2003, only 7% of respondents in households above the poverty line stated that
their meat consumption had increased compared to 4% of respondents below the
poverty line. As such, and in comparison with the September 2003 report, it is safe to
conclude that the relative increase in the consumption of some food items has been
more marked amongst those economically better off.
Respondents who live in areas affected by the Wall also seem to have experienced a
change in the intake of specific food items. As can be discerned from Figure 6.8, 46%
of respondents from areas crossed by the Wall said that their consumption of dairy
products had decreased, as compared to 35% of respondents who reported a de-
crease in “non-wall areas.” As for meat products, 64% of respondents in “wall areas”
reported that their meat consumption has decreased, compared to 48% who reported
a decline in meat consumption among “non-wall” respondents. The fact that a mere
26% of respondents in “wall areas” (compared to the 41% of the respondents in the
non-wall affected areas) said that their meat consumption has remained
unchanged is indicative of the impact the Wall is having on the living condi-
tions of this segment of society.
Figure 6-7: Change in consumption of dairy products and meat
(o081) according to the poverty level
Figure 6-8: Change in consumption of dairy products and
meat (o081) according to Wall
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6.4 THE MOST NEEDED FOOD ITEMS IN THE HOUSEHOLD
When examining the food priorities of Palestinian households compared to their
priorities six months ago, the most interesting change is in the increase in the percent-
age of respondents naming basic commodities as their main food priority. While this
percentage was 66% in July 2003, the rate increased to 73% in February 2004. Also
interesting, is the drop in the need for baby food, which decreased as a food priority
by 10% to become 14% in February 2004.
6.5 THE MOST NEEDED FOOD ITEMS IN THE HOUSEHOLD,
ACCORDING TO POVERTY
Although basic commodities such as sugar, tea, and flour are the main needed food
items in Palestinian households, the data in Figure 6.10 reveals that some food items
are more important than others, depending on the poverty level of the respondents.
Figure 6-9: Most important household food need (o107)
Figure 6-10:
Most
important
household
need (o107)
according to
poverty level
  154
Whereas 20% of respondents identified as hardship cases named baby food as their
most important food item, the percentage drops to 13% among respondents that are
above the poverty line. Also noticeable is the higher concentration on meat among the
respondents who are above the poverty line than among respondents who are living in
hardship. Whereas 5% of the former group named meat as their main needed food
item, only 1% of the latter stated the same.
6.6 SOURCE OF FOOD
Despite the intensive effort by local and international organizations to provide food to
those most needy within Palestinian society, a large number of households continue to
rely on their own resources for food. The following pages will describe the role of food
assistance as a primary source of food according to a several independent variables.
As indicated in Figure 6.11, the percentage of households that rely on their own
resources for food increased from 76% in July 2003 to 85% in February 2004. Only 8%
of Palestinian households rely on food assistance as the main source of food to their
households. This percentage dropped from 12% in July 2003. Also important to note is
that the reliance on food from family members has also dropped from 12% in July 2003
to 7% in July 2004, a decline that could be due to family members’ inability to sustain
their relatives regularly.
6.7 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO THE
POVERTY LEVEL
An examination of the source of food according to poverty level demon-
strates that 20% of respondents falling in the hardship case category rely on
food assistance, compared to 6% of respondents below the poverty line and
Figure 6-11: Primary source of food in the Palestinian household (o077)
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1% of respondents
above the poverty
line. In addition, more
respondents living in
hardship rely on
support from the
extended family than
do other respondents.
While only 3% of
respondents above
the poverty line rely
on the extended
family for food, the
percentage is 13% among those living in hardship.
6.8 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO REFUGEE
STATUS
Refugees also rely
more on relief assis-
tance than non-
refugees. As illus-
trated in Figure 6.13,
below, 13% of
refugees and only 4%
of non-refugees rely
on food assistance.
The role that UNRWA
plays in food distribu-
tion among refugees provides the main reason for the gap that exists between refu-
gees and non-refugees in this regard.
6.9 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO REGION
The concentration of refugees in the Gaza Strip seems to explain the higher reliance
on food assistance there over the West Bank. The fact that 12% of Gaza Strip respon-
dents said that they rely on food assistance, compared to only 6% in the West Bank
Figure 6-13: Primary source of food (o077)
 according to refugee status
Figure 6-12: Primary source of food (o077) according to the
poverty level
Figure 6-14: Primary
source of food (o077)
according to region
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also points to the important role UNRWA plays in the provision of food assistance to
refugees. On the other hand, a higher percentage of West Bankers than Gazans rely on
support from the extended family for food.
6.10 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO THE WALL
When the information was gathered as to whether respondents were affected by the
Wall or not, a significant observation was made relating to the increased role that
families play in assisting their relatives who need food assistance. As illustrated in
Figure 6.15, 18% of
the respondents who
reside in areas
directly affected by
the Wall identified
their extended
families as the main
provider of food to
their households,
compared to only 6%
of respondents
residing in “non-wall”
areas. This observa-
tion can be explained as a consequence of the tough realities that Palestinians residing
in Wall-affected areas are facing - realities that force them to resort to asking their
families for help.
6.11 FOOD ASSISTANCE
There is a sharp decline in the proportion of Palestinians who said that they received
assistance in recent months. Whereas 48% of all respondents said that they received
some type of assistance in July 2003, that percentage dropped to 39% in February
2004, a decline of 9%.
Further examination of
Figure 6.16 reveals
that the decline of
assistance was more
marked regarding
food assistance. In
addition to the overall
decline in assistance,
the proportion of food
assistance
dropped from
79% in July
2003 to 76%
in February
2004.
Figure 6-15: Source of food (o077)
according to the Wall
Figure 6-16: Proportion of food assistance compared to the
overall assistance provided (o035, o036)
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This decline, however, was distinctive in certain areas and regions. While, as illustrated
in Figure 6.17, there was a significant drop in food assistance in villages (from 29% in
July 2003 to 19% in February 2004) and in the West Bank (a drop from 50% in July
2003 to 44% in February 2004), the proportion of food assistance increased in refugee
camps from 18% to 28% and in the Gaza Strip from 48% to 55% during the same
period.
West Bank respondents
living outside refugee
camps received 37% of the
overall food assistance
provided, followed by Gaza
Strip respondents living
outside refugee camps who
received 36% of the food
assistance, Gaza Strip
refugee camp residents
received 21% of food assistance, with the last 5% distributed in the West Bank
refugee camps, as illustrated.
Figure 6.19 provides the proportion of food assistance delivered to the 16 districts and
governorates of the OPT.
Figure 6-17: Food distribution (o036) according to area and region of residence,
July 2003 - February 2004
Figure 6-18: Food distribution (o036)
according to place of residence: first and second types
of assistance
Figure 6-19: Food
distribution (o036)
according to
district
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Despite the significant drop in food assistance during the six months prior to February
2004, it can be argued that the targeting has become more appropriate. As illustrated
in Figure 6.20, the proportion of overall food assistance delivered to respondents
classified as above the poverty line declined from 25% in July 2003 to 15% in February
2004. Conversely, the proportion of food assistance to the hardship cases increased
from 34% in July 2003 to 42% by February 2004.
6.12 SOURCE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE
Two questions were raised in this survey regarding the providers of food assistance.
One question allowed respondents to state what was the most important type of
assistance they received and from whom; the other was specific and respondents
were asked who provided food rations to their households.
When examining Figure 6.21 below, the answers to both questions appear to be
consistent. UNRWA’s share of food assistance is 50%, followed by the Palestinian
Authority (15%) and other international organizations, such as the World Food Pro-
gram (WFP)1 and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which make
up approximately 15%.
The following analysis will be made according to the question where respondents
themselves identified food assistance and the source of that assistance. This question
has been included in all previous surveys and, accordingly, results can be compared
over time.
As discussed earlier, food assistance is increasingly targeting the neediest families in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A quick glimpse at Figure 6.22 shows that while all
of the food assistance providers are targeting those below the poverty line, trade
Figure 6-20: Food distribution (o036) according to poverty,
July 2003 and February 2004
1 WFP’s objective in the OPT is to assist the most vulnerable segment of non-refugee Palestinians.
Of its 530,000 beneficiaries, approximately 70% are from among the “new poor,” 28% are from
households regarded by the Ministry of Social Affairs as hardship cases, and the rest of
their aid targets those suffering from malnutrition or living in institutions.
The total expenditure for the period July 15, 2003 to July 14, 2004 was approximately US$
31 million. It was disbursed with the assistance of a number of local and international
partners including the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Commit-
tees and others. The food basket that is provided through WFP consists of cereals,
pulses, vegetable oil, sugar, wheat, and high energy biscuits.
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unions and international organizations seem to adopt a good targeting system. None
of the respondents receiving food assistance from trade unions and only 6% of those
receiving food assistance from international organizations were among respondents
classified as being above the poverty line. The Palestinian Authority also seems to
adopt a good distribution policy as only 12% of their food recipients were from those
above the poverty line. Only local NGOs and charities have distributed food assis-
tance to a relatively large percentage of respondents classified as being above the
poverty line, with only 71% of their recipients classified as poor.
As previously discussed, the deteriorating economic conditions during the past three
and a half years have impacted all sectors of Palestinian society, irrespective
of their refugee status or where they live. While the neediest refugees have
been catered to by UNRWA, the destitute among non-refugees did not
receive much food assistance. With a mandate to help the refugees,
UNRWA’s food distribution efforts have been on the forefront with almost
50% of food assistance being provided by this UN agency. As illustrated in
Figure 6.23, 88% of UNRWA’s beneficiaries are Palestinian refugees.
Figure 6-21: Providers of food assistance (o036)
Figure 6-22: Food distribution (o036) according to source and poverty
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As the economic situation worsened for refugees and non-refugees alike, various
organizations embarked on providing for the destitute among the non-refugee
population. In addition to the Palestinian Authority, organizations like the WFP and the
ICRC provided economically disadvantaged non-refugees with food assistance. As
also illustrated in Figure 6-23, 74% of the PA’s food assistance and 85% of the food
assistance provided by various international organizations have targeted non-refu-
gees.
The concentration of UNRWA food assistance is manifested in the proportion it
distributes in the Gaza Strip. As can be discerned from Figure 6.24, 72% of UNRWA’s
food assistance is carried out in the Gaza Strip where the overwhelming majority of
the residents are UNRWA-registered refugees. Also interesting to note is that all
assistance provided by trade unions was distributed in the Gaza Strip, while all food
assistance provided by international organizations was focused on the West Bank. In
general, however, the Gaza Strip receives almost 56% of all food assistance compared
to 43% of such assistance directed at the West Bank.
The role of UNRWA and the share it has in overall food assistance obviously
impacts the distribution of assistance to the various areas of the OPT, particu-
larly in refugee camps. Although the camp population in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip is around 665,000,1 (approximately 18% of the OPT), our
results reveal that 27% of the overall food recipients are refugee camp
Figure 6-23: Food distribution (o036) according to source
and refugee status
1 http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/camp-profiles.html
Figure 6-24: Food distribution (o036) according to source and region
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residents, as indicated in Figure 6.25, below. While almost all organizations provide
food assistance in cities, food assistance to villages is primarily provided by the
Palestinian Authority (35%) and international organizations (44%).
In addition to the poverty level and the refugee status of the respondents, the place of
residence of respondents clearly determines the proportion of food assistance
received from the various food assistance providers. While UNRWA naturally focuses
on the needy among the refugee population in and outside refugee camps, concen-
trated primarily in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority and the various interna-
tional organizations target their assistance to the non-refugee population, concen-
trated more in the West Bank, as indicated in Figure 6.26. Also noteworthy is that while
local NGOs target the West Bank more than the Gaza Strip (respectively 65% and
35%); Islamic organizations are more focusing on the Gaza Strip (respectively 40%
and 60%).
6.13 FREQUENCY OF FOOD ASSISTANCE
When respondents were asked about the frequency of food assistance, only
10% reported that food assistance is provided to them on a monthly basis,
15% reported that they received food assistance once every two months,
43% said that they received it once every three months and 34% stated that
their households received food assistance only once in the past six months.
Figure 6-25: Food distribution (o036) according to source
and area of residence
Figure 6-26: Food distribution (o036) according to source and place of residence
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When the results were examined
according to the source of food
assistance, international organiza-
tions proved to be the source
providing food assistance to recipi-
ents on a monthly basis more than
others, with the Palestinian Authority
coming in second. Although only 7%
of UNRWA food assistance recipi-
ents said that they received it
monthly, 68% said that they received
it either twice or three times in the
past six months. Food assistance provided by local NGOs does not seem to be pro-
vided regularly, as 62% of the recipients of such assistance reported that they re-
ceived it only once in the past six months.
When examining the frequency of food distribution according to region of residence,
the results in Figure 6.29, reveal that food distribution seems to occur more frequently
in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Whereas 74% of food recipients in the Gaza
Strip said that they received food assistance more than twice in the past six months,
only 57% of their counterparts in the West Bank said so.
One of the main
explanations for the
discrepancy in the
frequency of food
distribution between
the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip is
the large
concentration
of refugees in
the Gaza
Strip. An
Figure 6-27: Frequency of food
distribution (o074)
Figure 6-28: Frequency of food distribution (o074) by source of food assistance
Figure 6-29: Frequency of food distribution (o074)
according to region of residence
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examination of food
distribution accord-
ing to area of resi-
dence shows that
food distribution is
more frequent in
refugee camps than
in cities and villages.
As illustrated in
Figure 6.30, whereas
25% of food assis-
tance recipients from
refugee camps said
that they received
food assistance only once in the past six months, the percentage is respectively 48%
in villages and 34% in cities.
6.14 ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOOD ASSISTANCE
As discussed earlier, a sizeable
proportion of the Palestinian
population in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip rely on food
assistance as their primary
source of food. In addition, the
provision of food assistance
enables households to use the
money they would have spent
on food to purchase other
necessary items.
The results from Figure 6.31,
reveal that 52% of the food
recipients said that food assis-
tance enabled them to use the
money they would have spent to buy other food items for the household, 38% said that
they used the money to buy other household goods, and 10% said that it enabled
them to keep some assets that would have been sold if no food assistance was
provided.
Thus, food assistance has been instrumental in helping households manage the
hardship confronting them, and this assistance is making a difference for these
households. The attitudes respondents hold regarding food assistance is another
indicator for assessing the value of food assistance and its impact on the
Palestinian population.
To this end, food recipients were queried both about their perception of the
organization that provided them with food and about their level of satisfac-
tion with food assistance.
Figure 6-31: Main benefit from food
 assistance (o173)
Figure 6-30: Frequency of food distribution
(o074) according to area of residence
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Figure 6-33: Attitudes towards the organization of food
distribution (o075) according to poverty and
source of food assistance
6.15 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF FOOD
DISTRIBUTION
In general, 62% of food recipients believe that food distribution was either very
organized or somewhat organized. As indicated in Figure 6.31, only 38% said that
food distribution was not organized.
The attitudes of food recipients regarding the organization that distributes food vary
according to region, area, and place of residence of those respondents. While 52% in
the West Bank felt that food distribution was organized, the 71% of respondents felt
this way in the Gaza Strip. The sense of satisfaction was even higher among recipients
in Gaza Strip refugee camps, where 76% stated that food distribution was organized
or somewhat organized compared to 48% in the West Bank refugee camps. Lastly,
while 45% of food assistance recipients in villages considered food distribution to be
organized, this was the case for 70% of the recipients in refugee camps.
When attitudes
towards food
assistance
distributors were
examined
according to the
poverty level, the
poorer among
Figure 6-32: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075)
according to region, area and place of residence
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food assistance recipients were markedly more positive than those respondents
receiving food assistance who are classified as being above the poverty line. Whereas
63% of the former said that food distribution was organized or somewhat organized,
only 55% of the later shared this opinion.
It is equally important to point out the difference in attitude with respect to food
assistance providers. UNRWA and the other international organizations appear to be
perceived as the most organized, with only 30% and 34% respectively saying that the
food distribution by those organizations was not organized. The most negative per-
ception towards food distribution was among those receiving food assistance from the
Palestinian Authority, Islamic organizations, and trade unions, as shown, above, in
Figure 6.33.
6.16 LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH FOOD ASSISTANCE
The level of satisfaction with food assistance provides another indication of the
importance of food assistance. Clearly, as depicted in Figure 6.34, 67% of food
recipients are either very satisfied or satisfied with the food their household received
in the six months prior to February 2004. Only 33% said that they are not satisfied.
When exploring the reasons behind their dissatisfaction, 54% of those dissatisfied
with food assistance attributed their dissatisfaction to the infrequency of food distribu-
tion, 23% attributed their dissatisfaction to the quantity, and 20% were dissatisfied
with the quality of food assistance to their households.
The level of satisfaction varies according to a number of variables such as the source
of food assistance, refugee status, area of residence, and the poverty level of food
assistance recipients.
Figure 6.35 outlines the differences in satisfaction with food assistance
according to the source of food assistance. The assistance provided by
international organizations seems to generate the highest level of satisfac-
tion, with only 12% of its recipients not being satisfied. Local NGOs are rated
more negatively, with 56% of their beneficiaries expressing their dissatisfac-
tion with the food assistance provided by them.
Figure 6-34: Level of satisfaction with food assistance
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Given the rela-
tively higher
targeting of food
assistance to
refugees, it is
perhaps surpris-
ing that refugees
are less positive
than non-refugees
about the food
assistance re-
ceived. As illus-
trated in Figure
6.36, 62% of refugees are satisfied with food assistance, while this is the case for 75%
of non-refugees.
Even a higher
percentage of
food recipients in
cities are satisfied
with food assis-
tance (75%) than
are food recipi-
ents in refugee
camps (62%).
One of the possible
reasons for the higher dissatisfaction among refugees and refugee camp residents is
the higher rate of poverty among refugees, particularly those living in refugee camps.
Since the infrequent distribution of food assistance is the main reason for dissatisfac-
tion with food assistance, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, it is not unusual to
see that the dissatisfaction lies among those who are more economically disadvan-
taged. An examination of Figure 6.37 shows that the people who need food assistance
most are those who are least satisfied. While 58% of respondents classified as hard-
ship cases said that they were satisfied with food assistance, 65% among those above
the poverty line reported being satisfied.
Figure 6-36: Level of satisfaction with food assistance,
according to refugee status and area of residence
Figure 6-37: Level of satisfaction with food assistance
according to poverty level
Figure 6-35: Level of satisfaction with food assistance,
according to food assistance provider
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6.17 VALUE OF ASSISTANCE
The value of food assistance will be discussed in this part on the basis of what the
respondents have reported as the value of food assistance in New Israeli Shekels
(NIS)73. In the following pages, two measures to evaluate the value of food assistance
will be presented, the average value (mean) and the median (the 50th percentile).
While it is often easier to understand the average value of assistance, the median
might provide a better description of the real situation as the average value is often
influenced by few extreme numbers or outliers. Accordingly, the analysis here will be
based mainly on the median rather than the average.
The median value for
food assistance is
approximately NIS
150 (about US$ 33).
As illustrated below
in Figure 6.38, the
highest value of
assistance seems to
be in the West Bank
among those living
outside refugee
camps. Although, as
discussed earlier, the
Gaza Strip receives
more food assistance
than the West Bank,
the value of food assistance is higher in the West Bank than it is in the Gaza Strip (NIS
150 in the West Bank compared to NIS 120 in the Gaza Strip). Moreover, the value of
the food is also higher outside refugee camps. Whereas, for example, the median
value of food assistance in West Bank refugee camps is NIS 125, the median is NIS 196
in the West Bank outside the refugee camps. Similarly, whereas the median in the Gaza
Strip outside the refugee camps is NIS 130, the median in Gaza Strip refugee camps is
only NIS 100.
Also interesting to note is that the median value of food assistance in villages is much
higher than in refugee camps. As depicted in Figure 6.38, above, while the median
value in villages is NIS 150, the median value in refugee camps is only NIS 100, which
is almost 33% less than the value distributed in villages.
An examination of Figure 6.39, below, reveals that the median value of food assistance
is the same (NIS 150) for those food recipients who are below the poverty line and for
those who are above the poverty line. However, the average value is higher for those
below the poverty line. This could be explained by the possibility that a few hardship
cases who are extremely poor might have received a high value of food
assistance, thus increasing the average value.
Also important to note is the considerable difference in the value of food
assistance between refugee and non-refugee recipients. Whereas the
median value is NIS 120 for the former, the latter receives a median value of
Figure 6-38: Average value and median of food assistance
according to place, region, and area of residence
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Figure 6-41: Perceptions about the targeting of
food assistance (o166)
NIS 150. As will
be discussed in
the following
section, the
reason for this
difference is due
to the lower
value of food
assistance
provided by
UNRWA when
compared to
that provided by
other organiza-
tions who distribute food assistance to non-refugees.
When examining
the value of
assistance accord-
ing to source, the
highest value is
that provided by
international
organizations, with
a median value of
assistance reach-
ing NIS 400. As
indicated in Figure
6.40, the value of
UNRWA’s food
assistance is
reported to be
much lower with a
median of only NIS 100. This gap between the value of food assistance distributed by
UNRWA and that distributed by other international organizations provides an explana-
tion as to why villages and cities receive food assistance with a higher value than that
received by refugee camp dwellers. This could explain why the value of food assis-
tance in the West Bank is higher than that in the Gaza Strip, as international organiza-
tions focus their food
assistance more on the
West Bank than on the
Gaza Strip, as discussed
earlier in this chapter.
An examination
of Palestinians’
perceptions
(among those
who receive
food assistance
Figure 6-40: Average value and median of food
assistance, according to source
of food assistance
Figure 6-39: Average and median value of food assistance,
according to poverty and refugee status
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and those who do not) about the targeting of food assistance is, in general terms,
positive, but needs to be qualified. As indicated in Figure 6.41, 26% of respondents
maintain that food distribution is carried out indiscriminately, while a mere 16% of
respondents specified that food assistance primarily targets needy households. It is
therefore possible to conclude that, although the findings in this section clearly
indicate that food assistance seems to target the needy, public perceptions about
food targeting remain somewhat skeptical.
The main findings of this discussion of food and food assistance can be summarized
as follows:
The proportion of the overall food assistance delivered to respondents living
above the poverty line declined from 25% in July 2003 to 15% in February 2004.
Conversely, the proportion of food assistance reaching hardship cases increased from
34% in July 2003 to 42% by February 2004.
There is a sharp decline of 9% in the proportion of Palestinians who said that they
received assistance in recent months. More specifically, whereas 48% of the respon-
dents said that they received some type of assistance in July 2003, the percentage
dropped to 39% in February 2004.
There has been a decline in the number of Palestinians who rely on food assis-
tance as their primary source of food, and a parallel decrease in the number of
households who rely on the extended family for food.
There has been a relative improvement in the dietary intake of food.
The food situation in areas that are directly affected by the Wall is deteriorating
and might need extra targeting in the future.
Food is the second most important priority for the household. The fact that only
10% of respondents said that food is the most important unmet need indicates the
successful effort conducted by food assistance providers in distributing food assis-
tance to the needy.
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In this part of the study, issues related
to health and education will be
overviewed. In subsequent sections,
more specific questions concerning
the respondents’ attitudes about
health and education will be dealt
with according to the various relevant
independent variables at hand.
7.1 HEALTH AND
EDUCATION IN GENERAL
Before going into depth into issues related to health and education, it is important to
briefly evaluate the importance of health and education both for the household and for
the community.
When respondents were queried about the two most important needs of their house-
hold,1 health but especially education lost importance since the September 2003
report. Whereas in September 2003, education was the household’s most important
need, it now only takes fifth place in order of importance. Health remains the third most
important need of the household.
When taking into
consideration only
unmet needs,2 the
importance of educa-
tion continues to be
ranked in fifth place
(11%), while health as
an unmet need stands in
fourth place (12%).
These rankings might
suggest that the
needs of health and
education are already
quite well catered for.
When the question to
interviewees
concerned
the two most
important
1 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 6 of the study.
2 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 6 of the study.
Figure 7-2: The most important unmet need of
the household (o180)
7 HEALTH &
EDUCATION
Figure 7-1: The two most important needs
of the household (o079)
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needs of their commu-
nity, health again is
ranked in third place
and education is
ranked in fifth place.
This survey indicates
that education that has
declined considerably
in importance since the
September 2003 report,
where it was ranked in
second place after employment.
As the construction of the Wall nowadays has become one of the major issues in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, interviewees were asked whether or not the Wall affected
their household in various manners. For example, respondents were asked whether or
not the construction of the Wall had made access to basic services such as education
and health care more difficult. As detailed in Table 7.1, 25% of the respondents stated
that the construction of the Wall had hampered their access to basic services such as
education and health care.
7.2 HEALTH
This section will be divided into four main parts: (1) issues pertaining to the need for
medical care, (2) restrictions on the delivery of medical care, (3) the level of satisfac-
tion with health services and their providers, and (4) the provision and source of health
coverage. Before entering into these specific discussions, however, it is useful to start
off with more general health-related issues, such as the main reason for choosing a
specific health facility.
In general, the main reason that respondents chose their health facility is because that
facility is free or cheaper than others (42%). The second reason influencing the choice
of the health facility is distance or because it is the only one available (23%), followed
by trust in the quality of services (18%) and the availability of drugs (6%). The
remaining reasons for choosing a health facility, such as the short waiting
time (4%), the humanity of the caretakers (2%) or the gender of the physi-
cian (2%) do not seem to be such important factors in the decision for
choosing one health facility over another.
Figure 7-3: The two most important needs
of the community (o080)
Table 7-1: Effect of the construction of the Wall on access to basic services such
as education or health (o164f)
  172
As overviewed in Figure 7.4,the reasons behind Palestinians’ choice of a particular
health facility vary according to region and area of residence. Respondents in the West
Bank (48%) and the Gaza Strip (40%) are much more concerned than their counter-
parts in Jerusalem (16%) about their health facility being free or cheaper than other
ones. The same is the case for respondents in refugee camps (50%) and villages
Table 7-4:The main reason for choosing the health facility (o168) in general and
according to region and area of residence
Figure 7-5: The main reason for choosing the health facility (o168)
according to poverty level,  educational level and Wall
     173
(49%) in comparison
with respondents in cities
(35%). Also clear from
the results is that the
highest percentage of
respondents to choose
their health facility on the
basis of trust in the
quality (24%) and drug
availability (10%) can be
found in the Gaza Strip.
The reasons behind
Palestinians’ choice of a
health facility also vary
according to their level
of poverty, level of
education, and whether
or not their area of
residence is crossed by
the Wall. As can be
expected, a far higher
percentage of respon-
dents from households
living in hardship (55%)
and those with a
monthly income that falls
below the poverty line
(47%) than those with a
living standard above the
poverty line (27%) attach
importance to their
health facility being free
or cheaper than others.
The opposite is true
concerning choosing a
health facility on the basis
of distance or it being the
only one available, and
the trust in the quality provided by the institution. Furthermore, the higher educated
(35%) are less concerned than the medium (45%) and lower educated (53%) about
the cost of the health facility. Conversely, the former (28%) more than the latter
consider the distance of the health facility an important factor in their choice. Lastly, a
far higher percentage of respondents residing in areas that are crossed by the Wall
(61%) than those residing in other areas (39%) stated that the main reason
for choosing their health facility was that it was free or cheaper than others.
On the other hand, respondents residing in areas that are not crossed by the
Wall (19%) significantly more often than respondents residing in areas that
are crossed by the Wall (10%) choose their health facility on the basis of the
trust in the quality of services.
Figure 7-6: Drugs prescribed and provided for chronic or
acute problems over the past six months in general
(o169a1, o169a2, o169b1, o169b2)
Figure 7-7: Drugs prescribed for acute problems over the
past six months (o169a) according to area of residence,
refugee status and Wall
Figure 7-8: Drugs prescribed for acute problems over the
past six months (o169a) according to
poverty level and age
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One way to find out more about the health status of the population is to try and gauge
the percentage of people who - in the past six months - needed drugs for acute or
chronic problems. It is also important to find out in how often people who were pre-
scribed drugs for acute or chronic problems also had access to the necessary drugs.
In general, 19% of the total sample was prescribed drugs for acute problems, while
29% of the interviewees were prescribed drugs for chronic problems. There is a
disparity of a few percentage points between the number of respondents prescribed
drugs for both acute and chronic problems and the actual frequency with which they
were provided with drugs for these problems. Three percent fewer interviewees
prescribed drugs for acute problems were actually provided with the drugs (16%)
and 4% fewer who were prescribed drugs for chronic problems were actually pro-
vided with the drugs (25%).
As both the prescription and the provision of drugs for acute and chronic problems
vary according to different independent variables, they are discussed separately and
systematically below. First, concerning the prescription of drugs for acute problems
over the past six months, the results in Figure 7.7 suggest that fewer drugs were
prescribed in refugee camps (14%) as compared to cities (19%) and villages (23%).
A lower percentage of refugees (16%) than non-refugees (22%) was prescribed
drugs for acute problems. Lastly, the prescription of drugs for acute problems was
more than twice as high in areas crossed by the Wall (36%) than in other areas (17%).
The results also
indicate that the
prescription of drugs
for acute problems
increases with higher
levels of poverty and
with age. More
specifically, whereas
26% of the respon-
dents in households
living in hardship
were prescribed
drugs for acute
problems, this was
the case for a mere
13% of respondents in
households with a
living standard above
the poverty line.
Furthermore, whereas
a mere 13% of the
respondents between
18 and 24
years of age
were pre-
scribed
drugs for
Figure 7-9: Drugs provided for acute problems in the past six
months (o169b) according to area of residence,
Wall, poverty level and age
Figure 7-10: Drugs prescribed for chronic problems over
the past six months (o169a) according to
region of residence, poverty level and age
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acute problems, this was the case for 30% of the respondents who are 50 years or
older.
As for the provision of drugs for acute problems, one observes by comparing figures
7.7 and 7.8, on the one hand, and figures 7.9 and 7.10, on the other hand, that the
discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs for acute problems never
exceeds the 5% mark, except in areas that are crossed by the Wall. There, the discrep-
ancy between prescription and provision of drugs over the past six months reaches
8%.
Concerning the prescription
of drugs for chronic problems,
the results in Figure 7.10
clearly indicate that this
occurs far less frequently in
Jerusalem (18%) than in the
West Bank (30%) and in the
Gaza Strip (31%). Further-
more, a considerably lower
percentage of respondents in
households above the poverty
line (23%) than those in
households below the poverty line (31%) and those living in hardship (32%) were
prescribed drugs for chronic problems. Finally, it is obvious from the results that the
incidence of drug prescription for chronic problems is highest in the age group of 50
years and above.
As for the provision of
drugs for chronic
diseases, it is clear
from a comparative
glimpse at figures
7.10 and 7.11  that
the main discrep-
ancy between the
prescription and the
provision of drugs
occurs among
respondents that live
in hardship. Nine
percent fewer
respondents in this
category who were prescribed drugs for chronic problems were actually provided
with them.
The provision of drugs could come from various sources. As such, the
interviewees were queried about the source of the drugs they needed. In
general, 43% of the respondents stated that that the private pharmacy was
their source of medication, 30% said that it was a Ministry of Health clinic,
23% responded that their drugs came from a United Nations Refugee Works
Figure 7-12: Source of required prescription drugs (o170)
in general, according to region of
residence and Wall
Figure 7-11: Drugs provided for chronic problems
over the past six months (o169b) according to
poverty level and age
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(UNRWA) clinic and
3% said that their
drugs came from a
non-governmental
organization clinic.
The remaining 2% of
the respondents
specified that
although the drugs
were available, they
was too expensive
for them to pur-
chase.
The results on the
source of respon-
dents’ prescribed
drugs vary signifi-
cantly according to
most of the indepen-
dent variables at our
disposal. They are
overviewed in figures
7.12, 7.13 and 7.14.
First of all, when examin-
ing this issue according
to region, it is clear
that private pharma-
cies are least fre-
quently used to obtain
drugs in the Gaza
Strip (33%). Even
Ministry of Health
clinics as providers of
prescribed drugs are
mentioned by a far
lower percentage of
respondents in the
Gaza Strip (21%) than
in the West Bank
(35%) and Jerusalem
(44%). As such, it seems that UNRWA clinics are the main providers of drugs in the
Gaza Strip (41%).1 A further look at Figure 7.12 also shows that 50% of the respon-
dents who reside in areas that are crossed by the Wall specified that they acquired
their drugs from Ministry of Health clinics.
Figure 7-14: Source of required prescription drugs (o170)
according to poverty level
 and educational level
1  A potential explanation for the high reliance on UNRWA clinics in the Gaza Strip for
needed drugs is that the majority of the Gaza population are refugees and are most
likely to rely on UNRWA for such services.
Figure 7-13: Source of required prescription drugs (o170)
according to area of residence, refugee status
and place of residence
Figure 7-15: Type of medical care needed
in the past six months (o102)
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When examining the question on the source of drugs according to area of residence,
refugee status and place of residence, the reliance of refugees and - perhaps even
more often - camp refugees on UNRWA clinics for their needed drugs is marked. As
overviewed in Figure 7.13, 59% of the respondents in refugee camps compared to
21% in cities and a mere 5% in villages specified that UNRWA clinics provided them
with the needed drugs. Moreover, whereas 46% of the refugee respondents stated
that an UNRWA clinic was the source of most of their needed drugs, this was the case
for merely 1% of the non-refugee respondents. Finally, 56% of West Bank camp
respondents and 61% of Gaza camp respondents indicated reliance on an UNRWA
clinic for most of their needed drugs.
The results in Figure 7.14, mainly indicate that reliance on a private pharmacy for most
of the needed drugs is higher in households with a monthly income above the poverty
line (51%) than in households that fall below the poverty line (39%) or that live in
hardship (33%). Moreover, a lower percentage of low educated (36%) and medium
educated (39%) respondents than high educated respondents (49%) stated that the
source of most of their required medicine is a private pharmacy.
7.2.1 Need for medical care in the past six months
In an attempt to monitor Palestinian medical care needs, interviewees were asked to
specify from a predetermined list what type of medical care they or any of their
household members had been in need of in the past six months.1 In general, and as
overviewed in Figure 7.15, 79% of the respondents needed drugs, 74% were in need
of medical care, and 55% needed hospitalization, while 26% were in need of an
ambulance. Furthermore, 44% of the respondents stated that they needed vaccina-
tions. While 25% of the respondents were in need of family planning, 36% needed
prenatal care and 28% needed actual birth care. Slightly less than 30% of the respon-
dents needed health care for a sick child. Lastly, 17% of the respondents
Figure 7-16: Need for mental health care services and ability to reach them (o172) in
general and according to region of residence
8 It is worth pointing out that this question was also asked in the September 2003 report.
However, in September 2003, the question encompassed the time since the beginning of
the Intifada, while in the current report it concerns the past six months. Also, the current
report’s predetermined list includes many more types of needed medical care.
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specified that they or their household members had need of specialized care in the
past six months, 8% needed physical rehabilitation and 21% needed follow-up for a
chronic disease.
Another more specific type of medical care concerns mental health care. In an
attempt to assess the need, availability and accessibility of such specialized care,
interviewees were asked whether or not anybody in the household required mental
health care, and if so, whether or not the necessary services exist in their area and
whether or not they could be accessed in the past six months. In general, 65% of the
respondents stated that nobody in their household was in need of mental health care,
while an additional 11% of the respondents specified that nobody in their household
wanted this care.  Furthermore, 14% of the respondents said that mental health care
services are not available in their area of residence, 1% said that these services could
not be reached, while 3% stated that these services could not be reached most of the
time. Finally, 3% of the respondents said that mental health care services could be
reached most of the time, while 4% affirmed that these services could be reached all
the time. When analyzing this question according to region of residence, the results
show that the need for mental health care is the highest in the Gaza Strip and the
lowest in Jerusalem. The results are overviewed in Figure 7.16.
The results in Figure 7.17 indicate that the need for mental health care is higher among
refugees than non-refugees. The need for mental health care is also higher among the
poorer sections of society than among the households with a monthly income that is
above the poverty line. Lastly, across all subgroups under examination, the percentage
of respondents being able to reach mental health care services most of the time or all
the time is higher than the percentage of those who could not reach these
services most of the time or all of the time in the past six months.
Figure 7-17: Need for mental health care services and ability to reach them
(o172) according to refugee status and level of poverty
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7.2.2 Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months
In order to attain a better picture of the delivery of medical care, respondents were
also asked to specify whether or not delivery of medical care was restricted in the
past six months. Hereafter, each type of medical care, the need for such care and the
restrictions faced in the reception of such care will be discussed separately according
to the relevant variables that prove to be significant.
When examining the issue of prescription drug delivery over the past six months, in
general, 51% of the respondents stated that they had not faced any restrictions, 21%
were faced with a delay, while 7% of respondents reported that the delivery of drugs
was denied. As illustrated in Figure 7.18, below, the need for drugs was higher in the
Gaza Strip (10%) than in the West Bank (26%) and Jerusalem (37%). Denial of drugs
was most frequent in the West Bank (10%), but delay in the delivery of drugs was
most frequent in the Gaza Strip (28%). In comparison with Gazans (58%) and
Jerusalemites (57%), West Bankers were most frequently restricted in their ability to
attain prescription drugs. Furthermore, respondents with a household income level
above the poverty line (25%) were less often in need of drugs than respondents with a
household income below the poverty line (20%) or those living in hardship (12%).
Moreover, the former less frequently experienced a delay or complete inability to
attain drugs, and more frequently experienced no restrictions in their access to drugs.
The results detailed in Figure 7.19 show that respondents in refugee camps on the one
hand were most in need of drugs (8%), while on the other hand, they received this
care most frequently without any restrictions (64%). Denial of the provision of drugs
was higher in villages (11%) and cities (6%) than in camps (4%), while a delay in the
delivery of such care occurred more in refugee camps (24%) and cities (21%) than in
villages (18%). Furthermore, the need for drugs was more than twice as high
among respondents residing in areas that are crossed by the Wall (11%) than
among respondents residing in areas that are not crossed by the Wall (23%).
In comparison with respondents from areas that are crossed by the Wall,
respondents in other areas had their delivery of drugs less often denied (7%
vs. 13%), less often delayed (19% vs. 33%) and less often restricted (52%
vs. 44%).
Figure 7-18: Restrictions on the delivery of drugs in the past six
months (o102h) in general, according to region
of residence and poverty level
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Of the total
sample, only half
of the respondents
stated that their
delivery of medi-
cal care had not
been restricted in
the past six
months, while 7%
said this delivery
had been denied
and 17% specified that it had been delayed. When analyzing this question according
to region of residence, the need for medical care in the past six months was far greater
in the Gaza Strip (81%) than in the West Bank (70%) and Jerusalem (65%). However,
in comparison to respondents in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, respondents in the
West Bank faced the most restrictions, delays or denials of medical care. The effect of
closures and occasional curfews could explain this phenomenon. According to
poverty level, the percentage of hardship cases that were in need of medical care in
the past six months, and saw the delivery of this care denied, delayed or restricted is
higher than the percentage among respondents with living standards above the
poverty line or even those with living standards below the poverty line.
The results in Figure 7.21, below, show in a detailed manner that, although the need for
medical care was highest in refugee camps, it was less often denied or restricted in
those areas than in cities or villages. Furthermore, in comparison with areas that are
not crossed by the Wall, the need for medical care in areas that are crossed
by the Wall is greater and the denials, delays and restrictions faced by
respondents residing there are significantly greater.
In general, 45% of the respondents did not need hospitalization in the past
six months. Of the 55% who did need hospitalization, 37% did not face any
restrictions at all, 6% were denied hospitalization and 12% saw their hospi-
Figure 7-20: Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in
the past six months (o102g) in general, according to region of residence and
poverty level
Figure 7-19: Restrictions on the delivery of drugs in the past six
months (o102h) according to area
 of residence and Wall
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talization delayed. Although the need for hospitalization in the past six months has
clearly been higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank or in Jerusalem, denial and
restrictions of hospitalization occurred least in this region of residence. Once again, the
need for hospitalization was clearly far higher among households living in hardship
than among households with a living standard below the poverty line or households
with a monthly income level above the poverty line. The results on restrictions on
hospitalization in general, according to region of residence and poverty level are
detailed in Figure 7.22.
Although the need for hospitalization was lower in villages (51%) than in refugee
camps (44%) and cities (43%), denials, delays and restrictions occurred more often in
those areas. Furthermore, although the need for hospitalization in areas that are
crossed by the Wall and other areas was quite similar in the past six months, the
occurrence of denials, delays and restrictions was significantly higher in the former
than in the latter.
In general, 74% of the interviewees were not in need of an ambulance in the
past six months. Of the 26% of the respondents who were in need of an
ambulance, 5% were denied the provision of an ambulance, 7% faced a
delay, while the remaining 15% did not face any restrictions. Although a
slightly higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (70%) than in the
West Bank (73%) needed an ambulance in the past six months, restrictions,
Figure 7-21: Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months
(o102g) according to area of residence and Wall
Figure 7-22: Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102b) in general,
according to region of residence and poverty level
  182
delays and
denials of
such service
occurred
more fre-
quently in the
latter than in
the former.
As illustrated
in Figure
7.24, a higher
percentage of respondents above the poverty line (79%) and below the poverty line
(72%) than respondents living in hardship (67%) stated that in the past six months
they had not been in need of an ambulance.
Although about the same percentage of respondents in cities (75%) and villages
(75%) specified that they had not been in need of an ambulance in the past six
months, villagers clearly more than city residents faced denial, delay or restrictions in
the receipt of such care. When examined according to area of residence, the need for
an ambulance was the highest in refugee camps. Furthermore, not only did a signifi-
cantly lower
percentage
of respon-
dents
residing in
Figure 7-25: Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance
in the past six months (o102c) according to area
of residence and Wall
Figure 7-24: Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months
(o102c) in general, according to region
of residence and poverty level
Figure 7-23: Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months
(o102b) according to area of residence and Wall
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areas crossed by the
Wall than those in
other areas state that
they had not been in
need of an ambu-
lance in the past six
months, the former
also more than the
latter experienced
denial, delays or
restrictions in their
access an ambu-
lance. The results
according to area of
residence and the effect of the Wall are overviewed in Figure 7.25.
Although not included in the figure, it is also worth mentioning that the need for an
ambulance increases with age. More specifically, whereas 81% of the respondents
between the age of 18-24 years old specified that they had not been in need for an
ambulance in the past six months, this was the case for barely 70% of respondents
who are 50 years or older.
Of the total sample, 56% of the interviewees did not need vaccinations in the past six
months and 38% were not restricted in the provision of vaccinations. Two percent of
respondents were denied provision of vaccinations, while 4% faced a delay. The need
for vaccinations in Palestinian households was higher in the Gaza Strip (49%) than in
the West Bank (58%) and Jerusalem (69%). Furthermore, the need for vaccinations
seems to increase in parallel with the poverty of the respondents.
Despite that an equal
percentage of
respondents in
villages (57%) and
cities (57%) were in
no need of vaccina-
tions in the past six
months, restrictions,
delays and denials in
obtaining such care
was clearly higher in
the former than in the latter. The results in Figure 7.27, also suggest that respondents
residing in areas crossed by the Wall clearly faced more difficulties than their counter-
parts in other areas in obtaining the necessary vaccinations for their households.
Of all the interviewees, 75% have not been in need of family planning-
related medical services in the past six months. Of the 25% who were in
need of family planning over this time, 19% did not face any restrictions,
while 3% were denied the provision of such care and another 3% faced
delays. The percentage of respondents who were not in need of family
planning care was the highest in Jerusalem (96%), followed by the West Bank
(74%) and the Gaza Strip (70%). Restrictions, delays and denials of family
Figure 7-27: Restrictions on the provision of
vaccinations in the past six months (o102d) according toarea
of residence and Wall
Figure 7-26: Restrictions on the provision of
vaccinations in the past six months (o102d) in general,
according to region of residence and poverty level
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planning occurred most frequently in the West Bank. Furthermore, an equal percent-
age of respondents in households with a monthly income below the poverty line (66%)
and those living in hardship (66%) specified that they had no need for family planning.
The need for family planning was clearly the lowest in households with a living stan-
dard above the poverty line, with 82% of the respondents in that subgroup stating that
they had not needed family planning in the past six months. Although not overviewed
in Figure 7.28, it is notable that there is a statistically significant relationship between
the need for family planning and the variable of age. The lowest percentage of respon-
dents who reported needing family planning was found in age groups between 18-24
years (16%) and from 50 years and above (16%). In the age group between 25-34
years, 31% of the respondents were in need of family planning over the past six
months, while this was the case for 29% of the respondents in the age group of 35-49
years.
The respondents who least often reported that nobody in their household had
need of family planning over the past six months was found in refugee camps
(69%). In fact, when examining the need for family planning according to
refugee status, 28% of the refugee respondents were in need of family
planning in the past six months compared to 22% of the non-refugees
needing such care. Restrictions, delays and denials in the provision of family
Figure 7-29: Restrictions on the provision of family planning  in the past six months
(o102f) according to area of residence and Wall
Figure 7-28: Restrictions on the provision of family planning in the past six months
(o102f) in general, according to region of residence
and poverty level
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planning were the highest in villages. As detailed in Figure 7.29, not only were house-
holds in areas crossed by the Wall more in need of family planning than households in
other areas, they also more frequently faced restrictions, delays and denials in their
attempts to obtain such care.
In general, 64% of the total sample had no need for prenatal care over the past six
months. Of the 36% of the households where prenatal care was needed, 29% faced no
restrictions, 2% were denied access to prenatal care, while 5% were confronted with
delays. Although the need for prenatal care was clearly higher in the Gaza Strip than
in the West Bank or Jerusalem, the occurrence of delays and denial of access to
prenatal care was the highest in the West Bank. The results in Figure 7.30, below, also
illustrate how
the need for
prenatal care
increases in
parallel with
increased levels
of poverty.
Finally, it is
worth pointing
out that the
highest need
for prenatal
care according
to the variable
of age can be
found in the age
group between
25-34 years with 44% of the respondents stating that prenatal care had been needed
in their household in the past six months.
The percentage of respondents specifying that there has been no need for prenatal
care in their household in the past six months is about the same in refugee camps
(62%) and villages (63%), and is slightly lower in cities (66%). However, restrictions,
denials and delays in the provision of prenatal care have been highest in villages.
Furthermore, the results in Figure 7.31 also show that not only the need for prenatal
care in areas that are crossed by the Wall is higher than in other areas, but also that
more difficulties were faced in obtaining such care by respondents in the former than
by respondents in the latter.
Figure 7-30: Restrictions on the provision of prenatal care
in the past six months (o102e) in general, according to region of
residence and poverty level
Figure 7-31: Restrictions on the provision of prenatal care in the past six months
(o102e) according to area of residence and Wall
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Concerning birth care, 72% of the total sample had no such need in the past six
months. Of the 28% in need of such care, 3% were denied the delivery of birth care,
4% faced delays in the delivery of such care, while 21% faced no restrictions at all. As
the need for prenatal care was highest in the Gaza Strip, it is not surprising that the
need for birth care is also the highest in this region of residence. Once more, difficul-
ties in the delivery of such care occurred most frequently in the West Bank. Again
coherent with the findings about the need of prenatal care, the need for birth care
increases with increased levels of poverty.
The results in Figure 7.33, below, indicate that compared to respondents residing in
refugee camps (76%), a lower percentage of respondents in cities (72%) and villages
(70%) stated that nor they nor their household members needed birth care in the past
six months. Moreover, villagers were confronted most frequently with denials and
delays in the delivery of birth care. Furthermore, although there is only a slight differ-
ence in the percentage between respondents in areas crossed by the Wall and respon-
dents in other areas stating that there had been a need for birth care in their house-
holds, restrictions, denials and delays in the delivery of such care has been signifi-
cantly higher in the areas crossed by the Wall than in other areas under study.
Concerning the
delivery of health
care to a sick child,
71% of the total
sample of
interviewees did
not have any need
for health care for a
sick child in the
past six months. Of
the 29% who did
need such care, 21% did not face any restrictions, 3% had the delivery of health care
to a sick child denied, while 6% were provided with health care for their sick
child with a delay. Clearly from the results in Figure 7.34, households in the
Gaza Strip were more frequently in need of health care for a sick child than
households in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Furthermore, the poorer seg-
ments of society more frequently than the financially better-off seem to be in
need of health care for a sick child. Indeed, whereas only 59% of the respon-
dents living in hardship said that they did not have any need for health care
Figure 7-32: Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months
(o102i) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level
Figure 7-33: Restrictions on the delivery of birth
care in the past six months (o102i) according to area of
residence and Wall
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for a sick child in their household, this was the case for 65% of the respondents with a
monthly household income below the poverty line and for 73% of the respondents in
households above the poverty line.
The results in
Figure 7.35,
below, illus-
trate that
whereas the
need for
health care for
a sick child in
households in
refugee
camps and
villages is quite similar, it is higher in cities. Furthermore, while the need for health care
for a sick child is about the same in areas that are crossed by the Wall and in areas that
are not crossed by the Wall, the denial of delivery of such care and the delays in the
provision of health care to a sick child occurred more frequently in the areas that are
crossed by the Wall than in other areas.
Moving on to the delivery of specialized care, in general, 83% of the interviewees
reported that neither they nor their household members were in need of such care in
the past six months, 4% said that the delivery of such care had been denied, 6%
specified that it had been delayed, while 7% stated that the delivery of specialized
care had not been restricted at all. The need for specialized care is highest in the Gaza
Strip, followed by the West Bank, and only then, Jerusalem. However, the results in
Figure 7.36 indicate that it was most difficult for West Bankers to receive
specialized care without restrictions, denial or delay. When examined
according to poverty level, both the need for specialized care and the
restrictions of any kind on the delivery of such care were the highest among
households living in hardship.
Figure 7-34: Restrictions on the delivery of health care for a sick child
in the past six months (o102j) in general, according to region
of residence and poverty level
Figure 7-35: Restrictions on the delivery of health care
for a sick child in the past six months (o102j) according to area of
residence and Wall
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When studying the data according to area of residence, the need for specialized care
and the restrictions, delays or denials of such care are the highest in villages. Similarly,
when analyzing the results according to the effect of the Wall, the need for specialized
care and the
restrictions of any
type on the
delivery of such
care are the
highest in areas
that are crossed by
the Wall.
Concerning
physical rehabilita-
tion, the large
majority of 92% of the sample stated that neither they nor any of their household
members had need of such care in the past six months. Of the 8% percent that were in
need of physical rehabilitation, 3% saw their need for such care denied, 2% faced a
delay in the provision of such care, while the remaining 2% were provided with the
needed physical rehabilitation without restrictions. As is obvious from the results
detailed in Table 7.2, below, the number of respondents who affirmed that they were in
need of physical
rehabilitation is quite
small. As such, the
results on this ques-
tion will not be
analyzed
according to
the various
independent variables at hand because it would be impossible to draw any
significant and correct conclusions.
Figure 7-37: Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care
over the past six months (o102k) according
to area of residence and Wall
Figure 7-36: Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care in the
past six months (o102k) in general and according to region of residence
and poverty level
Table 7-2: Restrictions on the delivery of physical
rehabilitation in the past six months (o102l)
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Finally, concerning the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases in the past six
months, 78% of the total sample of interviewees had no need for such care. Of the
22% of households who did need follow-up for chronic diseases, 3% were denied the
provision of such care, 6% saw a delay, while 13% were not confronted with any
restrictions in the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases. When examining this
question according to region of residence, the need for follow-up of chronic diseases is
the highest in the Gaza Strip and the lowest in Jerusalem. Furthermore, there is a
definite increase in the need for follow-up of chronic diseases in parallel with in-
creased levels of poverty. Although not detailed in Figure 7.38, below, it is worth
pointing out that according to age the need for follow-up of chronic diseases is -
perhaps logically - the highest in the age group of 50 years and above, with 37% of
the respondents stating that they or their household members were in need of such
care in the past six months.
As portrayed in Figure 7.39, the need for follow-up of chronic diseases was the highest
in refugee camps, but the villagers who needed the provision of such care seem to
have had the hardest time in obtaining it. Furthermore, the need for follow-up of
chronic diseases
is slightly higher in
areas that are
crossed by the
Wall than in other
areas. In addition,
restrictions, denial
or delay in the
provision of follow-
up for chronic
diseases occurred
- once again -
more frequently in the areas that are crossed by the Wall than in areas that are
not crossed by the Wall.
Figure 7-42: Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the
following services in the past six months (0126)
Figure 7-39: Restrictions on the provision of follow-up
for chronic diseases in the past six months (o102m)
according to area of residence and Wall
Figure 7-38: Restrictions on the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases
in the past six months (o102m) in general and according to region
of residence and poverty level
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The above overview demonstrated that frequently when Palestinian households were
in need of some type of medical care they were confronted with difficulties in acquir-
ing that care. As such, it is not surprising that quite a few households had to find an
alternative health facility to provide them with the needed care. The analysis, below,
overviews in which ways the need to find an alternative health facility negatively
affected Palestinian households.
In general, 61% of the interviewees stated that they did not need to find an alternative
health facility. Of the 39% who were forced to find an alternative health facility, 12%
were most affected by additional costs, 7% were confronted with a delay of the
needed care, while for another 7% it caused more suffering. In addition, 5% of the
respondents who needed to search for an alternative health facility were most af-
fected by the low quality of services in that health facility, for 4% it created more
danger, while a final 2% complained about non-familiarity with the alternative health
facility. When analyzing the need to find an alternative health facility according to the
region of residence of the respondents, it is clear that such need was by far the
greatest in the West
Bank. Furthermore,
while in the West
Bank the additional
costs and the
Figure 7-42: Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the
following services in the past six months (0126)
Figure 7-41: Problems related to finding an alternative health facility (o167)
according to area of residence and Wall
Figure 7-40: Problems related to finding an alternative health facility (o167) in
general and according to region of residence
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delays in the provision of care seem to be the main problems related to having to rely
on an alternative health facility, Gaza Strip respondents were also affected by the
additional costs, and even more so the increased suffering caused by having to
choose an alternative health facility.
Far more respondents in refugee camps (72%) than in cities (65%) and villages
(49%) said that there had been no need for their household to find an alternative
health facility. In fact, when dealing with this issue according to refugee status, the
need to find an alternative health facility was also far lower among refugees than
among non-refugees, with 32% of the refugees reporting that they needed to search
for an alternative health facility as compared to 45% of non-refugees who needed to
do so. Furthermore, as portrayed in Figure 7.41, the need to search for an alternative
health facility was far greater in areas crossed by the Wall than other areas. Once
again, the additional costs created by the need to go to an alternative health facility
seem to be the problem that affected the household most. Nevertheless, the delays,
the increased suffering and the increased danger faced as a result of having to go to
an alternative health facility are not to be underestimated.
1.2.3 Level of satisfaction with
services and their providers in the past six months
As the title suggests, this section is mainly concerned with the level of satisfaction with
health services, while also trying to gauge who the main providers of these services
are. Before going into this analysis, however, it is important to overview the percentage
of respondents who benefited in the past six months from different types of health
services.
As summarized in Figure 7.42, 66% of the respondents stated that they or
their household members have benefited from hospital services in the past
six months, 74% used medication, 44% made use of primary health care
services, 8% benefited from physical rehabilitation, 13% from specialized
care, and 20% from ambulances.
Figure 7-43: Providers of hospital services (o126as) in the past six
months, in general and according to place of residence
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Having established the percentage of respondents who benefited from various types
of health care in the past six months, the level of satisfaction with each of these types
and their providers will be discussed separately and sequentially below.
Starting off with the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of hospital services, the
results in Table 7.3, below, indicate that 71% of the respondents were satisfied, while
29% were dissatisfied. It is worth noting that no statistically significant differences
were found when cross-tabulating the issue of satisfaction with hospital services with
any of the independent variables at hand.
As for the providers
of hospital services,
in general, 71% of
the respondents
stated that this
service had been
provided to them
by the Palestinian
Authority (PA), 13% referred to UNRWA as their provider, while 6% specified that
local NGOs were their providers of hospital services. An overview that includes the
other providers of such services is provided in Figure 7.43, below. Although throughout
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the PA is the main provider of hospital services,
the extent of its predominance in this field varies considerably according to different
variables. According to place of residence, for example, it is clear from the results in
Figure 7.43 that UNRWA is a service provider more often in West Bank and Gaza
refugee camps than elsewhere. Furthermore, in Jerusalem, Israeli health services are
the main provider of hospital services (45%), followed by local NGOs (26%), and
finally, the PA (11%).
Given the abundance of information and differences according to various indepen-
dent variables concerning the providers of each type of health service, under each
figure a short summary will be provided of the remaining main findings that are not
described in the graphs. Concerning providers of hospital services, the main findings
can be summarized as follows:
According to region
The Palestinian Authority is mentioned as a source for hospital services by a higher
percentage of Palestinians in the West Bank (77%) than in the Gaza Strip (72%). In
Jerusalem, a mere 11% of respondents referred to the Palestinian Authority as the
provider of their hospital services, while 45% of the Jerusalemites rely on Israeli health
services.
A higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (20%) than in the West Bank
(9%) refer to UNRWA as the source of their hospital services, while local NGOs are
most referred to in Jerusalem (26%), followed by the West Bank (6%) and the
Gaza Strip (2%).
According to area
The Palestinian Authority is most often cited as a provider of hospital services
in villages (75%) and cities (72%) and less so in refugee camps (65%). In
those camps, of course, UNRWA (30%) is mentioned by a higher percentage
Table 7-3: Level of satisfaction with hospital services (o126a)
in the past six months
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of respondents than in cities (11%) or villages (5%). Local NGOs seem to provide
more hospital services in cities (7%) and villages (7%) than in refugee camps (2%).
According to refugee status
Similar to the findings on providers of hospital services according to area of residence,
it is clear that the Palestinian Authority is more prominent as a provider of hospital
services to non-refugees (82%) than to refugees (60%), while UNRWA’s provision of
hospital services is mostly focused on the refugee population (25% refugees vs. 2%
non-refugees).
According to poverty level
The data clearly reveal that the poorer sections of Palestinian society rely more on the
Palestinian Authority as a provider of hospital services (hardship cases, 77%, and
those below the poverty line, 75%) than Palestinians with living standards above the
poverty line (63%). A higher percentage of Palestinians with a living standard above
the poverty line (10%) mentioned local NGOs as providers of their hospital services
than those with a family income that falls below the poverty line (5%) or those living in
hardship (3%). The provision of UNRWA’s hospital services seems to be quite evenly
spread over all sectors according to poverty line, with !4 % of the hardship cases and
another 14% of respondents with a family income below the poverty line referring to
UNRWA as their provider compared to 12% of those with a living standard above the
poverty line.
The second type of
health care respon-
dents were queried
about was provision of
medication. As
illustrated in Figure
7.44, below, in general
68% of the respon-
dents who benefited
from medication
services in the past six
months were satisfied,
while 32% were
dissatisfied. Satisfac-
tion with medication is
highest in Jerusalem
(90%), followed by the
West Bank (69%) and then the Gaza Strip (64%). Furthermore, the level of satisfaction
with medication is lower in cities (64%) than in refugee camps (71%) and villages
(75%). According to refugee status, the level of satisfaction with medication services
in the past six months is 10% higher among refugees (73%) than among non-refugees
(63%). Lastly, the level of satisfaction with medication services decreases
with increased levels of poverty.
Concerning the providers of medication, in general the Palestinian Authority
is the main provider with 49%, while UNRWA comes second with 28%. When
analyzing the provision of medication services according to place of resi-
Figure 7-44: Level of satisfaction with medication services in
the past six months (o126b) in general and according to
region and area of residence, refugee status
and poverty level
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dence, the Palestinian Authority only remains the main provider of such services in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip outside camps (69% and 44% respectively). In the camps
- whether in the West Bank (70%) or the Gaza Strip (62%) - UNRWA is by far the main
provider. In Jerusalem, the PA (6%) has a relatively small role in the provision of
medication, as there Israeli health institutions are the main providers (67%), followed
at a far distance by local NGOs (15%).
Concerning providers of medication services, the main findings in addition to those
described in Figure 7.45 can be summed up as follows:
According to region
A higher percentage of West Bankers (64%) than Gazans (42%) and Jerusalemites
(6%) identified the Palestinian Authority as their provider of medication services.  In
the Gaza Strip, UNRWA was the most frequently mentioned source of medication
(46%), while in Jerusalem, Israeli health services (67%) are the largest providers. Both
local NGOs (15%) and international organizations (4%) were most frequently cited by
Jerusalemites as their providers of medication.
According to area
A larger percentage of villagers (62%) than camp dwellers (30%) or respondents
residing in cities (49%) stated that the Palestinian Authority is their provider of medi-
cation. The same is the case for local NGOs, with 9% of villagers, 6% of respondents in
cities and 2% in camps identifying them as their source of medication.  UNRWA, of
course, is the main provider of medication in the refugee camps (64%), but was also
mentioned by 26% of respondents in cities and 5% of respondents in villages.
According to refugee status
The Palestinian Authority is the provider of medication to 28% of refugees
and 70% of non-refugees, while UNRWA is the source of medication for 54%
of refugees and 2% of non-refugees. Interestingly, 9% of non-refugees
mentioned private sources for their medication compared to a mere 2% of
the refugees.
Figure 7-45: Providers of medication services in the past six months (o126bs) in
general and according to place of residence
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According to poverty level
A larger percentage of respondents living in poverty referred to the Palestinian
Authority as their source of medication (hardship cases 58%, below poverty line 49%)
than respondents with a family income above the poverty line (40%). The same is true
for UNRWA with 32% of the hardship cases, 36% of those below the poverty line and
22% of those above the poverty line stating that UNRWA is their provider of medica-
tion. Local NGOs are more frequently mentioned by respondents with a family income
above the poverty line (9% vs. 6% below the poverty line and 4% hardship cases).
This is also the case concerning the use of private sources with 9% of respondents
above the poverty line citing this source of medication compared to 3% of respon-
dents below the poverty line and 1% of those living in hardship.
With regard to
the level of
satisfaction
among benefi-
ciaries of
primary health
care services,
in general, 78%
of the respon-
dents are
satisfied, while
the remaining
22% are
dissatisfied.
When examining the level of satisfaction with primary health care services according
to poverty level, a considerably higher percentage of respondents with a living
standard above the poverty level (86%) than respondents with a monthly household
income below the poverty line (74%) or those living in hardship (72%) are satisfied
Figure 7-46: Level of satisfaction with primary health
care services (o126g) in the past six months
(o126b) in general and according to region of
residence, poverty level, and the Wall
Figure 7-47: Providers of primary health care services in the past six
months (o126gs) in general and according to place of residence
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with those services. The results in Figure 7.46 also show that satisfaction with primary
health care services is significantly lower in areas that are crossed by the Wall (60%)
than in areas that are not (77%).
With regard to the providers of primary health care in the past six months, in general,
49% of the respondents specified that the Palestinian Authority provided them with
such services, while 38% of the respondents indicated that UNRWA had provided
them with primary health care. As indicated by the results in figure 7.47, below, the PA
is the largest provider of primary health care outside refugee camps both in the West
Bank (74%) and the Gaza Strip (51%). The role of the PA inside camps both in the
West Bank (16%) and the Gaza Strip (20%) in providing primary health care is far
smaller and is largely taken over by UNRWA (respectively 78% and 76%). It is also
worth pointing out that UNRWA’s role in primary health care in the Gaza Strip outside
camps is relatively large (45%). This could be explained by the large number of
refugees in the Gaza Strip who no longer reside in camps, but still benefit from
UNRWA services.
Regarding the providers of primary health care, the main findings, in addition to those
described in Figure 7.47 can be summarized as follows:
According to region
A far higher percentage of respondents in the West Bank (66%) than in the Gaza Strip
(42%) and Jerusalem referred to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary
health care. In Jerusalem, the main sources of primary health care are Israeli health
institutions (40%) and local NGOs (33%), while in the Gaza Strip UNRWA (54%) is
cited most frequently by respondents as service provider.
According to area
A considerably higher percentage of villagers (70%) than respondents residing in
cities (53%) or camp dwellers (19%) reported that the Palestinian Authority is their
source of primary health care. Expectably, a far higher percentage of camp residents
(76%) than those residing in cities (30%) and villages (17%) referred to UNRWA as
their source of primary health care.
According to refugee status
Predictably, the Palestinian Authority is clearly the main provider of primary health
care for non-refugees (82% vs. 20% refugee) and, conversely, UNRWA is the main
provider of primary health care for the refugee population (66% vs. 6% non-refugee).
According to poverty level
When examining the source of primary health care according to poverty, it is clear that
UNRWA provides care more frequently to those living in hardship (43%) and below the
poverty line (47%) than to those with a family income above the poverty line (26%).
The provision of primary health care by the Palestinian Authority is more evenly spread
over poverty status, with 52% of those living in hardship, 46% of those below
the poverty line and 48% of those above the poverty line referring to the
Palestinian Authority as their source of primary health care.
With regard to the level of satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services,
the results in Figure 7.48 illustrate that in general a small majority of 51% of
the respondents are satisfied, while the remaining 49% beneficiaries of such
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care are dissatisfied. It is worth noting
here, that there are no statistically signifi-
cant relationships between the level of
satisfaction with physical rehabilitation
services and any of the independent
variables at hand, as the number of
beneficiaries of such care is too small
(n=106).
As for the providers of physical rehabilita-
tion services, the only statistically signifi-
cant relationship that could be estab-
lished was according to refugee status.
First, however, in general, 45% of physi-
cal rehabilitation services in the past six
months have been provided by the Palestinian Authority. Unlike the types of health
services discussed above, UNRWA (10%) is not the second main provider of physical
rehabilitation services. In fact, the role both of local NGOs (21%) and international
organizations (13%) in providing physical rehabilitation is greater than that of
UNRWA. When analyzing the provision of physical rehabilitation services according to
refugee status, it is clear that the PA mainly provides such services to non-refugees
(63%), while UNRWA primarily provides such services to refugees (20%). The results
in Figure 7.49, below, also indicate that international organizations provide physical
rehabilitation services equally to refugees (12%) and non-refugees (12%), while local
NGOs seem to concentrate their services more on the refugee population (26%) than
on the non-refugees (18%). Lastly, it is notable that when Islamic organizations
provide physical rehabilitation services, they seem to do so solely to the refugee
population (10%).
Regarding the level of satisfaction with specialized care services, in general, 61% of
the respondents are satisfied with the provision of those services, while 39%
are dissatisfied. The results portrayed in Figure 7.50 also clearly indicate that
satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services is far lower in the West Bank
(51%) and the Gaza Strip (61%) than in Jerusalem (92%). Furthermore,
about an equal percentage of beneficiaries of physical rehabilitation services
Figure 7-48: Level of satisfaction with
physical rehabilitation services (o126h)
Figure 7-49: Provision of physical rehabilitation services over the past six months
(o126hs) in general and according to refugee status
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below the
poverty line
(51%) and
those living in
hardship
(52%) are
satisfied with
such services,
while this is
the case for a
far higher
percentage of
respondents
with a monthly
household income above the poverty line (80%).
Examination of the providers of specialized care over the past six months shows that,
in general, the three main providers of such care are (1) the Palestinian Authority
(37%), (2) UNRWA (22%), and (3) local NGOs (20%). It is worth pointing out that 8%
of the respondents specified that the specialized care was provided to them by other
private sources. Moreover, those who received specialized care services from private
sources solely reside in the West Bank outside camps (23%). It is also interesting to
notice that - unlike with any of the types of health services discussed above - the PA is
also the main provider of specialized care in West Bank refugee camps (60%). Lastly,
in Jerusalem, twice as many respondents were provided with specialized care by local
NGOs (62%) than by Israeli health services (31%). The results are detailed in
Figure 7.51.
Concerning providers of specialized care, the main findings in addition to
those described in Figure 7.51 can be summed up as follows:
Figure 7-50: Level of satisfaction with specialized
care services (o126i) in general, according to region
and poverty level
Figure 7-51: Providers of specialized care over the past six months
(o126is)  in general and according to place of residence
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According to region
A slightly higher
percentage of respon-
dents in the Gaza Strip
(43%) than in the West
Bank (35%) reported
that the Palestinian
Authority is their
source of specialized
care. The opposite is
true concerning
UNRWA, with more
than double the percentage in the Gaza Strip (30%) than in the West Bank (14%)
reporting UNRWA as their provider of specialized care. In Jerusalem, the main provid-
ers of specialized care are local NGOs (62%), Israeli health services (31%) and
international organizations (8%).
According to area of residence
The provision of specialized care by the Palestinian Authority seems to be quite evenly
spread over cities (38%), refugee camps (34%) and villages (35%). UNRWA is the
main provider for specialized care in refugee camps (47%), but was also referred to
as a source in cities (17%) and villages (13%). The main focus of international organi-
zations and local NGOs with regard to specialized care seems to be cities.
According to refugee status
When examining the source of specialized care according to refugee status, it is clear
that a higher percentage of non-refugees (43%) than refugees (32%) report that the
Palestinian Authority is their provider of specialized care. As for UNRWA, 33% of
refugees specified it as their source of specialized care compared to 7% of non-
refugees.
According to poverty level
The Palestinian Authority as a provider of specialized care is mentioned by a consider-
ably higher percentage of respondents with a family income above the poverty line
(40%) and below the poverty line (44%) than by the respondents living in hardship
(29%). UNRWA’s focus for specialized care, however, seems to be more on hardship
cases (35%) and Palestinians with a family income that falls below the poverty line
(27%) than on those above the poverty line (10%).
Finally, beneficiaries of ambulance services over the past six months were asked
about their satisfaction with those services. In general, 72% of the respondents were
satisfied, while the remaining 28% were dissatisfied. More specifically, while the level
of satisfaction in the Gaza Strip (63%) and Jerusalem (63%) is quite similar, it is
considerably higher in the West Bank (81%). Furthermore, as specified in Figure 4.52,
the level of satisfaction with ambulance services decreases in parallel with
an increase in the level of poverty in households.
Finally, concerning the providers of ambulance services in the past six
months, in general, the majority of such services have been provided by the
Palestinian Authority (52%). Other main providers include international
Figure 7-52: Level of satisfaction with ambulance services
(o126j) in general and according to region of residence and
poverty level
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organizations (15%), UNRWA (14%), and local NGOs (13%). When analyzing this
question according to place of residence, several interesting differences are apparent.
While the PA is the main provider of ambulance services in the West Bank outside
camps (47%) and in the Gaza Strip outside camps (47%), it does not provide such
services at all in West Bank camps, while in Gaza Strip refugee camps it remains the
main provider of ambulance services (46%).
While UNRWA mainly provides ambulance services in West Bank camps (44%)1
and Gaza Strip camps (39%), its share in the provision of ambulances is larger in the
Gaza Strip outside camps (16%) than in the West Bank outside camps (1%).
Local NGOs only provide ambulance services to the West Bank camps (33%)
and non-camps (23%) and Jerusalem (25%), but do not seem to provide such ser-
vices at all in the Gaza Strip, whether it is in camps or outside camps.
Ambulance services provided by international organizations seem more concen-
trated in the West Bank and Jerusalem than in the Gaza Strip.
The provision of ambulance services by Islamic organizations seems to be mostly
concentrated outside camps, both in the West Bank (7%) and the Gaza Strip (5%).
Concerning providers of ambulance services, the main findings in addition to those
described in Figure 7.53 can be summarized as follows:
According to region
A higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (66%) than in the West Bank
(41%) stated that the Palestinian Authority was the source of their ambulance
service. The same is valid for ambulance services provided by UNRWA
(Gaza Strip 23% vs. West Bank 6%). Ambulance services by international
organizations seem to have been more concentrated in the West Bank (20%)
than in the Gaza Strip (9%).
1  It is worth noting that UNRWA West Bank is endowed with only four ambulances.
Figure 7-53: Providers of ambulance services over the past six months. (o126js) in
general and according to place of residence
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According to area of residence
Ambulance services provided by the Palestinian Authority are more concentrated in
villages (61%) and cities (56%) than in refugee camps (32%), while those provided
by UNRWA are mainly reported in camps (40%), followed by cities (10%) and 1% in
villages.
According to refugee status
Of the non-refugee population, 64% reported that the Palestinian Authority was their
provider of ambulance services, while this is the case for 42% of the refugee popula-
tion. Ambulance services provided by UNRWA were solely referred to by refugee
respondents (27%), while ambulance services provided by international organizations
seemed to be equally divided between the refugee (14%) and non-refugee (14%)
population.
1.2.4 Health coverage
As health coverage1 comprises an important aspect of health and the provision of its
services, interviewees were asked whether or not they receive any assistance in
covering their medical expenses. As indicated in Figure 7.54, below, 26% of the
respondents still cover their medical expenses through their own sources. When the
respondents do receive assistance in covering their medical expenses, the main
providers are government health insurance (43%) and UNRWA (20%). Another 7%
cover their medical bills through private health insurance and 2% have their health
coverage
provided by
charitable
organizations.
The remaining
2% of the
respondents did
not specify who
provided them
with health
insurance, but
did say that they
delayed pay-
ment of the fees.
In comparison
with the results
on the same
question in the previous report (September 2003), health coverage by government
insurance increased by 10%, UNRWA’s health coverage increased by 3%, private
health insurance decreased by 4%, while coverage by charitable organizations
decreased by 7%. The percentage of the respondents covering medical expenses
from their own pocket has decreased by 5% since the September 2003 report and by
9% since the December 2002 report.
Figure 7-54: Sources of health coverage (o089) in general and
according to area of residence (excluding Jerusalem respondents)
1 It should be noted that in the analysis regarding health coverage, respondents in
Jerusalem are excluded. Jerusalemites are entitled to Israeli government health
coverage, and as such their inclusion into the analysis would provide inaccurate results
about Palestinians covered by Palestinian government health insurance.
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The results in Figure 7.54 also illustrate that the sources of health coverage vary
considerably according to the respondents’ area of residence. Government health
insurance is the main provider of health coverage in villages (47%) and cities (46%),
but is largely superceded by UNRWA in refugee camps, where the government only
provides for 28% of the residents. Expectedly, UNRWA provides assistance through
health insurance mostly in camps (55%) and not so often in cities (16%) and villages
(1%). Respondents in villages seem to receive the least assistance in covering their
medical expenses as - in comparison with respondents in cities (24%) and refugee
camps (11%) - they far more frequently cover medical bills from their own sources
(37%). Finally, coverage by private insurance is most frequent in cities (9%), followed
by villages (6%) and then refugee camps (4%).
Sources of health coverage also significantly differ between the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Although the percentage of respondents stating that they are covered by
government health insurance does not differ much between the West Bank (44%) and
the Gaza Strip, the percentage of respondents specifying that their medical bills are
covered by UNRWA1 is far lower in the West Bank (13%) than in the Gaza Strip
(30%).2 Furthermore, the percentage of respondents covering medical expenses from
their own pocket is twice as high in the West Bank (32%) than in the Gaza Strip (16%).
The results described in Figure 7.55 also indicate that the percentage of respondents
in areas crossed by the Wall who are covered by government health insurance (63%)
is considerable higher than the percentage of respondents saying so in other areas
(40%). A similar percentage of respondents in areas crossed by the Wall (24%) with
respondents in other areas (26%) stated that they cover their own medical bills.
1.2.5 Health coverage and income
The source of health coverage among Palestinians does not only vary depending on
where they live in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it also differs accord-
ing to the income level of the household. As the results in Table 7.4 indicate,
Figure 7-55: Sources of health coverage (o089) in general and according to
region of residence and Wall (excluding Jerusalem respondents)
1  It is worth noting that UNRWA does not offer its own health insurance scheme, although
the Agency (partially) covers hospitalization costs and also some medication charges.
2  The higher percentage of refugees among the total Gaza Strip population as com-
pared to the West Bank population could explain this finding.
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coverage by government health insurance seems to be quite randomly spread over
the different income levels, while more low-income households than high-income
households cover their medical bills by using UNRWA services. More specifically,
whereas 31% of
households with a
monthly income level
of less than NIS 500
cover their health
expenses through
UNRWA, none of the
households with an
income level over
NIS 5,000 do so.
Generally, house-
holds with a higher
monthly income
seem to be covered
more frequently by
private health
insurance than
households with a
lower income level.
Moreover, the former
also cover medical expenses from their own sources more often than the latter. Still, it
is worth pointing out that 12% of households with a monthly income level of less than
NIS 500 cover their medical bills through private health insurance.
Health coverage and poverty
As was discussed earlier, the government (43%) and UNRWA (20%) are the main
providers of health coverage. When examining the beneficiaries of health coverage
according to the variable of poverty, one notices that both government insurance and
UNRWA more frequently provide health coverage to Palestinians with a household
income that falls below the poverty line (respectively 64% and 75%). However, two
rather alarming findings stand out in Figure 7.56, below. First, a higher percentage of
households below the poverty line (54%) than households above the poverty line
Table 7-4: Sources of health coverage (o089) according to
household income level (excluding Jerusalem
respondents) (o057v3)
Figure 7-56: Sources of health coverage (o089) according to poverty
level (excluding Jerusalem)
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cover their medical expenses
through private health
insurance. Second, although
the general results indicated
that the percentage of
households that cover their
medical expenses from their
own pocket has dropped by
5% in the past six months, the
percentage of households
below the poverty line that
cover their own medical
expenses has increased by
8% since the September 2003 report. Indeed, whereas in this report 54% of the
respondents stated that they pay their own medical bills, this was the case for 46% of
the respondents last September.
When examining the source of health coverage for respondents living in hardship, it is
clear that government insurance is the main provider (43%), followed by UNRWA
(26%). The percentage of hardship cases that are covered by private health insurance
dropped from 14% in the September 2003 report to 8% in this report. More disturbing,
however, is that in this report is that the percentage of respondents living in hardship
who cover their medical expenses from their own sources has slightly increased from
15% in the last report to 17% now. Also, it is worth pointing out that for the first time
some respondents mentioned that they delayed payment of their medical fees. More
concretely, 5% of the respondents living in hardship seem to be in this situation.
7.3 EDUCATION
As in the section on
health, it is valuable
to first determine the
general level of
satisfaction with
education services
and schools in the
past six months, and
also to find out more
concretely who were
the main providers of such services.
The results pointed out that 75% of the total sample of interviewees benefited from
school services in the past six months. As overviewed in Figure 7.58, the large major-
ity of 87% of the beneficiaries are satisfied with the schools. However, the
level of satisfaction is considerably greater in the West Bank (92%) than in
the Gaza Strip (83%). The level of satisfaction with schools is the lowest in
Jerusalem (78%).
Figure 7-57: Sources of health coverage (o089) for
hardship cases (excluding Jerusalem)
Figure 7-58: Level of satisfaction with school services in the
past six months (o126c) in general and according
to region of residence
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In general, the Palestinian Authority (61%) and UNRWA (31%) are the main providers
of school services. The provision of schools by Islamic or international organizations,
local NGOs, Arab governments or organizations, and private sources are minimal and
do not exceed 3% respectively. When analyzing the provision of schools according to
place of residence, one can very clearly notice that while the PA is the main provider
outside refugee camps both in the West Bank (88%) and the Gaza Strip (51%),
UNRWA is the main provider inside the camps both in the West Bank (71%) and the
Gaza Strip (85%).13 Local NGOs play a major role in the provision of education in
Jerusalem (21%) and to a lesser extent in the West Bank camps (7%) and in the Gaza
Strip outside camps (2%). The provision of private schools is mainly concentrated in
Jerusalem (14%).
In addition to the information provided in Figure 7.59, there are more significant
differences according to several other independent variables. They are briefly
overviewed below.
According to region
A far higher percentage of West Bankers (82%) than Gazans (40%) and Jerusalemites
(59%) identified the Palestinian Authority as the provider of their school services. In
the Gaza Strip, UNRWA was the most frequently mentioned source of school services
(58%), compared to 12% in the West Bank. Local NGOs (21%) and private sources
(14%) were most frequently cited by Jerusalemites as their providers of school
services, while these sources were barely mentioned by any respondent in the West
Bank or the Gaza Strip.
1  It is worth mentioning that there is an agreement in place between the PA and UNRWA,
according to which UNRWA will enroll non-refugee students (preferably girls) in
UNRWA schools if: (a) there is no PA school in the surrounding three km, or (b) they
reside in a frontier village, or (c) they reside in Shu’fat camp and meet certain condi-
tions.
Figure 7-59: Providers of schools in the past six months (o126cs) in general and
according to place of residence
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According to area
A considerably higher percentage of villagers (86%) than respondents residing in
cities (64%) or camp dwellers (14%) stated that the Palestinian Authority provides
them with schools. UNRWA, of course, is the main provider of school services in
refugee camps (82%), but was also mentioned by 28% of the respondents in cities
and 5% of the respondents in villages.
According to refugee status
The Palestinian Authority provides school services to 90% of non-refugee respondents
and 31% of refugee respondents, while UNRWA mainly provides these services to
refugees (63%) and only 1% of the non-refugee respondents.
According to poverty level
The Palestinian Authority’s school services seem to be quite equally provided to
Palestinians across poverty levels, with 58% of the hardship cases, 60% of the respon-
dents with a family income below the poverty line, and 62% of those above the
poverty line having benefited from these services in the past six months. The poorer
sections of society (38% hardship cases, 36% below the poverty line) more so than to
those Palestinians with a household income above the poverty line (23%) seem to
benefit from schooling provided by UNRWA. Those respondents with a family income
above the poverty line rely more on private sources (4%) and on local NGOs (8%) for
schooling than do their poorer counterparts.
1.3.1 The overall situation
As illustrated in Figure 7.60, only 2% of the respondents said that they are illiterate,
8% stated that they only went to elementary school, and 16% specified that they only
went to preparatory school. About 32% of the respondents finished secondary school,
while a relatively high percentage either attained some level of college education
(23%) or college and above (16%). For the purposes of analysis in this study, the
various levels of education were categorized into three categories: low education
(illiterate and elementary), medium education (preparatory and secondary),
and high education (some college, and college and above). When the various
levels of educational attainment are grouped in such manner, one can see
that 10% of the total sample of interviewees are low educated, 51% are
medium educated and 39% are highly educated.
Figure 7-60: Educational attainment (o056 and educ)
     207
When examining the
educational attain-
ment among Palestin-
ians according to
gender, one sees that
a higher percentage
of women than men
are low (13% vs. 8%)
or medium (53% vs.
48%) educated, while
a higher percentage
of men than women
obtained high educa-
tion (44% vs. 35%).
As illustrated in Figure
7.62, below, the
refugee population
seems to be better
educated than the non-refugee population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Indeed, whereas fewer refugees (6%) than non-refugees (15%) are low educated,
more refugees than non-refugees are medium educated (53% vs. 49%) and high
educated (42% vs. 37%).
1.3.2 Educational attainment, according to region and area of residence
Educational attainment also differs significantly according to region and area of
residence of the interviewees. First, according to region of residence, it seems that the
lowest level of education can be found in the West Bank, while the highest level of
education is in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, whereas 14% of the respondents in the West
Bank are low educated, this is the case for only 7% of the respondents respectively in
the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of
interviewees in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (37%) and
Jerusalem (34%) obtained high educational levels. Second, according to
area of residence and consistent with the findings on educational attainment
according to refugee status, the highest level of education seems to be
located in refugee camps, while the lowest level of education seems to be in
Figure 7-62: Educational attainment
according to refugee status
Figure 7-61: Educational attainment
according to gender
Figure 7-63: Educational attainment according to region
and area of residence
  208
villages. More concretely, whereas 15% of the respondents in villages are low edu-
cated, this is the case for 9% and 6% of the respondents respectively in cities and
refugee camps.
1.3.3 Education and place of work
There seems to be a correlation between the level of educational attainment and the
place of work of the respondents. As illustrated in Figure 7.64, below, a considerable
higher percentage of low
and medium educated
respondents than high
educated respondents
rely on the Israeli labor
market and, as such are
employed in Israel proper
or settlements. Con-
versely, the high edu-
cated more so than the
medium and low edu-
cated seem to rely on the
Palestinian labor market in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.
1.3.4 Education and income
There is a clear statistical significance between level of education and income: a
significantly higher percentage of respondents with a high level of education (56%)
than respondents with medium (32%) or low (18%) levels of education enjoy a living
standard above the poverty line. Logically this implies that an impressive 82% of the
low educated respondents come from a household with a monthly income that falls
below the poverty line, whereas this is the case for ‘only’ 44% of the high educated
respondents. The overall results are overviewed in Table 7.5, below.
There is also
a very
strong
correlation
between
the level of
education
of Palestinians and their ability to maintain jobs, or – in case of job loss – to change
employment. The results in Table 7.6, indicate that a far higher percentage of high
educated than low or medium educated managed to retain their employment. More
specifically, in the past six months, 56% of the low educated remained in the same job,
while 35% of this group lost their jobs and only 8% managed to change their employ-
Table 7-5: Educational attainment according to poverty level
Table 7-6: Educational attainment and change in the
employment situation (o012)
Figure 7-64: Educational attainment according to
place of work (o011) of those who are employed and
unemployed
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ment. In comparison, 85% of the respondents with high educational levels kept the
same employment, only 8% lost their jobs, while 7% was able to find different employ-
ment.
In conclusion, the findings in this part of the study indicate that health, but especially
education, have lost importance as needs both for the household and for the commu-
nity since the September 2003 report. Compared to other types of unmet needs of the
household, health and education are not high on the priority list, which might suggest
that those needs are already quite well covered.
The main three factors influencing Palestinians’ choice of a health facility are (1) the
health facility being free or cheaper (42%), (2) the distance or availability of a health
facility (23%), and (3) trust in the quality of services (18%). The results showed that
the highest percentages of Palestinians choosing their health facility based on the first
reason can be found in the West Bank, in refugee camps and villages, among the
poorer segments of society, among the low educated, and among Palestinians residing
in areas that are directly affected by the wall.
Concerning the need for drugs for acute and chronic diseases in the past six months,
19% of the total sample was prescribed drugs for acute diseases and 29% were
prescribed drugs for chronic diseases. The results point to a gap of a few percent
between the prescription of drugs for both acute and chronic diseases and the actual
provision of the drugs for these problems. The prescription of drugs for acute diseases
was the highest in villages, among non-refugees, among residents directly affected by
the Wall, among the poorest in Palestinian society, and among respondents who are 50
years or older. As for the discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs for
acute problems, it never exceeds the 5% mark, except in areas that are crossed by
the Wall. The prescription of drugs for chronic diseases was quite similar in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and was the highest among the poorer segments of society
and among respondents who are 50 years or older. As for the provision of drugs for
chronic problems, the main discrepancies between prescription and provision of such
drugs are found among Palestinians living in hardship and among those who are 50
years or older.
The private pharmacy is the main source of medication, followed by the Ministry of
Health clinic, the UNRWA clinic, and much less frequently, the NGO clinic. The UNRWA
clinic is the main source of medication in the Gaza Strip, among refugees, and in both
West Bank and Gaza Strip camps. The reliance on a private pharmacy for medication
is highest in Jerusalem, in villages, among non-refugees, among the economically
better-off in society, and among the high educated.
Concerning the need for any of the 12 types of medical care in the past six months
under review in this part of the report, with the exception of the need for birth care, the
need for health care for a sick child and the need for specialized care, the need for
any type of care was consistently highest in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps,
among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are
directly affected by the Wall. Birth care and specialized care were most
needed in villages, while health care for a sick child was most needed in
cities. Furthermore, concerning restrictions, delays and denials for the
provision of any of the 12 analyzed types of medical care, generally difficul-
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ties occurred most often in the West Bank, in villages (often least frequently in refugee
camps), among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are
crossed by the Wall.
In general, 39% of the total sample of interviewees specified that they were forced to
find an alternative health facility. However, the results showed that the need to find an
alternative health facility was the highest in the West Bank, in villages, among non-
refugees, and among residents in areas that are crossed by the Wall. The most fre-
quently reported problems resulting from having to find an alternative health facility
were additional costs, delay in the needed care, and more suffering.
Considering the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of six different types of
health services, 71% were satisfied with hospital services, 68% were satisfied with
medication, and 78% were satisfied with primary health care. Furthermore, 51% of the
beneficiaries of physical rehabilitation services were satisfied, while 61% were
satisfied with specialized care and 72% were satisfied with ambulance services.
Concerning the providers of these six different types of health services, in general, the
results indicated that the PA and - to a lesser extent - UNRWA, are the main providers,
except physical rehabilitation services where UNRWA’s place is taken in by local
NGOs, and with regard to ambulance services where a slightly higher percentage of
beneficiaries reported using international organizations rather than UNRWA.
Governmental health coverage and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main heath
insurance providers. Although, in general, the percentage of Palestinians covering
their medical expenses from their own pocket has dropped by 5% (26%) since the
September 2003 report, alarmingly, the percentage of households below the poverty
line that cover their own medical bills has increased by 8% (54%) since last Septem-
ber. Finally, this analysis indicates that a higher percentage of households in the West
Bank than in the Gaza Strip, and a higher percentage of households in villages than in
cities and refugee camps cover medical expenses from their own resources.
Concerning education, a large majority (87%) of respondents are satisfied with their
school services. The PA and UNRWA are the main providers of such services, with the
PA focusing its attention mostly on the non-refugee population outside camps and
UNRWA mainly targeting the refugee population whether inside or outside camps.
Furthermore, the largest portion of Palestinians with high educational levels can be
found among refugees, in refugee camps and in the Gaza Strip. The low and medium
educated tend to rely more on the Israeli labor market, while the high educated rely
more on the Palestinian labor market. Moreover, the low and medium educated are far
less able to maintain their employment than the high educated. Finally, the low and - to
a lesser extent - the medium educated are more likely than the high educated to
belong to households with an income level that falls below the poverty line.
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Part 8 of our study focuses on issues
pertaining to women and children,
and, more specifically, on the impact
of the Intifada on women and chil-
dren.
In the first section on women, all
issues where cross-tabulation with
the independent variable of gender
shows a statistically significant
difference will be discussed. In
addition and more concretely, the
main focus in this section lies on the
employment situation of women and on the impact of employed women’s financial
contribution to the household. For the first time, this section will also deal with some
issues that specifically concern housewives.
In the section pertaining to the impact of the Intifada on children, several main issues
will be addressed, such as child labor and the types of such labor, children and
education, behavioral changes in children as a result of the Intifada, the influence of
the Intifada on the needs of children, and the ability of parents to care for and protect
their children.
8.1 IMPACT OF THE INTIFADA ON WOMEN
8.1.1 In general
As has been the case in previous reports, specific issues discussed elsewhere in the
report are not examined according to the independent variable of gender as, usually,
opinions between male and female respondents do not differ in a significant manner.
They will be overviewed in this section. However, important differences in opinion
according to gender with regard to both employment and children will be discussed in
the appropriate sections of this chapter. Furthermore, it is important to note that the
results of the survey conducted for this report reveal even fewer significant differ-
ences in opinion along the lines of gender than was already the case in previous
reports.
One of the differences in opinion between male and female respondents concerns
their consideration of the option of emigration. As indicated in Table 8.1, below, a
higher percentage of female respondents (83%) than male respondents
(70%) do not consider emigration to be an option. Furthermore, a higher
percentage of male respondents than female respondents affirmed that they
consider emigration (9% vs. 5%) or that they would like to emigrate, but
cannot and will perhaps do so later (20% vs. 12%). It is perhaps worth
8 WOMEN
& CHILDREN
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remembering
that in Report 5
on Palestinian
perceptions of
their living
conditions
(December
2002) the same
question was asked with similar results as this time, both in general and according to
gender.
Women seem to
be less ham-
pered than men
in their at-
tempts to reach
their place of
work, as 6%
more female
respondents
(56%) than their male counterparts (50%) stated that it was not difficult to reach work
in the past six months. A similar question was asked in Report 5 on Palestinian percep-
tions of their living conditions (December 2002), but then over a timeframe of 12
months. Then, too, women found it less difficult than men to get to work (it should be
pointed out that, generally speaking, the ability to go to work has improved; at that
time only 33% of female respondents declared that it was not difficult to reach work
compared to 28% of the male respondents).
8.2 WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT
Although issues related to employment and the labor market have been discussed in
detail in Part Two of the study, it is valuable to have a closer look at some of these
issues from a gender perspective. This is the main aim of this section.
8.2.1 Number of women employed per household
In general, in the majority of Palestinian households no women are employed. Of the
total sample of the survey conducted for this report, 74% of the respondents said that
of the employed in the household none are women. In 22% of the surveyed house-
holds, one woman is employed, while in 4% of the households two or more women
work.
Compared to the results on this question in the previous report (December 2003), a
considerably lower number of households have women in the labor market. Indeed, in
December 2003, 37% of the surveyed households had at least one women
employed, which already was an increase of 3% of households with women
in the labor market since the December 2002 report. The results in the survey
conducted for the current report are similar to those in the November 2001
report. At that time and as is the case now, 26% of the households had at
least one women employed.
Table 8-1: Do you think of emigrating? (o094a)
according to gender
Table 8-2: Ability to go to work in the past six months (o114)
according to gender
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The results in Figure
8.1, below, further
detail that there is a
significant relation-
ship between the
number of women
employed in the
household and the
level of education of
the interviewees. The
number of households
with employed
women seems to rise with advanced education. Indeed, whereas 88% of the house-
holds with a low level of education have no women in the labor market, this number
decreases to 81% in households with medium education levels and to 60% in house-
holds with a high level of education.
The number of
households that
have women
employed is also
influenced by age.
As the results in
Table 8.3 indicate,
the highest percent-
age of households with at least one woman employed (33%) can be found in the age
category of 24 to 35 years, while in all the other age categories, the percentage of
households with at least one women working stands at about 23% to 24%.
2.2.2 Impact of women’s employment on household financial situation
One might suppose that the financial situation of households with employed women is
more comfortable than that of households with no employed women, as women are
adding to the household income. As such, one would expect a larger number of
women in the labor market in higher income households than in lower income house-
holds. The results in Figure 8.2, below, seem to support this hypothesis. For example,
whereas 96% of the respondents with a monthly household income of less than NIS
500 and 82% of respondents with a monthly household income between NIS 500-1600
declared that no female household members were employed, this was the case for
Figure 8-1: Number of women employed per household
(o018b) in general and according to educational level
Figure 8-2: Number of employed women per household
(o0018b) according to household income level (o057)
Table 8-3: Number of women employed per household
(o018b) according to age
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60% of the respondents with a monthly household income that is higher than NIS
5,000 and for only 55% of the respondents with a household income ranging between
NIS 3,000 and NIS 5,000.
The extent of
employed
women’s
contribution to
the household
is further
reinforced
when examin-
ing the issue from the perspective of poverty level. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, 31% of
households with a living standard above the poverty line have at least one woman in
the labor market. This percentage decreases to 26% in households with a monthly
income that falls below the poverty line and to 16% in households living in hardship.
As the employment of female household members so obviously impacts the household
financial situation, it should also positively influence the ability of the household to
financially cope in the future. Indeed, as the results in Figure 8.4, show, whereas 52%
of the respondents where at least one woman in the household is employed stated that
they would financially cope for “as long as it takes”, only 30% of the respondents from
households with no
women employed
made such a
statement. Simi-
larly, whereas 18%
of the respondents
from households
with no women
working admitted
that they do not
even have enough
to live on now, this
was the case for
only 5% of the
respondents from
households with at least one working woman.
8.2.3 Type of employment and place of work, according to gender
Generally, women are found more often in specific types of employment. As illustrated
in Figure 8.5, in the Palestinian labor market, women are more often than men in the
role of professionals (16% vs. 8%) and employees (65% vs. 33%). Men are more often
employed as skilled (16% vs. 3%) or unskilled workers (19% vs. 1%) or technicians
(7% vs. 0%) than their female counterparts. Also in this sample, a higher
percentage of employed males than employed females are self-employed
(18% vs. 13%).
Also, when examining type of employment from the perspective of the type
of employer, there are clear differences according to gender. The government
(37% women vs. 26% men), international agencies (9% women vs. 4%
Figure 8-3: Poverty level according to whether or not female
household members are employed (o018b)
Figure 8-4: Ability of households to cope
financially (o044) according to whether or not female household
members are employed (o018b)
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men), international
NGOs (7% women
vs. 3% men) and
local NGOs (8%
women vs. 4% men)
are more frequently
the employers of
female employees
than male employ-
ees. The private
sector (about 25%)
and agricultural
petty trade (4%) seem to provide about the same percentage of employment to male
and female respondents, while manufacture petty trade provides employment to a
higher percentage of men (7%) than women (2%). Furthermore, in this sample, a
considerably higher percentage of males (28%) than females (10%) are self-em-
ployed.
When looking at the
total sample, the
employment situation
also significantly
differs according to
gender. As the results
in Figure 8.7 over-
view, a higher
percentage of male
respondents than
female respondents
are employed,
whether it is full-time
(36% vs. 17%), part-
time (7% vs. 4%) or for a few hours a day (16% vs. 4%). Furthermore, a far higher
percentage of female respondents than male respondents are not employed (75% vs.
Figure 8-7: Employment situation (o008), according to gender
Figure 8-6: Type of employer (or last type) (o063),
according to gender
Figure 8-5: Occupation (o009), according to gender
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41%). Interestingly,
among those respon-
dents who are not
employed, 21% of the
males are actually
unemployed compared
to a mere 5% of the
females. The females
who are not employed
seem to be mainly
housewives (62%).
When examining
the salary
regularity and
amount accord-
ing to gender,
employed women
clearly have
more reason to
feel financially
secure than their
employed male
counterparts. The
results in Figure
8.8 illustrate that
employed women (85%) far more than employed men (61%) receive their salaries
regularly and fully. Furthermore, a higher percentage of male respondents (9%) than
female respondents (3%) do not receive their salary regularly nor fully.
In comparison with their male counterparts, working women seem to have their place
of work closer to where they reside. More concretely, while 25% of the male respon-
dents have their place of work in the Gaza Strip, this is the case for 47% of the female
respondents. However, males (20%) far more frequently than females (2%) are
employed in Israel proper.
8.2.4 Loss of employment, according to gender
Loss of employment, and the manner or the effort Palestinians invest in trying to find
another job, clearly varies according to gender. When interviewees were asked
whether or
not their
employment
situation had
changed in
the past six
months, a
higher percent-
age of female
Figure 8-9: Main place of work (or most recent place of work)
(o011), according to gender
Figure 8-10: Change in employment situation in the past
six months (o012), according to gender
Figure 8-8: Salary regularity and amount (o099),
according to gender
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respondents than male respondents (85% vs. 65%) managed to maintain their job.
Furthermore, as overviewed in Figure 8.10, below, a higher percentage of male
respondents (24%) than female respondents (9%) has lost their job, but at the same
time a higher
percentage of
male (11%)
than female
respondents
(6%) changed
their employ-
ment.
Among the unemployed respondents, men clearly tried much harder to find different
employment than their female counterparts. As illustrated in Figure 8.11, of the male
unemployed, 75% tried hard to find another job, while only 14% did not try at all to
seek alternative employment. In comparison, only 27% of the female unemployed
tried hard to find work and 61% did not try at all to find employment.
As the results in Table
8.4 indicate, the
reasons for not search-
ing for alternative
employment vary
considerably accord-
ing to gender. The main
reasons for men not to
search for another job
include: studying
(36%), sickness
(16%), lack of job
opportunities (14%)
and old age (12%). The
reasons for women not
to look for another job
are entirely different,
with a majority of 61% of the female respondents arguing that they want to devote
more time to home commitments and children. However, it is also worth pointing out
that 7% of the female respondents stated that they did not search for employment
because society and/or their husbands do not allow women to work.
From the analysis above, it became clear that although women seem to be more
capable of maintaining their employment than men, once unemployed, men are more
eager to find alternative employment. Interestingly, it seems that men are also more
willing than women to compromise on their wages as long as this entails that they can
keep their job or at least avoid total unemployment. Indeed, when respon-
dents were asked to indicate their willingness to work, a higher percentage
of male respondents than female respondents stated that they were willing to
work if the wage is 10-25% lower (19% vs. 11%), or 25-50% less (12%
vs.3%), or even if the wage is 50% lower (8% vs. 3%). In addition, a consid-
erably lower percentage of male respondents than female respondents
stated that they would only be willing to work if the wage were the same as
Figure 8-11: Attempts to find a job (o014) according to gender
Table 8-4: Reasons for not searching for another job (o140),
according to gender
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before (23% vs. 38%). Conversely, a higher percentage of female respondents than
male respondents said that they would be willing to work at any wage (45% vs. 38%).
Here, it is perhaps also worth noting that the high percentage of respondents specify-
ing that they would be willing to work at any rate could point to the dire circumstances
of many Palestinians who are desperate enough to be willing to work at any rate in
order to generate at least some income to sustain themselves and their families.
8.2.5 Housewives
For the first time in the history of this survey, two questions were directed specifically
at the interviewed housewives in order to be able to obtain a clearer picture of house-
wives in Palestinian society and the place they might occupy in the informal labor
market. As such, the interviewed housewives were first asked how many hours a day
they work at home, and secondly, how many hours a day they spend on work not
related to the house or the children, but perhaps helping out in the family shop or
working in the field. The analysis, below, of the answers on those two questions, is
based on the mean
or the average
amount of hours per
day spent by
housewives either at
home or for work not
related to the home
and the children.
In general, house-
wives seem to
spend an average of
about seven hours a
day on work at
home. However, and
as detailed in Figure
8.13, the daily hours
of work at home for
housewives seems
to increase with
poverty. Further-
more, the house-
wives that fall into
the categories of 25-
34 years of age and
35-49 years of age
seem to spend more
daily hours of work in the house than those that are between 18-24 years of age or
older than 50 years. A plausible explanation for these differences in time per day
spent working at home could be that the housewives in the former age
categories are more likely to have children in the household, while the
housewives that fall into the latter categories either do not have children yet
or their children are grown up and/or have left the house.
Figure 8-12: Willingness to work (o015)
 according to gender
Figure 8-13: Hours per day of work at home for
housewives (o159) in general, according to
poverty level, and age
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The average amount of time spent on work not related to the house or children among
housewives who do actually utilize their time in other ways, is about three hours and
20 minutes a day. As was the case concerning households that have women in the
labor market, it seems that also housewives in households with a monthly income
above the poverty line spend more time on work not related to the house or the
children than housewives in poorer households. Furthermore, the housewives who
have a higher level of education seem to spend a higher average number of hours on
work not related to
the house or the
children than house-
wives with medium or
low educational
levels.
The average number
of hours spent on
work not related to
the house or children
among housewives
who do spend time helping out beyond the typical housework also varies according to
region and area of residence. As illustrated in Figure 8.15, the daily average number of
hours of work spent in work unrelated to the house and the children, is higher in the
Gaza Strip than in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem, and is also higher in refugee
camps than in cities or villages.
8.3 IMPACT OF THE INTIFADA ON CHILDREN
8.3.1 Children and employment
Given the long duration of the Intifada and the negative implications it has on
Palestinians’ livelihood, there has been a steady increase in child labor since
the beginning of the second Intifada. It appears that an increasing number of
Palestinian households have begun to rely on their children to provide
additional income.
Figure 8-14: Number of hours spent for work not related to the
house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.) (o160) in
general, according to poverty level (poverty3), and
according to educational level (educ)
Figure 8-15: Number of hours spent for work not related to
the house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.)
(o160), according to region of residence, and area of resi-
dence
     221
However, and despite the ongoing harsh conditions prevailing in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, in this report, the percentage of children below the age of 18
and below the age of 16 employed for more than four hours a day has declined
significantly to the level of child labor as it stood in December 2001. More concretely,
whereas in the last report (September 2003) still 23% of the respondents stated that at
least one of their children below the age of 18 was working for more than four hours a
day and 12% of the respondents admitted that at least one of their children below the
age of 16 were doing so, these percentages in the current report dropped to respec-
tively 11% and 4%. One factor that could explain this drop could be the timing of the
surveys conducted for the reports. Whereas the survey for the last report was con-
ducted in the middle of the summer school holidays and at a time where many youth
were involved in temporary employment, the survey for the current report was
conducted during the school year and at a time where many of the youth are not
involved in temporary employment. As such, only after the next survey foreseen for
the summer of 2004, might it be possible to draw more definite conclusions.
When examining the issue of children and employment according to the region of
residence of the respondents (Figure 8.16), it is clear that fewer households in East
Jerusalem seem to have children working, while a slightly higher percentage of
households in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank have both children below the age
of 18 and below
the age of 16
working for
more than four
hours a day.
When studying
the issue of
children and
employment
from the perspec-
tive of households’
economic status, it
is evident that the
decision to involve
children below the age of 18 and even below the age of 16 in the labor market is
strongly affected by financial difficulties faced by households. As illustrated in Figure
8.17, 18% of the households living in hardship have at least one child below the age of
18 working for more than four hours a day, while this is the case for only 5% of the
Figure 8-16: Number of children below the age of 18
(o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed
for more than 4 hours a day, in general and
according to region of residence
Figure 8-17: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below
the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day,
according to poverty level (poverty3)
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households with a family income above the poverty line. Similarly, whereas 7% of the
households that can be classified as hardship cases have at least one child below the
age of 16 working, this is the case for 3% of the households with a living standard
above the poverty line.
The interviewees
were also asked
about the various
strategies that they
use in order to
cope with hard-
ship.14 In answer-
ing this question,
respondents were
given the opportu-
nity to specify from a predetermined list which coping strategies they had used. In this
list, there was one question asking the interviewees whether or not they had sent
additional members below the age of 18 into the labor market.
In general, 10% of the respondents stated that they had sent more household mem-
bers below the age of 18 into the labor market as a method of coping with the hard-
ship. It is worth remembering that this percentage stood at 16% in the last report
(September 2003). As such, there is a drop of 6% among respondents who sent
household members below the age of 18 into the labor market. This, again, could be
partially explained by the fact that the survey for the current report was conducted
during the school year, while the survey for the last report was conducted during the
summer holidays.
As illustrated in
Figure 8.18, there
are clear differ-
ences in the
percentage of
respondents that
opted for
sending children
below the age of
18 into the labor
market as a
coping strategy
according to
region, poverty
level and the
effect of the Wall.
Once again, there is no great difference in the percentage of respondents in
the West Bank (10%) and the Gaza Strip (11%) who sent children below the
age of 18 into the labor market. This coping mechanism is used least fre-
quently by respondents in East Jerusalem (3%). Furthermore, reliance on the
strategy of sending children below the age of 18 to work increases as poverty
increases. More concretely, whereas 7% of households with a family income
above the poverty line sent children below the age of 18 into the labor market
Figure 8-17: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a)
and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4
hours a day, according to poverty level
Figure 8-18: Children below the age of 18 in the labor market as
a coping strategy (o131f) in general and according to region of
residence, poverty level, and Wall
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as a coping strategy, this percentage swells to 11% among households with a living
standard below the poverty line and to 15% among households living in hardship.
Finally, the strategy of sending children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a
means of coping with hardship is far more often found in areas that are crossed by the
Wall (18%) than in areas that are not crossed by the Wall (8%).
For the first time in our series of studies, interviewees who said that they have at least
one child below the age of 18
working for more than four
hours per day were asked
about the type of work these
employed children carry out.
The answers were classified
into four categories, which
included (1) farming, (2)
construction, (3) workers
and (4) shop assistants. As
indicated in Figure 8.19, the
largest percentage of
employed children below the
age of 18 work as shop assistants (38%), followed by 27% who fall into the category
of workers, 25% who are employed in farming and 10% who are involved in construc-
tion.
8.3.2 Children and education
In general, only 1% of the respondents stated that it was “almost impossible” for the
household members to reach their place of education, 5% said that it was “very
difficult”, and 23% considered it to be “difficult”. The majority of 71% of the respon-
dents said that it was not difficult at all for their household members to attend school
or university.
In comparison
to the results
on this ques-
tion in the last
report (Sep-
tember 2003),
there is a
considerable
improvement
in the ability of
Palestinians to
get to their
place of education. Indeed, last September, less than half the respondents (46%)
stated that it was “not difficult” to attend school or university, while the majority
continued to face various levels of difficulties in getting to their place of
education.
In comparison with the results of September 2003, there is still a significant -
albeit diminished - difference in opinion concerning the ability to attend
school or university depending on the region in which respondents reside. As
indicated in Figure 8.20, fewer West Bankers (64%) than Jerusalemites
Figure 8-19: Type of work of employed children
below the age of 18 (o065o)
Figure 8-20: Ability to attend school or university in
the past 6 months (o113a) in general and
according to region of residence
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(76%) and Gazans (79%) stated that it was not difficult to reach school or university.
In the report of September 2003, only 32% of West Bank respondents said so, but the
differences according to region of residence which remain considerable, merely
highlight the continuing restrictions of movement as a result of closures and occasional
military actions that are felt more by Palestinians in the West Bank than by their
compatriots in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
Household members of respondents in villages clearly continue to have a harder time
attending school or university than their peers in cities and refugee camps. Indeed,
whereas 76% of city residents and 71% of camp dwellers said that their household
members did not face any difficulty in getting to their place of education, only 62% of
village respondents shared this opinion. Again, this trend can by explained by the
prevailing conditions on the ground as villagers, in order to attend some schools and
especially universities, must be able to enter cities, which remain closed or hard to
reach as a result of the Israeli military checkpoints surrounding them.
Finally, the results
in Figure 8.21 also
illustrate that
respondents
residing in areas
that are crossed by
the Wall face far
more difficulties in
attending school
or university than
respondents in
areas that are not
crossed by the
Wall. More con-
cretely, whereas half of the respondents that were affected by the Wall (50%) stated
that it has not been difficult for their household members in the past six months to
attend school or university, this was the case for a majority of 74% of the respondents
that were not affected by the Wall.
Respondents with school-age children were also asked how often in the past six
months their children had been unable to attend school or were late to school due to
curfews or closures. Generally, the results very much correspond with the results from
the previous question’s analysis concerning the ability to attend school or university in
the past six months. Whereas in general 71% of the respondents stated that it has “not
been difficult” in the past six months to attend their place of education, another 71%
of the respondents replied that in the past six months that their children had never or
were almost never unable to attend school or arrived late to school as a result of
closures or curfews. Of the remainder of the respondents, 26% said that their children
were unable to go to school or arrived late fewer than ten times a month,
while 3% stated that this happened ten times or more a month in the past six
months.
As overviewed in Figure 8.22, below, the inability to attend school or late
arrival at school due to curfews or closures varies considerably according to
the respondents’ region and area of residence. Concretely, a markedly higher
Figure 8.21 Ability to attend school or university in the past 6
months (o113a), according to
area of residence and Wall
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percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (87%) and in Jerusalem (70%) than in the
West Bank (59%) said that their children were never or were almost never unable to
reach school or arrived late at school as a result of curfews or closures. Furthermore, a
distinctly higher percentage of respondents in villages (73%) and cities (72%) than in
refugee camps (62%) relayed that their children were never or almost never unable to
attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures. In short, these results seem to
indicate that the main trouble spots for attending school in the past six months are in
the West Bank and in refugee camps.
When parents of school-going children were asked about the frequency in the past six
months of their children not being taught by their regular teacher because that
teacher was unable to come to school due to curfews or closures, the results seem to
indicate that children were able to reach school easier than their teachers. In general,
only 53% of the parents said that it never or almost never happened that their children
were not taught by their regular teacher because he/she was unable to reach school
as a result of curfews or closures. Of the remainder of the respondent parents, 39%
said that their children were not taught by their regular teacher less than ten times per
month, while 7% stated that this happened ten times or more per month in the past six
months. As was the case concerning children’s inability to attend school, the inability
of teachers to get to school as a result of curfews or closures also varies considerably
according to region and area of residence. As overviewed in Figure 8.23, below,
children not being taught by their regular teacher because that teacher was unable to
come to school due to closures or curfews occurred less frequently in the Gaza Strip
(64%) and Jerusalem (52%) than in the West Bank (45%). Furthermore, a far higher
percentage of parents in cities (58%) and villages (51%) than in refugee camps
(39%) affirmed that it never or almost never happened that their children were not
taught by their regular teacher in the past six months. In summary, it is again
in the West Bank and in refugee camps that teachers seem to have the most
trouble in getting to their classrooms.
In the survey conducted for this report, respondents for the first time were
asked if they had moved from their original place of residence since the
beginning of the Intifada. Hereby, they were also queried about their reasons
Figure 8-22: Frequency in the past six months of the inability to attend school or
of arriving late at school due to curfews/closures (o113b) in general and
according to region of residence, and area of residence
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behind the move to another town, city or village. Although this question is discussed in
more detail in Part One of this report, it is covered briefly here, because one of the
possible reasons for moving was for children in the household to be able to continue
their education. As indicated in Table 8.5, below, 94% of the respondents had not
moved since the beginning of the second Intifada. However, slightly less than 1% of
the respon-
dents moved so
that their
children could
continue their
education.
Although this
percentage
does not look
impressive at
all, when
translated into
reality, it implies
that more than 25,000 families in the OPT have moved to another town, city or village
since the beginning of the Intifada in order to ensure the continuation of their children’s
education.
8.4 CHILDREN AND THE INTIFADA
The harsh conditions of the Intifada have impacted many Palestinian children in
different ways. In order to be able to create a more concrete picture of the effects of
the Intifada, respondent parents were asked whether or not their children
(below the age of 18) expressed signs of psychological problems such as
aggressive behavior, poor school results, bedwetting and nightmares. In
general, 36% of the parents detected aggressive behavior among their
children, 31% noticed poor school results, 25% reported bedwetting, and
28% stated that their children suffered from nightmares. Although these
Table 8-5: Moved from original place of residence to
another town, city or village since the beginning
of the Intifada so that children can continue with their education
(o161)
Figure 8-23: Frequency in the past six months of children not being taught by
their regular teacher because the teacher was unable to come due to curfews/
closures (o113c) in general, according to region of residence, and area of
residence
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results are de-
pressing as they
are, it is notable
that they represent
an improvement to
answers to the
same question in
the August 2003
survey. At that
time, still 46% of
the parents
reported aggres-
sive behavior, 38% poor school results, 27% bedwetting, and 39% nightmares. From
this comparison, one could possibly deduce that Palestinian children are slowly but
surely starting to bounce back over time from traumas experienced when the nega-
tive and direct effects of the Intifada, such as shooting, injury or death of a relative or
friend, arrests and beatings, confinement at home as a result of curfews or Israeli
military incursions, were widespread.
After having generally discussed the negative impact of the Intifada, it is important to
explore whether or not children’s behavioral problems differ according to the various
independent variables at hand. As such, below, each of the listed effects of the
Intifada on children below the age of 18 will be discussed separately.
Concerning children showing aggressive behavior since the beginning of the Intifada,
there are significant differences when examining the answers according to region and
area of residence,
refugee status, poverty
level, and the effect of
the Wall. As detailed in
Figure 8.25, in compari-
son with children in the
West Bank (29%) and
East Jerusalem (30%),
children in the Gaza
Strip most frequently
manifested aggressive
behavior (48%).
Furthermore, a lower
percentage of children
in villages (30%) than in
cities (38%) and
refugee camps (43%)
suffer from aggressive
behavior. A higher percentage of refugee children (41%) than non-refugee
children (33%) seem to behave aggressively. The results in Figure 8.25 also
indicate that aggressive behavior among children seems to augment with an
increase in hardship. Finally, aggressive behavior among children seems to
be more common among children residing in places that are crossed by the
Wall (44%) than among those who have their home in places that are not
crossed by the Wall (35%).
Figure 8-24: Impact of the second Intifada on
children (o033a, b, c, d)
Figure 8-25: Aggressive behavior by children (o033a)
according to region and, area of residence, refugee status,
poverty level and Wall
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Figure 8-27: Bedwetting by children (o033c) according to
region of residence, area of residence and poverty level
The phenomenon of poor school results since the beginning of the Intifada is similar in
the West Bank (26%) and East Jerusalem (26%) and is most evident in the Gaza Strip
(42%). It is perhaps worth remembering here that the overall assessment of poor
school results according to region of residence has changed noticeably since the
September 2003 report. At that time, poor school results were most common among
children in the West Bank and least witnessed in children residing in East Jerusalem. As
such, in the past six months the problem of bad school results among West Bank
children seems to have considerably diminished.
Furthermore, the
results in Figure
8.26 clearly
indicate that
incidence of poor
school results is
far more pro-
nounced in
households that
live in hardship
(54%) than in
households with a monthly income below the poverty line (39%) or above the poverty
line (23%).
When analyzing the issue of bedwetting according to region of residence, it is again
obvious that bedwetting is far more frequent in the Gaza Strip (37%) than in the West
Bank (18%) and Jerusalem (15%). Again, results with regard to bedwetting were very
different in the September 2003 report as at that time bedwetting was mostly a
problem among West Bank children. A possible explanation for this change could be
that in the past six months Israeli military incursions, attacks and targeted killings
occurred more often in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and, as such, it is now the
Gazan children more than the children in the West Bank and East Jerusalem who
increasingly experience traumatic events and as a result progressively manifest more
signs of psychological distress such as bedwetting.
A significantly higher
percentage of
children residing in
refugee camps
(37%) than in cities
(24%) and villages
(19%) wet their
beds. Furthermore,
bedwetting occurs
far more frequently
Figure 8-26: Bad school results by children (o033b)
according to region of residence and poverty level
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amongst children in
households living in
hardship (44%) than
among children in
households with a
monthly income
above the poverty
line (19%) and even
than children in
households with a
monthly income
below the poverty
line (29%).
Consistent with the
findings above, a higher percentage of children in the Gaza Strip (35%) than children
in the West Bank (25%) and Jerusalem (20%) suffer from nightmares. Also similar to
previous findings, nightmares are a more common phenomenon among children in
refugee camps (36%) than among children residing in cities (27%) and villages
(26%). Finally, once more poverty negatively impacts children’s state of mind, as a far
higher percentage of children in households living in hardship (44%) than children in
households that are financially relatively better-off (27%) have nightmares.
Given the so
obviously
persisting
manifestations
of psychologi-
cal distress
among
Palestinian
children below
the age of 18, it
is important to
assess to what
extent parents feel that they are capable of fully meeting the needs of their children for
care and protection. As could be expected given the continuing high percentages of
children who express signs of psychological problems, in general, a majority of
parents (53%) do not feel that they can fully care and protect of their children. Again
not surprising given the trends detected above, a lower percentage of parents in the
Gaza Strip (39%) than in Jerusalem (46%) and the West Bank (54%) feel that they can
meet the needs of their children for care and protection. Similarly, a lower percentage
of parents in refugee camps (42%) than in cities (44%) and villages (57%) report
feeling able to meet these basic needs of their children.
The ability of parents to fully meet the needs of their children for care and
protection also varies significantly according to refugee status and poverty
level. As overviewed in Figure 8.30, a considerably lower percentage of
refugee parents (43%) than non-refugee parents (51%) are able to meet
these needs. Furthermore, an impressive 66% of parents in households living
Figure 8-29: Care and protection needs of children (o171) in
general and according to region and area of residence
Figure 8-28: Have the children (below the age of 18) in your
household suffered from nightmares since the beginning of the
second Intifada? (o033d) according to region of residence,
area of residence and poverty level
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in extreme poverty admitted that they were unable to meet the needs of their children
for care and protection. This was “only” the case for 43% of parents in households with
a living standard above the poverty line.
As usual,
parents were
asked to
specify what in
their opinion is
the most
important need
of their chil-
dren. In
general, 32% of parents considered their children’s regular attendance of school to be
the most important need; 29% believed that it was most important that their children
eat as before the Intifada; while 26% stated that it was most important for their
children to have safe opportunities to play with friends. Less than 10% (9%) of the
parents believed that the most important need of their children was to receive psycho-
logical support and only 5% considered unrestricted access to medical care to be the
most important need for their children. The most striking differences in comparison
with the September 2003 report is the decrease in the percentage of parents viewing
psychological support for their children as the most important need (decline from
19% to 9%), and the increase in the percentage of parents stating that the most
important need of their children is to eat as before the Intifada (increase from 20% to
29%).
These reported needs vary according to region and area of residence. For example, a
far higher percentage of parents in the West Bank (41%) than in Jerusalem (26%) or
the Gaza Strip (22%) asserted that the most important need of their children is to
attend school regularly. The importance of school attendance is also significantly
higher in villages (42%) than in cities (29%) and refugee camps (25%). Conversely,
the need for children to eat as they did before the Intifada is considered to be more
important by parents in the Gaza Strip (32%) and by parents in refugee camps (39%)
than by parents in other regions and areas of residence.
Figure 8-30: Care and protection needs of children (o171)
according to refugee status, and Wall
Figure 8-31: Most important need of children (o105) in general and
according to region and area of residence
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Parents’ perceptions about the most important need of their children vary according to
the poverty level of the households. Indeed, the less poor are the respondent parents,
the more importance they attach to the need of their children to have safe opportuni-
ties to play with their friends and to attend school regularly. In contrast, the need for
children to eat as
they did before the
Intifada gains
importance with
increased levels of
poverty. Moreover
and as detailed in
Figure 8.32, both the
need of children to
attend school regu-
larly and to eat as
they used to do before the Intifada are more important to parents that reside in areas
that are crossed by the Wall than to parents in areas that are not crossed by the Wall.
In conclusion, when examining specific issues related to women and children, a
number of interesting and sometimes worrying findings can be identified. These
results are summarized in the bullets below.
In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December
2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one woman em-
ployed (26%). In fact, the percentage dropped to the level it stood at in the December
2001 report. Interestingly, the percentage of households with at least one woman
employed swells with an increased level of education and is also highest in the house-
holds that fall in the age category of 24 to 35 years.
When women in the household are employed, it has a clear positive effect on the
household’s financial status, as these households tend to have a higher monthly
income level and can more often position their financial status above the poverty line.
Furthermore, those households seem to be in a better position to cope financially in
the future.
Women in the labor market less frequently lost their jobs than their male counter-
parts. However, those women who did loose their employment tried less hard than
men to find alternative employment. Furthermore, although less women than men are
employed full-time in the labor force, women more than men seem to be able to bring
home a regular and full salary. Lastly, men more than women are willing to compro-
mise on their wages as long as they can keep a job and avoid total unemployment.
In general, housewives spend an average of seven hours a day on work at home.
Housewives who also spend time on work not related to the house or children, on
average do so for about three hours and 20 minutes a day.
In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, De-
cember 2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least
one child below the age of 18 employed (11%). In fact, the percentage has
dropped to about the level of child labor as it stood in the December 2001
report. The decision to have children work is influenced by the financial
situation of the household, as a far higher percentage of households living in
Figure 8-32: Most important need of children (o105)
according to poverty level and Wall
  232
hardship or below the poverty line than households with a living standard above the
poverty line have children employed. Children in the labor market are most often
working as shop assistants, or are workers or involved in construction.
Albeit that about 30% of the household members of respondents continue to face
difficulties in getting to their place of education, there appears to be a considerable
improvement in the ability of Palestinians to attend school or university since Septem-
ber 2003.
About 71% of the respondents stated that their children in the past six months
had never or almost never been unable to attend school or had arrive late, while 53%
of the parents said that it never or almost never happened that their children were not
taught by their regular teacher because he/she was unable to reach school due to
curfews or closures. However, both child and teacher attendance of school were most
problematic in the West Bank and in refugee camps.
Since the beginning of the Intifada, 36% of parents reported aggressive behavior
among their children, 31% noticed bad school results, 25% mentioned that their
children are bedwetting, and 28% reported that their children have nightmares.
Although the results are striking, they represent an improvement on the answers to the
same question in the September 2003 report. All four types of behavioral problems are
most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among the poorer segments of
society.
A majority of 53% of parents admit to being unable to fully meet the needs of
their children for care and protection. Again, this phenomenon is most pronounced in
the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer elements of society and among
refugees.
The need for children to attend school regularly is the priority for the majority of
parents. In comparison to the September 2003 report, a declining percentage of
parents stress the need for their children to receive psychological support, while an
increasing percentage emphasize the need for their children to eat as they did before
the outbreak of the Intifada. The importance attached to the need for children to eat as
they did before the Intifada is most striking in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among
the poorest and in areas that are crossed by the Wall.
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Part 9 of the report investigates the living
situation of the Palestinian refugees living
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(oPT) and the impact of international aid
on their livelihoods.
Refugees constitute 46% of the popula-
tion sample, i.e. 674 out of 1,464 respon-
dents. 1 As indicated in the following
figure, most of refugee respondents
reside in cities.
Twenty-six percent of the West Bank
refugees included in our sample live in camps, which mirrors the statistics of the
United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). Our
refugee sample in Gaza somehow underrates camp
residents: they make up 44% of our total sample,
while UNRWA estimates they representation at 53%
of the population.2
Conversely, refugee camps - which are usually
perceived as the embodiment of refugee status - are
mostly by not exclusively inhabited by refugees. On
average, 95% of the camp residents we interviewed
were refugees, with a high of 98% in the West Bank
and a low of 94% in the Gaza Strip.
Part 9 is divided into two sections.
The first section sets out to establish a basic socioeconomic profile for the
refugees as perceived by the refugees themselves and by the OPT population as a
whole.
The second section focuses on the Palestinians’ perceptions of the socioeconomic
assistance programs undertaken on behalf of the refugees.
Our main explanatory variable is the “refugee status” independent variable. However,
when relevant, we will also use the “camp refugee” variable, either vis-à-vis inhabit-
ants of other areas of residence (i.e. villages and cities, including non-camp refugees)
or other places of residence (i.e. non-camp dwellers, including non-camp
1 Previous reports have shown that nearly all refugees (above 95%) were registered with
UNRWA.
2 See UNRWA, Figures as of 31 December 2003, Public Information Office, UNRWA
Headquarters (Gaza), March 2004.
Figure 9-1: Distribution of
refugees according to area of
residence
9 REFUGEES
& UNRWA
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refugees). Vari-
ables related to
age, gender,
education are
excluded from our
analysis as they
are dealt with in
other parts of the
report. Also
generally ex-
cluded is East
Jerusalem as a
place of resi-
dence.
9 . 1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE REFUGEES
This section aims at sketching refugees’ socioeconomic characteristics, regardless of
the sources of assistance they receive, as compared with non-refugees and the OPT
population at large. Analysis is mainly based on data linked to three interrelated
notions:
Poverty status in terms of household income. 1
Causes of poverty such as mobility constraints, employment status and availabil-
ity of alternative sources of income.
Unmet needs at both the household and community levels.
9.1.1 Poverty status and refugees: reality and perceptions
 9.1.1.1 Poverty line and refugee status
Current situation
Overall, refugees are comparatively poorer than non-refugees. In terms of household
income, this means that the percentage of refugees below the poverty line2 (including
the hardship cases, i.e. those who earn half or less than the level of income needed to
be on the poverty line3) is higher. Sixty percent of the refugee sample was in this
situation as compared with 53% of the non-refugee sample.
1 We refer here strictly to the monetary income-related definition of poverty. It is agreed that,
overall, (transient) poverty is also related to gaps in education, health, housing and other human
development criteria.
2 The determination of the poverty line and of the hardship cases category used in this
report is discussed at length in the Introduction and Part II and Part III.
3 The notion of “hardship cases” used in this report is different from the notion of
“Special Hardship cases” used by UNRWA. The latter is not restricted to income-
related criteria as it also restricts eligibility to specific categories of the refugee
population (families headed by widows, for instance). For a comprehensive definition of
UNRWA’s “Special hardship cases” see below, footnote 18.
Figure 9-2 Refugee status according to place of residence
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Refugee camps
clearly emerged as
a focal point of
poverty, with
proportionally more
hardship cases
(38%), than in cities
and villages (22%
and 15% respec-
tively). Strictly
speaking, hardship
cases constitute the
majority of the
camp population, while in other areas the majority of the population is above the
poverty line. However, our data shows that that this pattern in refugee camps is mainly
due to conditions in the Gaza Strip, where nearly half of camp residents are hardship
cases. Quite to the opposite, in the West Bank one finds more hardship cases outside
the camps.
Evolution in the past six months
The figures obtained in this survey indicate lower levels of poverty than the data
obtained in our preceding survey (July 2003), when 66%, i.e. an additional six percent,
were considered below the poverty line and hardship cases.1 The non-refugee sample
is slightly worse-off than in July 2003, as percentages of non-refugee hardship cases
and those below the poverty line climbed from 51% to 53%. The relative improvement
of the refugees’ socioeconomic status between July 2003 and February 2004 can also
be inferred from the family income figures. During this period, the percentage of
refugees who earned low incomes (NIS 1,000 and less) decreased from 23% to 19%,
whereas the same group among non-refugees increased from 18% to 22% (o057v3).
The refugees’ better
socioeconomic
situation is due to the
improvement in their
employment conditions
during the period
under scrutiny. Be-
tween July 2003 and
February 2004, the
percentage of full-time
employed among
refugees increased by
6% (from 48% to
54%), while the
Figure 9-3: Poverty according to refugee status
1 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 175.
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percentage of
unemployed
decreased by 5%
(from 25% to 20%).
Conversely, during
the same period, the
non-refugees
experienced a
decline in the full-
time employed by
5% (from 48% to
43%), while the
number of unem-
ployed increased by
2% (25% to 27%)
(o08)1.
Analyzing the evolution of conditions from a geographical perspective demonstrates
the uneven nature of progress in refugees’ socioeconomic status.
In terms of place of residence, the overall socioeconomic status improvement ob-
served among refugees reflected the improvement of conditions for West Bank camp
dwellers (98% of them being refugees), who appear to have benefited more from the
relative relaxing of Israel’s closure policy.2 The percentage of hardship cases in this
group declined by 12% (from 28% to 16%), while the percentage of people above the
poverty line increased by 10% (from 35% to 45%). In contrast, conditions for Gaza
camp dwellers (94% of them being refugees) deteriorated dramatically, with the
percentage of hardship cases among Gaza refugee camp residents rising from 36% to
46% and the proportion of those above the poverty line dropping from 31% to 23%
(o08).3
Highlighting the different conditions between refugee camps in the West Bank and
those in the Gaza Strip, the percentage of (very) low income earners (below NIS
1,000) increased in the Gaza refugee camps from 27% to 35%, but sharply decreased
in the West Bank refugee camps from 33% to 9% (o057v3).
9.1.1.2 General perceptions of income and of living conditions
The refugees’ perceptions of their purchasing power do not significantly reflect their
overall improved socioeconomic status for the period surveyed. Hence, the percent-
age of refugees who perceived their income as lower than needed was significantly
higher than average: 71% of them believed their income to be much less (41%) or
slightly less (30%) than needed. Non-refugees were less dissatisfied about their
income (o040).
1 The o08 variable does not consider retired people, housewives and students unem-
ployed.
2 The percentage of hardship cases and above-the-poverty-line respondents (refugees
and non-refugees) among the non-camp dwellers remained stable at 19% and 46%
respectively.
3 In comparison, the percentage of non-camp resident hardship cases decreased from
34% to 29%, while the percentage of non-camp residents above the poverty line
increased from 25% to 34%.
Figure 9-5: Evolution of employment situation (o008)
according to refugee status
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These perceptions
are nevertheless
more positive than
those of July 2003,
however the
perception of
improved conditions
is slightly more
prevalent among
non-refugees.
Between July 2003
and February 2004, the percentage of respondents who considered their income less
than needed decreased by 6% among non-refugees and by 5% among refugees.
Over the same period, the percentage of respondents who considered their income
higher than needed increased by 7% among non-refugees and by only one percent
among refugees.
The non-refugees confirmed their comparatively more favorable socioeconomic
status by reporting more optimistic financial forecasts. Forty percent of them believed
that they would be able to keep up financially “as long is it would take”, and 51% that
they could “barely manage” or were in a serious situation, versus 32% and 56%
respectively of the refugee respondents. Six months earlier, one third of each category
believed they “could manage” and 55% that they could barely get by (o044).
In a nutshell, between July 2003 and February 2004, refugee prospects for improved
income remained less optimistic, whatever the refugees’ area of residence, whereas
those prospects were somewhat improved for non-refugees. During this time period
the political prospects of the Roadmap failed, and along with it hoped-for positive
short- and long-term socioeconomic impacts (such as the re-opening of the Israeli job
market and possible proposed compensation/repatriation schemes). It is possible
that the pessimism of refugees reflects their added economic and political stake in
these developments.
Figure 9-6: Perceptions of income’s conformity to needs (o041)
by refugee status
Figure 9-7:
Perceptions of
the
refugees’
living condi-
tions (o144)
by refugee
status
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The refugees’ overall less-enviable socioeconomic status is reflected in the OPT
population at large. About two-thirds of our total sample believes that the refugees are
much or slightly worse-off than non-refugees. That percentage is less, however,
among non-refugees themselves. More strikingly, 12% of non-refugees believe that
refugees are slightly or much better-off than others, as compared with 3% of refugee
respondents who believe that refugees are slightly or much better-off (o0144xo02).
Interestingly enough, in terms of area of residence, camp residents tend to consider
the refugees’ living conditions in a more balanced way than residents of cities and
villages. They are more likely to believe that there is no real difference between
refugees and non-refugees in this respect, and less likely to consider refugees worse
off. Paradoxically, more residents of cities (9%) and villages (7%) also see refugees as
being better off than non-refugees, versus 2% of the refugees (o0144xo060).
9.1.2. Causes of poverty
The comparatively underprivileged status of refugees is generally ascribed to the
latter’s lack of access to capital, land and alternative sources of income, to greater
expenses due to persistent unmet needs or to a decrease in the socioeconomic
assistance provided, rather than conjectural factors linked to mobility problems or to
types of employment available.1
9.1.2.1 Mobility constraints
Regarding mobility, the statement still holds true. The closure policy imposed
by Israel in the OPT affected refugees less than non-refugees. In general,
66% of the latter experienced a lot of mobility problems versus 51% of the
former (o031). And while relatively similar percentages of both categories
Figure 9-8: Perceptions of the refugees’ living conditions (o144)
by area of residence
1 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 174-176.
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encountered
difficulties in
getting access to
places of work
(o114), fewer
refugees suffered
from business
losses due to
curfew (28%
versus 40% of non-
refugees)
(o0140e). Also, the
construction of the
Wall prevented
more non-refugees
(36%) from getting to their place of work than refugees (21%) (o0164c).
When examining area of residence, camp residents (88%) (and resident of cities) are
in general less exposed to mobility restrictions than villagers (95%), with regards to
reaching place of work (47% versus 62%, respectively) (o0130e), or to suffering
business losses because of curfews (21% versus 45%, respectively) (o0140e). In
addition, the camp residents’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis residents of villages is
all the more obvious when it comes to Wall-related access to work problems: 18% of
camp residents were affected in this respect, versus 22% of city residents and 47% of
village residents (o0164c).
9.1.2.2. Employment status and alternative income sources
As highlighted in our preceding survey, there is no significant difference between
refugees and non-refugees regarding type of employment, employment situation and
unemployment status per se.1 Refugees are represented, like the general population,
among full-time workers (26%) and housewives (32%) (o008). Students (11%) and
retired people (2%) excluded, 13% of refugees are not employed. In addition, around
half of the main breadwinners (54%) have gone through various periods of unemploy-
ment since the beginning of the Intifada, most of those periods extending from 7 to 24
months (26%).
When employed, however, refugees tend to receive their salaries more regularly and
fully than non-refugees (75% versus 61%) (o099), perhaps because they are em-
ployed in more sustainable job sectors, such as the public sector (where 32% of
refugees are employed versus 27% of non-refugees) or in international agencies
(where 12% of refugees are employed versus 6% of non-refugees). Conversely, many
more non-refugees are self-employed (36% versus 30% of refugees), or are employed
by the private sector (30% versus 18% of non-refugees) (o063).
Conversely, refugees seem to be more vulnerable to variations in the local
job market. These variations have had a comparatively larger impact on their
level of income, as they enjoy fewer alternative sources of income, such as
work in Israel or in another country (14% versus 16% of non-refugees)
Figure 9-9: Various impacts of mobility restrictions (o031, o114,
0140e, 0164c) by refugee status
1 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 174.
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(o011), independent income (27% versus 40% of non-refugees) or property renting
(10% versus 14% of non-refugees) (o0163b). Likewise, they are less in a position to
sustain the hardship by selling property (5% versus 8% of non-refugees) or by
cultivating land (10% versus 31%) (o0131c and d).1 Financial help from international
organizations somehow helps allay difficulties: 21% of refugees benefit from this kind
of assistance versus 11% of non-refugees (o0163b) (see Section 9.2) but, as we will
see below, international aid is not stable. Ultimately, one finds refugees more likely to
resort to short-term measures in order to sustain the hardship, such as reducing
expenses (79% versus 74% of non-refugees) or not paying water and electricity bills
(45% versus 39% of non-refugees) (o0131h, g).
Fewer opportunities for alternative sources of income result in higher percentages of
refugees ascribing a drop in income to job losses: 34% of refugees versus 25% of
non-refugees reported themselves in that situation. Among other causes of income
decline, our survey underscored working hour losses (27% versus 24% of non-
refugees) and business/cultivable land damaged (9% versus 10% of non-refugees)
(o0109).
Job loss was also the major cause of income decline in refugee camps (48%) and in
villages (29%), ahead of working hour loss (23% for refugee camp residents and 22%
for villagers). The impact of job losses was more marked in Gaza refugee camps,
where the percentage of camp residents naming job loss as the reason for their drop in
income was over twice as great as among those residing outside camps.
9.1.3. Unmet needs
Employment and financial assistance were considered by 52% of our overall popula-
tion sample as the main important unmet needs (29% for employment and 23% for
financial assistance), well ahead of housing (15%), health (12%), education (11%)
and food (10%) (o0180).2
Figure 9-10: Job losses as main cause of income decrease (o109)
by place of residence
1 This is especially the case of camp refugees where, due to lack of land property, less than 2% of
residents in either Gaza or the West Bank can cultivate land or sell property to sustain
hardship (o0163 c and d).
2 The pre-eminence of employment as a need is also positively asserted by 45% of
refugees and 40% of non-refugees as their households’ first most important need, well
ahead of food and financial assistance for refugees (14% and 13% respectively), and
food and health for non-refugees (17% and 15% respectively) (o079av3). Employment
is also referred to by the overall sample as the main first important community
assistance (62%), ahead of financial assistance (11%) and food (10%) (o0180av3).
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Given the higher impact jobs losses have had on refugee income, it is no surprise that
employment is more often cited as an unmet need by refugees than non-refugees.
Actually, as indicated in Figure 9.11, refugees appear to be more in need of basic
services than non-refugees, except for education and health (and food for some of the
special hardship cases)1 which are provided to them on a regular basis by UNRWA.
It is worth
noting that
while food is
more
frequently
referred to
as an
important
unmet need
among
refugees in
general (as
can be seen in the above figure), it is underrated as such by refugee camp residents.
Our survey finds that only 6% of camp residents consider food an unmet need versus
11% of city residents and 29% of village residents (o0180xO060). The discrepancy
between camp and non-camp residents is wider in the West Bank, where 2% of the
former considered food as an important unmet need versus 12% of the latter, than in
Gaza where the percentages where at 8% and 12%, respectively (o0180xplace).
These findings may be explained by an emphasis on food assistance in UNRWA-
recognized camps which, as we saw above (see Figure 9.4), are the OPT’s main
pockets of poverty. Conversely, refugees living outside the camps may be insuffi-
ciently supported in this respect.
When it come to the services most in demand in refugee camps and informal refugee
areas,2 most respondents from our total sample believe that income-generation
services are most
desirable, ahead
of infrastructural
rehabilitation, relief
and regular basic
services such as
education and
health.
This hierarchy of
priorities in
services corre-
sponds to the
Figure 9-11: Most important needs (o180) according
to refugee status
1 See footnote 18.
2 Informal refugee areas (or informal refugee gatherings) are also called “unrecognized
camps”.
Figure 9-12: Most desired service in refugee camps and refugee
areas (o146)
     243
hierarchy established by the refugee and non-refugee respondents. However, when
one takes as an independent variable the area or place of residence, it is clear that
camp residents (at 19%), whether in Gaza or the West Bank, are more likely to opt for
relief over infrastructure rehabilitation than city (17%) or village residents (15%).
The comparative
importance of
infrastructure reha-
bilitation and relief
services (which here
includes shelter
rehabilitation) when
set alongside other
basic services may
stem from an urgent
need to address the
direct hardships
incurred by the
community in the
overall destruction of
shelters, communal
buildings and physical
infrastructure due to Israeli military incursions. More generally, and regardless of the
Intifada per se, UNRWA has long complained that lack of resources, minimal space for
improvement and expansion, and great population density contribute to an overall
deterioration in shelter and physical infrastructure conditions in its five fields of
operation.1
However, in terms of availability of services, our survey shows that with regard to the
main infrastructural services, such as water, sewage disposal and electricity net-
works, camp residents emerge on average better off than, or equal to, residents of
other areas.2
9.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND REFUGEE STATUS
This section aims at determining the refugees’ perceptions of the socioeconomic
assistance provided by local and international assistance institutions operating in the
OPT. In this respect, Palestinian refugees constitute a specific category. Most of them
have since May 1950 been provided basic services in the fields of education, primary
16 See for instance the report presented at the Workshop II of the Conference organized by UNRWA
in Geneva on 7-8 June 2004: “Community Development and Refugees: Infrastructure,
Environment, Housing and Social Development” (available on UNRWA’s website
www.unrwa.org).
17 Camp residents are worse off than city residents and sometimes villagers when it
comes to connection to less basic services, such as satellite TV (66% versus 72% and
65% respectively), internet (4% versus 18% and 11% respectively), fixed phone (45%,
versus 68% and 58% respectively) and mobile phone (52% versus 61% and 62%
respectively) (o0174 h, g, e, fxO060).
Figure 9-13: Access to infrastructure
 (o174a, o174b, o174c) by area of residence
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health care, housing, and relief/social services by UNRWA, the only UN agency that
has worked for such a long time in the exclusive service of one particular category of
refugees.1
In the OPT, over 1.5 million refugees are registered with the Agency, accounting for
more than 40% of the total population of these areas. All refugee children registered
with UNRWA in the OPT are eligible for nine years free schooling, and as part of its
regular program of assistance, the Agency runs 269 elementary and preparatory
schools for 250,000 pupils. Primary health care is also provided and the Agency
operates 51 health centers across the territories. Whilst UNRWA has no role in admin-
istering the 27 recognized refugee camps in which 650,000 refugees in the OPT live, it
does have some responsibility for developing and maintaining infrastructure. Refugee
families unable to meet their own basic needs are eligible for additional care, under
the Agency’s Special Hardship Case program (SHC). In the OPT 110,000 persons are
registered as SHCs and receive direct material and financial assistance, including
regular food parcels (see below for SHC criteria), funded from the Agency’s regular
program budget. UNRWA runs a number of other poverty alleviation and income-
generating projects, including a small loans scheme.
Following the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, UNRWA launched a
program of emergency activities in the OPT, aimed at responding to the immediate
and longer-term needs of the refugee population. The main pillars of the Agency’s
response include an emergency employment creation scheme - which by the end of
2003 had created over 45,000 short term jobs - and a large-scale food assistance
program, under which refugees who have lost their livelihoods are provided with food
baskets covering around 60% of their daily needs. UNRWA is currently feeding
approximately 1,000,000 persons as part of this program. Other interventions include
a program of emergency shelter repair and reconstruction, selective cash assistance
and a number of health and education activities, including psychosocial counseling.
Unfortunately however, donor contributions requested to respond adequately to the
crisis did not keep pace with mounting needs during 2003-2004, resulting in the
gradual curtailing of most, and the suspension of other, emergency activities and
obliging UNRWA to strictly prioritize its interventions.2 In particular, shortfalls in
funding have seen food distributions almost halved in the Gaza Strip and the volume
of food reduced in the West Bank; drastic cuts in the Agency’s emergency re-housing
program and the suspension of its shelter repair program in the West Bank; the
suspension of repairs to water and sewage lines severely affected by Israeli military
activity; the cancellation of in-kind assistance in the form of shoes and basic school
supplies for children, and the suspension of emergency education measures such as
1 UNRWA’s latest definition of the “Palestine refugee” (1993) stipulates that “Palestine refugee shall
mean any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1
June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of
the 1948 conflict.” Refugees within this definition and their direct descendants are
eligible for Agency regular services (source: Consolidated Registration Instructions
(Effective January 1993). Emergency services are granted not only on the basis of
refugee status but also economic conditions.
2 UNRWA, UNRWA emergency appeal 2004, UNRWA Headquarters (Gaza: December
2003).
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the distribution of self-standing learning material, education kits and after school
activities, etc.20 The outcome of these austerity measures pervade the sub-sections
that follow.
This section is divided in two subsections:
Current socioeconomic assistance according to refugee status: coverage, content
and sources.
The future of socioeconomic assistance, based on levels of satisfaction vis-à-vis
current assistance received and the future of UNRWA per se.
9.2.1. Current socioeconomic assistance
9.2.1.1.Coverage
Actual trends
As highlighted in preceding surveys, refugees emerged as the main recipients of
assistance during the period under scrutiny. Over half of them received assistance of
some sort as
compared with
one-third of non-
refugees (o035).
However, the
figures produced
in this survey
were, for refu-
gees especially,
significantly
lower (minus
14% for refu-
gees and 5% for non-refugees) than those obtained in the July 2003 survey, or more
generally since the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.
In terms of area of residence,
refugee camp residents remained
the main targets of socioeco-
nomic assistance (66%), ahead of
city (39%) and village residents
(24%). This was more the case in
Gaza, where 72% of refugee
camp residents received assis-
tance versus 54% of those living
outside the camps, than
in the West Bank where
Figure 9-14: Assistance received (o035, o035b) according to
refugee status, 2001-2004
Figure 9-15: Assistance received (o035) by
place of residence
20 Ibid, 4.
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48% of camp residents received assistance versus 29% of those living outside the
camps (o035).
Tracing the decline of assistance during the six past months per place of residence,
one clearly sees that West Bankers, be they camp residents or not, were those most
affected. The percentage of beneficiaries among Gaza refugee camp residents, the
main recipient category altogether, even increased slightly from 71% to 72% (o035).
As we will see below, this evolution is surely due to lack of adequate funding of
UNRWA. It may also result from a need to focus on the Gaza camps, which were both
the main poverty pockets in the OPT (see above 9.1.1.1.) and the most affected by
Israel’s military measures during the time of this survey.
Perceptions of coverage
To what extent do refugees perceive that the assistance they received adequately
covered their needs? Our survey shows that refugees feel on average comparatively
more covered by assistance. Among those who needed assistance and did not receive
it, one finds significantly fewer refugees (20%) than among non-refugees (34%)
(o038r). The refugees’ comparative advantage may be due to the resilient and
sustainable character of UNRWA’s services as compared to the services of the
Palestinian Authority, of local NGOs and of international bodies.
Confirming a focus of institutionalized assistance in the Gaza refugee camp communi-
ties, only 8% of Gaza refugee camp residents reported they had not received needed
assistance. The percentage of Gazans living outside the camps who reported thus was
twice as high; the percentage of West Bank refugee camp residents who reported thus
was three times as high (25%); and the percentage of West Bankers residing outside
camps who did not receive needed assistance was over four times as high (33%).
The comparative advantage of refugees in terms of assistance received was acknowl-
edged by the OPT population at large. Fifty-three percent of our total sample believed
that refugees received comparatively more assistance, versus 39% who saw no
significant
difference, and
9% who stated
that non-
refugees
received
comparatively
more assistance
(o0145). How-
ever, both
refugee and
non-refugee
Figure 9-16: Perceptions of levels of received assistance (0145) by
refugee status
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respondents tended to portray themselves as more needy, or the other as more
privileged, regarding assistance received. While 55% of non-refugees considered the
refugees worse off (see Section 9.1.1.3), nearly two-thirds of non-refugees believed
that refugees received more assistance. Conversely, most refugees said that their
refugee status was not a determining factor in the receipt of aid, thereby suggesting
that received assistance was insufficient, since they also believed that more 70% of
refugees were worse off that non-refugees (see 9.1.1.3). Lastly, the percentage of
refugees who reported that non-refugees received more assistance than they was
twice as large as the percentage of non-refugees who thought that non-refugees
received more aid.
The more obvious discrepancy with regard to perceived levels of received assistance
lies between West Banker non-camp residents and West Bank camp residents. While
the former category’s assessment is somewhat in line with non-refugees’ assessment
(see above), West Bank camp residents were more inclined to believe that non-
refugees received more assistance (25%) than the other way around (24%). This
phenomenon may be interpreted as West Bank camp residents’ response to the
dramatic decline in assistance (from 71% to 48% reporting assistance) they received
over the past six months, (see Figure 9.13).1 In contrast, camp residents and non-
camp residents in Gaza had similar perceptions as to the distribution of received
assistance per refugee status.
9.2.1.2 Content of assistance received over the six past months
Three main types of assistance will be analyzed: food, financial aid, and job and
employment assistance.
Food
Our survey confirmed that food was the most important first and second assistance
item received by the OPT population. Food assistance was referred to as the first most
important type of assistance received by a majority of 76% of refugees and non-
refugees alike.2 It was also mentioned as the second most important type of assis-
tance received by 68% of refugees and 54% of non-refugees (o036a1). When com-
pared with the July 2003 survey, the significance of food aid has nevertheless de-
creased in combined importance (by 13 % for refugees and 3% for non-refugees)
(o036foo). Residents of all areas were less likely to report food as the first or second
most important assistance received by a minimum of 6% (West Bank camp residents)
and a maximum of 12% (West Bankers residing outside camps). This was not true for
Gaza camp residents, where 62% of respondents rated food as the first or second
most important item, up from 54% in July 2003 (o036fooxplace).
Our survey found that the percentage of refugees depending on food assistance was
threefold the percentage of non-refugees (13% versus 4%, respectively). This is due,
as recalled above (see Part 6), to the major role UNRWA plays in delivering food on a
1 This decline however may be seen as service providers’ response to the improvement
of conditions for refugee camp residents in the West Bank during the July 2003 -
February 2004 period.
2 Refugee status in not a valid independent variable in this case (chi2>0.05).
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regular basis to its hardship cases1 and, more broadly, within its emergency program.
Conversely, while both categories were consistent in their use of extended family
support (8 % and 7%, respectively), refugees appeared less able to rely on their own
income for food (80% versus 89%, respectively) (o077). These findings testify to the
shift in the institutional set-up of household food supply that has occurred from July
2003 to February 2004 among refugees and non-refugees, as indicated in the follow-
ing figure:
Financial aid
After food, refugees considered financial aid the most important assistance item
received, with 11% of them declaring financial aid as either the first or the second
most important item
received (o036fin). When
considering place of
residence, most groups
were less likely than in our
previous survey to select
financial aid as one of the
most important types of
aid, except for West
Bankers residing outside
refugee camps.
Figure 9-18: Received financial assistance (o036fin) by
area of residence,
July 2003-February 2004
Figure 9-17: Main source of food in refugee households (o077),
July 2003-February 2004
1 As part of its regular program of assistance, UNRWA provides relief aid to 28,500 refugee
families (115,000 persons) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are registered with the Agency as
Special Hardship Cases (SHCs). The UNRWA concept of special hardship incorporates several
eligibility criteria. The total regular monthly income of the family should not exceed a
determined threshold and the family should not include a male adult who is able to
work. Consequently, eligible families are those e.g. headed by a widow, divorcee or
abandoned woman; an orphan; or a refugee male over 60 years of age. In addition, SHC
status can also be granted to families headed by or including a male adult who is
following a full-time course of study; is serving a term of compulsory military service; or
is suffering from a medical condition which renders him incapable of earning a living
(Source: UNRWA).
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Job and  employment assistance
The percentage of refugee households benefiting from job assistance (32%) was over
twice as high as the percentage of non-refugees benefiting from job assistance (14%)
(o023). Strikingly,
these figures are
much lower than
those obtained in
our July 2003
survey by a
margin of 12% for
both refugees and
non-refugees.
More short-time
jobs (11% of
refugees and 5%
of non-refugees)
than long-term
jobs (4% of
refugees and 1%
of non-refugees)
were offered.
Other employment-related assistance included, aside from provision of job opportuni-
ties, unemployment funds (17% of refugees versus 4% of non-refugees).
Looking at the issue from a geographical perspective, the only places of residence
that were not affected by the decline in job aid were the refugee camps in the Gaza
Strip, where the percentage of
beneficiaries grew from 37% to
45%. This appears to reflect
concern among main employ-
ment providers about the
serious deterioration of the
socioeconomic conditions
affecting Gaza camp residents
during the period under survey
(see Section 9.1.1.1).
Probably on account of the
short-term nature of the job
assistance schemes, respon-
dents considered employment
assistance a low-importance
item, despite the dominant
refugee perception of employ-
ment assistance as a major
unmet need (see Section
9.1.2.3). The percentage of
refugee respondents that
considered employment
assistance one of the two most
Figure 9-20: Source of first most important
assistance received (o036c1) according o
refugee status
Figure 9-19: Job assistance received in the past six months, by
place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 (o023)
  250
important assistance received remained at 5% between July 2003 and February 2004,
while increasing among non-refugee respondents from 1% to 2% during the same
period of time (o036emp).
9.2.1.3. Sources of assistance
General trends
The survey confirmed the refugees’ material dependency on UNRWA’s services, as
62% of them reported that the Agency was the source of their first most important
assistance item received (o036c1), ahead of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and trade
unions (10% each). The PA and international organizations (other than UNRWA)
emerged as the main providers of assistance for non-refugees, but non-refugees’
sources of socioeconomic assistance were, as could be expected, much more diverse.
In comparison with the July 2003 survey, while the percentage of people considering
UNRWA the most important provider of first important services declined for refugees
(minus 6%), it increased for non-refugees (plus 8%). The latter may have benefited
comparatively more from emergency measures that targeted the overall population
such as food assistance to people living under siege or to those whose homes were
demolished by the Israeli army. In the same context, the PA saw its role as a main
provider of first most important services to refugees increase twofold, from 5% to
10%.1
More specifically, UNRWA remained the main provider of first most important received
assistance in the refugee camps, with 60% in the West Bank camps and 62% in Gaza
camps (o036c1) reporting UNRWA as the source of crucial aid, but to a lesser extent
Figure 9-21: Main sources of regular services (o126bs, o126cs, o126ds, o126es,
o126fs) for refugees
\
1 Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 182.
2 In July 2003, the Islamist organizations and the local NGOs were each considered by
27% of the Jerusalemite respondents as the main providers of first most important
services. In January, this percentage reached 0% for the former and 4% for the latter.
Conversely, UNRWA’s percentages in Jerusalem climbed from 9% to 57% during the
same period of time.
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than in July 2003, when the same query produced proportions of 69% and 68%,
respectively. Further, UNRWA lost its preeminence among West Bank beneficiaries
(refugees and non-refugees) residing outside the camps (23% versus 29% in July
2003), where the PA has taken the lead as the main provider (25% versus 12% in July
2003). The main reason for that change, besides the Agency’s budgetary problems
outlined early in this section, may be UNRWA’s shifting focus from the West Bank to
East Jerusalem to make up for the dramatic decline in Islamist charitable organiza-
tions there.2
Source of assistance per type of services
UNRWA retained its place as the refugees’ main provider of the most important
assistance in the form of food (34% versus 4% for the PA), in-kind aid (52% versus
14% for Islamic institutions) and coupons (53% versus 18% for the PA). It is in
distributing those same items that UNRWA also takes precedent within the refugee
camps. However, comparing these results with those of the precedent survey shows a
decline in UNRWA’s role as a provider of emergency food rations (54% in July 2003,
i.e. minus 20% in February 2004),1 and of in-kind aid (80% in July 2003, i.e. minus
28% in February 2004).
In the same respect, UNRWA slipped from the first to second provider of medication
(26% versus 32% for the PA) and stabilized its position as second to the PA regarding
employment services (41% versus 44%), and third to trade unions and the PA in the
provision of financial assistance (12% versus 34% and 23%, respectively) to the
refugees (o036).
Our survey
confirmed that
UNRWA is the
main provider to
refugees of
services made
available on a
regular basis
(without reference
to importance)
such as schooling,
medication,
primary health
care and food
rations. No dra-
matic change
occurred from that
perspective during
the July 2003 -
1 According to UNRWA, its rations seek to cover 50-60% of daily calorific needs, and
are to be considered a supplement to household income (NIS 155 in the West Band and
NIS 189 in Jerusalem, for instance). Since 2003, UNRWA has been forced to further
reduce its coverage of daily calorific requirements.
2 We highlighted in our precedent survey the phenomenon whereby more refugees
above the poverty line than non-refugees in the same situation got assistance (Bocco,
Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 180).
Figure 9-22: UNRWA as the source of regular services
(o126bs, o126cs, o126ds, o126es, o126fs, o126gs)
by area of residence
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February 2004 period, except that the PA became the first provider of regular employ-
ment schemes for refugees. This resulted more from the latter’s enhanced role in this
sector (moving from 32% to 43% between July 2003 and February 2004) than from
UNRWA’s demise (as it decline from 36% to 39% during the same period of time).
UNRWA’s pervasiveness has also to do with the broad targeting of its regular educa-
tion and health services for which registered refugees are eligible, regardless of their
socioeconomic condition.2 This being said UNRWA’s activities are mainly focused on
the camps, which are among the main poverty pockets in the OPT.
The following sub-section aims at providing information relevant to how refugees
contemplate the future of the assistance programs undertaken by international and
local assistance institutions. After gauging the refugees’ level of satisfaction with the
services received, the report will determine their attitude vis-à-vis the future of
UNRWA.
9.2.2. The future of socioeconomic assistance
This sub-section aims at providing information about the refugees’ perceptions of the
future of assistance programs carried out on their behalf. Two perspectives will be
considered. The first perspective is operational, pertaining to the refugees’ degree of
satisfaction and reliance regarding the assistance programs carried out on their
behalf. The second perspective, of a more political nature, has to do with the refugees’
opinion regarding the sustainability of UNRWA’s mandate.
9.2.2.1 Satisfaction with assistance received
 In line with the overall sample, 61% of refugee respondents expressed general
satisfaction (52%) or much satisfaction (9%) with the assistance received (o037). This
result is close to the result obtained in our precedent survey (July 2003: 59% of
respondents were satisfied).
Among the 39% that were unsatisfied, the great majority of refugees and non-refu-
gees alike ascribed their dissatisfaction to unsatisfactory frequency (60%) of ser-
vices, ahead of inadequate quantity (21%), or the quality of services (17%) (o0123).
Unsatisfactory frequency was prevalent in every place of residence, but especially in
Gaza, where 67% of refugees inside the refugee camps and 70% of refugees outside
the refugee camps were dissatisfied.1
Regarding levels of satisfaction related to the first most important assistance received
in the six past months, refugee status is not a conclusive independent, explanatory
variable. As we saw above, emergency programs - including UNRWA’s programs -
sometimes cover both refugees and non-refugees. In general, the level of satisfaction
rose, especially in the field of employment assistance where the level of satisfaction
increased from 51% in July 2003 to 74% in February 2004 (o036empt).
In the same context, refugee status was significant in only two cases. Regard-
ing medical assistance, refugees proved to be more satisfied (at 89%) than
non-refugees (at 75%) (o036). Refugees were comparatively less satisfied
with food assistance, 35% of them reporting dissatisfaction (a rise of 4%
1 In the West Bank, the results were different as camp refugees were more dissatisfied by
the frequency of assistance (60%) than those living outside the camps (53%).
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since July 2003) versus 24%
of the non-refugees (a rise
of one percent since July
2003). In line with this
finding - and maybe
explaining it - is the larger
percentage of dissatisfied
camp residents (40%
versus 26% of city residents
and 38% of villagers) vis-à-
vis food assistance. Camp
residents also were less
satisfied with found food
distribution than non-camp
residents (23% versus 19%
respectively), especially in the Gaza Strip (o0166xplace). As stated earlier in the
report (See Part 6 on Food), one may ascribe the wider dissatisfaction among camp
refugees, despite that they are more targeted than non-refugees, to higher poverty
levels. It may also reflect the camp refugees’ dismay at the decrease in regularity of
UNRWA’s food distribution due to under-funding.
Still, refugees’ diminished satisfaction regarding food as the first most important
received item must be qualified. As seen above (Section 9.1.2.3), food is considered
on average by refugees as one of their least significant unmet needs.
When it come to services received regularly (o0126), refugees status becomes a valid
independent variable. This is due to UNRWA’s operations as a major regular supplier
of services exclusively to refugee communities. However, the survey shows that
whereas the refugees benefited comparatively more from regular services, both
refugee respondents and non-refugee respondents are in agreement in their satisfac-
tion with these regular services.
As in the preceding survey, it appears that refugees were satisfied with the assistance
received, whatever the source of assistance, except for those two areas they reported
as primary unmet needs: employment and financial aid (see Section 9.1.2.3). For non-
refugees, the situation was similar, with the exclusion of financial aid, where satisfied
respondents prevailed by a brief margin of one percent.
Figure 9-23: Percentage of the total population who
received and were satisfied with regular services
(o126b, c, d, e, f, g) by refugee status
Figure 9-24: Future of UNRWA (o147) according
to refugee status
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To sum up, although refugees (and non-refugees) remain critical of certain aspects of
the assistance they receive, either as most important or regular items, they were in
general satisfied and did not appear to have major complaints with the assistance
system established on their behalf.
9.2.2.2. The future of UNRWA’s mandate
Refugees’ satisfaction with international assistance inevitably reflects upon UNRWA.
The austerity measures the Agency was bound to adopt as a result of budget restric-
tions, and the persistence of gaps in the levels of employment and financial aid
delivered, do not seem to have altered the overall favorable opinion refugees have
towards the Agency. This attitude may stem from the safety net constituted by its
various emergency and regular programs. It may also be due to the political signifi-
cance of the its mandate, which is widely interpreted by the OPT population as the
embodiment of the refugees’ political rights as enshrined in paragraph 11 of the
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III). Whatever words refugees have
used to portray the Agency, from our father to the contemptuous stepmother,1
UNRWA has over the years become part of the OPT social fabric.
The only question remaining to be discussed here relates to how the refugees see the
future of UNRWA within the context of the peace process. A significant proportion of
refugees and non-refugees stated that UNRWA should be preserved until the refugee
issue is solved. On average, respondents suggesting that the advent of a Palestinian
state trigger the dismantlement of UNRWA services were three times fewer and those
advocating the immediate dismantlement of UNRWA were fourteen times fewer than
those who advocated its continuation. Refugee status here is relevant in the sense that
non-refugees were more ready to opt for a dismantling of UNRWA once a Palestinian
state is established or as soon as possible.
The survey indicates that the socioeconomic status of refugees improved be-
tween July 2003 and February 2004, with hardship cases in decline and a higher
percentage of refugees reporting themselves above the poverty line. The situation of
non-refugees deteriorated slightly during the same period. This positive evolution
among refugees is due to an improvement in the employment situation of the refugees,
the percentage of full-time employees among them increasing by 7% and the percent-
age of unemployed decreasing by 3%.
These findings hide important spatial differences. In terms of place of residence,
only West Bank camps (98% of their residents being refugees) were affected by the
improvement in socioeconomic conditions, perhaps able to benefit from the slight
relaxing of Israel’s closure policy during the period under scrutiny. For instance, the
percentage of hardship cases in the West Bank refugee camps decreased by 12%,
while increasing by 10% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
In absolute terms, however, refugees remained poorer than non-refugees. Our
survey found that the main reason for increased poverty among refugees lies in their
lack of alternative sources of income (availability of land and capital). Fewer
1 Report – International Mission to Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan and Lebanon,
April 10-19, 1994. Refugee Working Group VI (Cairo: May 10-12, 1994) 5-6; Fawaz Turki.
The Desinherited (New York:  Monthly Review Press, 1972) 58.
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opportunities to rent, sell or cultivate land, for instance, make them more sensitive to a
tightening of the job market. Improved employment during the period under scrutiny
did not make up for lack of capital, even more so because rewarding job opportunities
(mainly in Israel) are limited due the external closure policy imposed on the OPT
population.
Employment and financial aid are among the main unmet needs aired by the
refugee respondents. Refugees are in general more “service-demanding” than non-
refugees, except in sectors where UNRWA distributes free services, such as education
and health, to the entire refugee population.
Refugees have remained the main targets of socioeconomic assistance. The
percentage of refugee recipients was twofold the percentage of non-refugee recipi-
ents. However, responding to the favorable evolution of the refugees’ socioeconomic
situation, the percentage of refugees assisted dwindled by 14% in the July 2003-2004
period, while decreasing by 5% for non-refugees. The only places of residence not
affected by decline in assistance were the Gaza refugee camps where, contrary to
conditions in the rest of the OPT, hardships were on the rise.
Regarding emergency assistance, refugees considered food the most important
item received. Employment was considered as a relatively marginal assistance item
mainly because it was composed mostly of short-term job schemes.
UNRWA remained by far the main source of assistance of emergency and regular
assistance items for refugees. However, likely due to budgetary restrictions, its
importance declined in the July 2003 - February 2004 period from 66% to 60%.
Conversely, the PA saw its share of emergency assistance provision among refugees
increase from 5% to 10%. It notably became more influential in the field of employ-
ment schemes, whether in the form of emergency assistance or regular service.
Despite the decrease in assistance and UNRWA’s declining role, a majority
(about 60%) of refugees (and non-refugees) were generally satisfied with the emer-
gency assistance they received in the past six months. Regarding regular services, the
refugees’ level of satisfaction overtook that of non-refugees.
Our respondents, refugees and non-refugees alike, underscored the operational
and political salience of UNRWA’s mandate by stating that it should be preserved until
to the settlement of the refugee issue, rather than the advent of a Palestinian state.
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The purpose of this report is
to examine Palestinian
perceptions towards a
number of issues pertaining
to internal Palestinian
politics. The Palestinian-
Israeli conflict is not exam-
ined here because the
intention is to identify various
issues that might prove to be
helpful to better understand
the prospects of political
development in the future
Palestinian state. Obviously,
the future political settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis will have a major
impact on the political structure and the political economy of Palestine. Will Palestine
be economically viable? Will it have control over its borders? What is the future of
Israeli settlements? To what extent will Palestine have control over its natural re-
sources, particularly water? What is the future of Palestinian refugees? Will Palestine
be geographically contiguous? What will be the stake in Jerusalem?
Unquestionably, the outcome of these questions will either provide the Palestinian
leadership and Palestinian institutions with legitimacy, or illegitimacy as they govern
the future Palestine. It is rather inconceivable for the Palestinian public to accept
anything less than what was outlined in the various international documents pertaining
to the Palestine issue, particularly UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Any
Palestinian leadership that reaches an agreement that undermines the minimum
requirements envisaged in - or the spirit of - the above mentioned UNSC documents
will render that leadership illegitimate and, as such, render the relationship between
the citizens of the future Palestinian state and its leadership one of distrust and non-
recognition. Consequently, the prospects for good governance and mutual respect
between the government and the public will be doubtful. In fact, any attempt by any
leader, including Yasser Arafat, to stifle the political demands of the Palestinian people
will bring chaos and bloodshed.
Arafat neither purposively unleashed the uprising (as Thomas Friedman and
others suggest) nor did he have great incentive to try to crush it. The al-Aqsa
Intifada is the predictable expression of anger by a people for whom negotia-
tions to end a military occupation and restore legitimate rights failed. Had Arafat
tried to crack down on the Intifada, it likely would have led to a Palestinian civil
war1.
1 Robinson, Glenn, Palestinian leadership in Transition?
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/20010315ib.html
10 POLITICS &
GOVERNMENT
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While the above conditions are necessary for the establishment of a good relationship
between the government and the governed, there are other internal issues that are
also important in the development of the future Palestinian political system and
political institutions. Among these conditions are the creation of credible and viable
political institutions that are governed by laws, rules and regulations in which the
public has a role, through its elected representatives, in forming.
This public participation is essential in any type of political development. Throughout
the long history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian public has accumu-
lated a substantial amount of understanding and recognition of the importance of
participatory politics and freedom of expression. This was evident through a number
of configurations, such as the diversity of the Palestinian political institutions that were
part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the importance of the Palestinian
National Council (PNC) and the multiplicity of its members, and also the mixed
political backgrounds and affiliations of the members of the Executive Committee of
the PLO.
The pre-existing political groupings both within the PLO and outside of it consti-
tute a degree of political pluralization unequalled in the Arab world. Rather than
the Monarch/Dictator/one party state model, full panoply of political factions
exists ranging from Islamic fundamentalists to communists. The existence of the
government in exile, the PNC, and its various constituencies is a level of democ-
racy that could serve as the nucleus for democratization in Palestine.1
This phenomenon has also manifested itself in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(OPT) even prior to the signing of the Oslo Protocol in 1991. While under occupation,
the Palestinians have exhibited signs of political maturity. The free and regular elec-
tions for student councils, trade unions, and other professional organizations were
unique to this region. Also unique was the establishment of a strong civil society
movement that was composed of a large number of organizations whose political
affiliations were diverse and whose services were targeting the general public and not
the constituency of the respective NGOs.
Another characteristic of the Palestinian political history and experience is the multi-
plicity and freedom of the Palestinian press, even after the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority. Numerous publications, radio and TV stations, and other media
were established with diverse political agendas. Moreover, pubic opinion polls were
conducted regularly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the results were pub-
lished regularly even when these results presented negative attitudes towards the
Palestinian Authority, or its leadership, or its institutions.
This is not to say that Palestinian political institutions are totally democratic and
accountable. There are major misgivings voiced about the performance of the Pales-
tinian Authority as well as other political institutions and organizations. Transparency is
not optimal, corruption continues to be a problem, and the role of the Pales-
tinian leadership is highly debated.
1 Wing, Adrien Katherine, Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Future State of Palestine
With a Case Study of Women’s Rights, PASSIA, Jerusalem, http://www.passia.org/
publications/research_studies/K_Wing_Democracy/Part2.htm
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However, the fact that these negative tendencies are debated amongst the Palestin-
ians themselves, in the Palestinian Legislative Council, in the Palestinian media, and as
part of the various activities that are carried out regularly in the various parts of the
OPT is another indication of the political maturity of the Palestinian body politic.
The following pages will examine some of the questions related to Palestinian political
life, particularly those related to the Palestinian perception of a number of political
issues. Through this exercise, some indicators may provide a picture of the prospects
for political development in the future Palestinian state.
10.1 TRUST IN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS
The question raised in this survey regarding which political or religious organization
Palestinians trust most was an open-ended question where respondents were given
the opportunity to name the organization they trust most. Interviewers were instructed
to write the name of any organization stated by the interviewees and they were also
instructed not to mention the option of “no trust in any organization” unless the
respondent specifically stated that. A follow-up question was also asked to those who
said that they do not trust any political and religious organization in order to probe
their general preference. In the follow-up question, the main Palestinian political and
religious organizations were read to the interviewees.
It is important to include here a note on the wording used in this report to refer to the
various Palestinian political tendencies. After much discussion, we have decided to
provide broad reference to Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian People’s Party and
other groups founded on leftist ideology as “secularist” factions. While Fateh, histori-
cally the strongest faction represented in the Palestine Liberation Organization,
includes religious and secular tendencies, its core ideology has developed
out of nationalist, rather than, Islamist roots. Similarly, Hamas and Islamic
Jihad and smaller Islamist factions are referred to here as “religious” factions,
despite that their platforms are a mix of Islamist, religious and nationalist
aims. This broad division should neither dismiss the role of the minority
Figure 10-1: Trust in political and religious factions
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Christian population, nor obscure the very complex interplay between religious,
secular and nationalist objectives and rhetoric in Palestinian political discourse.
According to the general public
As illustrated in Figure 10.1, 45% of respondents said that they do not trust any
political or religious organization, 24% trust Fateh, 18% trust Hamas, 5% selected
Islamic Jihad, 2% selected the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
while the remaining respondents trust other secular and religious institutions. Interest-
ingly, the results show a slight drop in support for most of factions in comparison with
the results of July 2003. This decline in trust in specific organizations is also reflected in
the increase in the percentage of those who said that they do not trust any organiza-
tion. While in July 2003, 42% of the respondents said that they do not trust any organi-
zation, this percentage increased to 45% in February 2004.
The results in Figure 10.1, above, also indicate that when those respondents who
specified that they do not trust any organization were probed to state their preference,
Hamas came in the highest with 19% choosing this faction, 15% mentioned Fateh, 7%
saying Islamic Jihad, and 54% maintaining their opinion of not trusting any organiza-
tion.
According to region
When examining trust in political and religious factions according to region (West
Bank vs. East Jerusalem vs. the Gaza Strip), the results point to significantly stronger
support for specific factions in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. More specifically,
and as indicated in Figure 10.2, below, whereas 48% of the respondents in the West
Bank said that they do not trust any organization, the percentage in the Gaza Strip is
only 37%.
The difference
between the Gaza
Strip and the West
Bank in terms of
factional trust is
also reflected in the
relative strength of
trust for Fateh and
Hamas in the Gaza
Strip as compared
to the West Bank.
While Fateh and
Hamas, respec-
tively, enjoy the
trust of 28% and
23% of respondents
in the Gaza Strip,
these percentages
drop to 24% and
16%, respectively,
in the West Bank.
Figure 10-2: Most trusted factions, according to
region
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Also evident from Figure 10.2 is the relatively stronger support for religious factions in
the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Whereas the overall trust in religious factions in
the Gaza Strip amounts to almost the same as that in secularist groups (respectively
31% and 32%), overall, West Bank respondents place their trust in secularist factions
(30%) and religious groups (22%).
Jerusalemites responses concerning their most trusted faction is quite different.
Although the number of respondents in the Jerusalem area is too small to draw any
scientific conclusions, generally, the results convey a strong feeling of factional distrust
amongst Jerusalem residents, with 59% of the respondents saying that they do not
trust any faction. However, it is interesting to note that trust in Fateh among East
Jerusalem respondents is very low (9%) when compared to trust in non-secularist
organizations, including Hamas (27%).
According to area
Further examination of trust in political factions according to area of residence reveals
that Fateh enjoys the strongest support among refugee camp residents (30%), while
its strength is the lowest is among respondents residing in cities (21%). On the other
hand, trust in Hamas is relatively consistent both in cities and in refugee camps, 18%
and 20% respectively. Interestingly, Hamas enjoys the lowest amount of trust among
village residents,
with only 16%
specifying that
Hamas is the
organization they
trust most, com-
pared to 25% who
trust Fateh the
most. These results
are overviewed in
Figure 10.3.
It is also important
to point out the
relatively strong
showing of the
secularist groups
such as the
Democratic Front
for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP),
the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP), and FIDA in villages. While respondents’ trust in
these organizations is only 2% in cities and 1% in refugee camps, the percentage of
trust is 5% amongst village respondents, as also indicated in Figure 10.4, below.
According to place
Figure 10.5, below, shows the differences in the level of factional trust accord-
ing to place of residence. Clearly, the differences in the level of factional trust
between West Bank and Gaza Strip non-camp residents are not as sharp as
they are between West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camp residents. The lack
of trust in any political or religious faction in the West Bank refugee camps is
Figure 10-3: Most trusted factions, according to
area of residence
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very evident
(61%) and
nearly twice as
high when
compared to the
lack of factional
trust evident in
Gaza Strip
refugee camps
(31%). More-
over, trust in
Hamas is much
lower among
West Bank
refugee camp
respondents than among Gaza Strip refugee camp respondents. More specifically,
whereas only 7% of the former mentioned Hamas as the organization they trust most,
25% of the latter named Hamas as the most trusted faction.
According to refugee status
Although no statistical significance exists when analyzing refugee status and trust in
political factions, it is noteworthy that Palestinian refugees are likely to be more
politically polarized than Palestinian non-refugees. As illustrated below in Figure 10-6,
a higher percentage of Palestinian refugees than Palestinian non-refugees trust Fateh
and Hamas.
According to poverty level
A strong correlation exists between trust in Palestinian political factions and the
poverty level of
respondents. Ironi-
cally, respondents that
are classified as being
above the poverty line
are more likely to
distrust any political
or religious factions
than those who are
below the poverty line.
As indicated in Figure
10.6, below, over half
the respondents who
are above the poverty
line said that they do
not trust any political
or religious faction
compared to 40% for
those who are below the poverty line.
Figure 10-4:Most trusted faction, according
to place of residence
Figure 10-5: Trust in factions, according
to refugee status
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Moreover, trust in the
main factions among
the respondents above
the poverty line is
significantly lower than
among those who are
below the poverty line,
including those who are
classified as hardship
cases. Concretely,
whereas respectively
20% and 15% of the
respondents above the
poverty line trust Fateh
and Hamas, these
percentages are 29%
and 19% respectively
among respondents below the poverty line and 26% and 20% among respondents in
hardship.
Although trust in the main political factions is lower among respondents above the
poverty line, it is worth noting that the trust these respondents place in other secularist
organizations is slightly higher than the trust these factions enjoy among respondents
who are economically less advantaged. Indeed, whereas 8% of the former trust the
PFLP and the other secularist organizations, the percentage is 4% among the below-
poverty line respondents, and 3% among the hardship cases.
According
to employment
There are clear indications that employment status impacts where respondents place
their trust. As detailed in Figure 10.7, 54% of respondents who trust Fateh are fully
employed, while 44% of respondents who trust Hamas are fully employed. Moreover,
29% of respondents who
trust Hamas are unem-
ployed, compared to 22%
among Fateh support-
ers that are unem-
ployed. In general, the
results indicate that the
proportion of respon-
dents trusting secularist
factions is stronger
among those who are
fully employed, while
this is not so
obviously the
case among
the religious
factions, as a
Figure 10-6: Trust in factions, according to
poverty level
Figure 10-7: Trust in factions, according to
employment  status
     263
significant percentage of respondents who place their trust in religious factions are not
employed or partially employed.
According to gender
There is also a significant relationship between factional trust and gender. Females are
more likely than males to distrust any political or religious faction. Whereas only 44%
of males do not trust any political or religious factions, this percentage is 56% among
female respondents. Moreover, while trust in Hamas is divided equally across the
gender line, the
situation is
slightly
different with
respect to
Fateh and the
other secular-
ist factions,
where males
are more
likely than
females to
trust these
groups.
According to education
Trust in political and religious factions is also statistically significant according to
education. Trust in the PFLP, for example, is particularly high among respondents with
some college educa-
tion or above. Indeed,
55% of those trusting
the PFLP are highly
educated. Hamas also
enjoys a high level of
trust among the
higher-educated, with
46% of those placing
their trust in Hamas
being classified as
being highly edu-
cated.
According to model country
When respondents were asked the model country they would like the future Palestine
to emulate, it was worthy of note that a relatively large percentage of respondents
chose Western European countries as their preferred model. Even amongst those who
trust religious factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, a significant percentage
wants Palestine to follow a Western system of government. As illustrated in
Figure 10.10, 17% of those trusting Hamas and 24% of those trusting Islamic
Jihad want Palestine to be modeled after one of the Western states. While this
might seem astonishing, a sizeable percentage of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
supporters would like Palestine to emulate an Islamic state.
Figure 10-8: Factional support, according to gender
Figure 10-9: Factional trust, according to
 educational attainment
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The apparent appreciation for Western-style system of government is more often
echoed by respondents who said they trust secularist political groups and, even more
so by respondents who said that they do not trust any political or religious factions.
While very few respondents trusting Fateh said that they would like to see a system of
government that is modeled after countries like Iran or Pakistan (5%) or to adopt the
caliphate system of government (2%), 34% said they want Palestine to be modeled
after a western, particularly one of the European states.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the majority still favor an Arab-style system of
government. This is particularly true for those trusting Fateh, of which 54% want
Palestine to emulate other Arab states, particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
According to most trusted source of information
Also important to examine is the relationship between trust in the factions and the
source of information Palestinians trust most. This is particularly important given the
known impact of state-controlled media in shaping political opinions and viewpoints
and stifling political participation and development.
When examining the sources of information Palestinians trust most, it is clear that
state-owned media such as the Palestinian Authority radio and TV are comparatively
weak in influence. Perhaps the relative flexibility of the Palestinian Press Law, which
freely provides for access to multiple sources of information, enabled Palestinians to
seek, and consequently rely on other sources of information. As demonstrated in Table
1, only 15% of Fateh supporters rely on Palestinian TV for their news, while 5% rely on
Palestinian radio. Respondents trusting Fateh, as well as those trusting other factions
rely heavily on Al-Jazeera. In fact, 37% of the respondents said that they trust Al-
Jazeera, followed by 16% who trust Al-Manar TV.1 However, further examination of
which respondents rely on Al-Manar TV station as their most trustworthy
source of information shows that respondents who trust religious factions
form the core of its Palestinian viewer base.
Figure 10-10: Factional trust, according to the model country for the future Palestine
Figure 10-10: Factional trust, according to the model country
for the future Palestine
1 Al-Manar TV station broadcasts from Lebanon and is affiliated with the Lebanese party
Hizb-Allah.
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10.2 TRUST IN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Just after the survey was conducted in February 2004, two senior Hamas leaders,
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Rantisi, were assassinated by Israel. Other
Palestinian leaders previously assassinated included Abu Ali Mustapha, Secretary
General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
In addition to those who have been assassinated, a number of Palestinian leaders are
in detention in Israeli prisons. Such leaders include Abdul-Rahim Mallouh, a senior
leader in the PFLP, Marwan Barghouti, a senior Fateh leader and a member of the
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and also Husam Khader, another Fateh leader
and a member of the PLC. These examples and the near-house arrest of President
Yaser Arafat is indicative of the crisis underway in the collective Palestinian leader-
ship.
The policy of assassination and imprisonment of Palestinian leaders has obviously
been adopted by the present Israeli government to undermine not only the current
Palestinian leadership but also any leadership that it views as unwilling to accept its
terms. The following pages will examine the attitudes of Palestinians towards their
leadership according to a number of independent variables. The question used in the
survey was also an open-ended question where respondents were given the opportu-
nity to name the leader they trust most.
According to the general public
Two of the three most trusted Palestinian leaders according to our survey
were assassinated by Israel just after the fieldwork for this study was
completed. The third, President Arafat, is repeatedly threatened by Israel
with deportation or death and is therefore unable to leave his offices. The
 Table 10-1: Most important source of information,
according to trust in faction
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forth most trusted leader, Marwan Barghouti, is in Israeli prison. Another leader from
the list in Figure 10.11, namely Secretary General of the PFLP Ahmad Saadat, is in a
Palestinian prison, after pressure from the Israeli government. Other leaders who are
on the list, Abdullah Al-Shami, an Islamic Jihad leader, and Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar, a
prominent Hamas leader, are presumed to be on the list of Israeli assassination
targets. The only two popular Palestinian leaders who remain relatively free to work
and lead are Ahmad Qurei (Abu-‘Alaa), the current Palestinian prime minister and Dr.
Haider Abdul Shafi, a prominent leader from the Gaza Strip who headed the Palestin-
ian delegation to 1991 talks in Washington prior to the Oslo Agreement.
In such conditions, one wonders about the prospects for the emergence of a new
Palestinian leadership. While it is true that 49% of the respondents do not trust any
leader, that percentage is not unique when compared with other parts of the world,
including in stable democratic states. Moreover, further examinations of what kinds of
Palestinians say they do not trust any leader shows little difference comparatively with
the kinds of Palestinians who named a leader they trust most. Accordingly, there is no
reason to believe that this group of undecided Palestinians is a potential support base
for a leader acceptable to the Israeli government.
In any case, Yaser Arafat remains the only Palestinian leader to command the bulk of
the trust of the Palestinian public, especially after the assassination of the two most
prominent Hamas leaders. While new Hamas leaders will undoubtedly emerge, it is
not yet clear as to the extent those leaders will be able to rally public support, hence
public trust, particularly after Hamas made the decision to maintain the anonymity of
its top political echelon.
According to region and area
A close look at the trust in leadership according to region and area of residence reveal
that Yaser Arafat enjoys a relatively consistent level of trust in all the parts of the OPT.
As shown in Figure 10.12, Arafat enjoys the highest level of trust among
refugee camp residents (26%) and the lowest in East Jerusalem, where only
9% named Arafat as the leader they trust most.
Figure 10-11: Trust in leadership
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According to refugee status
The trust in Arafat amongst refugee camp residents is also reflected in the level of
trust he enjoys amongst Palestinians who are refugees or descendents of a refugee
family. As indicated in Figure 10.13, 24% of refugees trust Arafat, while only 18% of
non-refugees say the same. In general, non-refugees appear to be more distrustful of
any Palestinian leader than refugees, as also illustrated in Figure 10.13.
Figure 10-13: Palestinian trust in political and religious leaders,
according to refugee status
Figure 10-12: Trust in leadership,  according to region
and area of residence
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According to poverty
The poor also seem to trust Arafat more than those who are economically better-off.
Whereas 18% of those classified as being above the poverty line trust Arafat, the
percentage is respectively 22% among hardship cases, and 24% among respondents
who are classified as being below the poverty line, but not extremely poor, as illus-
trated in Figure 10.14.
The lower trust in Arafat among those Palestinians above the poverty line is by no
means indicative of the presence of another personality that enjoys more trust
amongst this sector of the Palestinian public. Another look at Figure 10.14 shows the
extent of distrust in any leader amongst the economically advantaged as compared
with that amongst the economically disadvantaged. Whereas 54% of the former do
not trust any political or religious leader, 42% and 43% of the latter report not trusting
in any political or religious leader.
Figure 10-14: Trust in leadership, according to poverty
Figure 10-15: Trust in leadership, according to
education, gender, and age
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According to education, gender, and age
Trust in Arafat seems to be consistent according to education, gender, and age
except where trust in him dwindles to 11% among the oldest generation of Palestin-
ians. This generation also shows a high level of distrust in leadership in general, but
also has a higher trust in secularist leaders than other age groups.
10.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFORMING THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY
According to the general public
The large majority (72%) of Palestinians stated that reform of the Palestinian Authority
is an urgent matter, and only 24% saying that reform of the Palestinian Authority
should be dealt with only after independence. As indicated in Figure 10.16, only 4%
said that there is no need for reforming the Palestinian Authority.
Clearly, the reform of the
Palestinian Authority is
primarily related to issues
pertaining to mismanage-
ment and corruption, with
only a minority of respon-
dents saying that what
concerns them most about
the Palestinian Authority is
security issue or issues
related to democratization
or human rights. As can be
discerned from Figure 10.17,
55% of the respondents said
that the most issues that they are concerned about with respect to the Palestinian
Authority are the issues of corruption, nepotism, and lack of transparency and ac-
countability. Only 6% were primarily concerned about human rights and democracy,
and 19% were concerned about the inability of the Palestinian Authority to deal with
security matters.
Figure 10-16: Attitudes towards the urgency of reform
of the Palestinian Authority
Figure 10-17:
The issue
that concerns
Palestinians
most with
respect to the
Palestinian
Au-
thority
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The seriousness
Palestinians
display with
respect to corrup-
tion and nepotism
is widespread
even amongst
respondents with
the least educa-
tion. Like the
medium and
higher educated
respondents, the
least-educated
recognize corrup-
tion as the main problem confronting the Palestinian Authority. They are even more
specific about corruption than the respondents who have attained higher education.
In fact, 26% of this sector of society identified nepotism as the main problem.
Differences according
to region of residence
are mainly related to
transparency and
human rights, with
slight differences
between the West
Bank and the Gaza
Strip. While 10% of
the respondents in
the Gaza Strip said
lack of transparency
as the main issue
they are concerned
about, only 5% of the West Bankers said so. West Bankers are more concerned about
the lack of human rights, with 5% of West Bank respondents identifying it as the main
problem as compared to 3% of Gaza Strip respondents. Table 10.3 summarizes the
differences
between West
Bank, East Jerusa-
lem, and Gaza
Strip respondents
with regard to the
various problems
facing the Palestin-
ian
Authority.
Concern
about
human
 Table 10-2: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with
respect to the Palestinian Authority,
according to education
 Table 10-3: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with
respect to the Palestinian Authority,
according to region
 Table 10-4: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with
respect to the Palestinian Authority according to area of
residence
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rights in the West
Bank is largely due
to the concern
village respon-
dents express
about this issue,
where 9%
identify the lack
of human rights
as the most
serious problem
compared to only
2% of city and
refugee camp
respondents.
When examining the above-mentioned concerns according to the economic status of
the respondents (Table 5), the most outstanding difference seem to be higher concern
about corruption among respondents classified as being above the poverty line. In
fact, when compared to the less economically-advantaged respondents, respondents
with a higher income are less concerned about human rights and only 2% of them
identified this as the issue they are more concerned about.
Finally, an examination of the issue of most concern according to political trust reveals
that concern
about corrup-
tion is just as
strong among
those trusting
Fateh, the
faction that
constitutes the
backbone of
the Palestinian
Authority. Also,
Fateh ‘sup-
porters’ are
more inclined
to be con-
cerned about
lack of democ-
racy than are Hamas or Islamic Jihad supporters. Moreover, while the discussion about
unauthorized weapons is often related to Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, the
respondents trusting Hamas and Jihad were more concerned about the inability of the
Palestinian Authority to deal with unauthorized weapons than were the
respondents trusting Fateh.
According to region
 Table 10-5: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with
respect to the Palestinian Authority,
according to the poverty level
 Table 10-6: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect
to the Palestinian Authority, according to the most trusted political
or religious faction
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It could be deduced from the above analysis that when Palestinians talk about reform-
ing the Palestinian Authority, they are in fact thinking about corruption and nepotism
more so than about other issues like human rights or security. This concern about
corruption is widespread irrespective of whether the respondents come from the West
Bank, Jerusalem, or the Gaza Strip. However, as shown in Figure 10.18, this concern
seems to be stronger in the Gaza Strip than it is in the West Bank as 77% of the
respondents there said reform should be a priority, as compared to 67% in the West
Bank.
According to area
Concern about immediate reform of the Palestinian Authority is weakest in villages
where 29%% of the respondents believe that reform should be dealt with only after
the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared to only 18% among refugee camp
respondents and 23% among respondents residing in the main cities of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip.
According to place of residence
It is surprising to note that while attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority
are similar between Gaza Strip camp and non-camp residents, attitudes vary rather
significantly when comparing camp and non-camp respondents in the West Bank.
Whereas 81% of West Bank respondents believe that reforming the Palestinian
Authority should be a priority and should not wait until after independence, 66% of
non-camp respondents in the West Bank said that this is should be a priority. More-
over, a sizeable proportion of West Bank non-camp respondents (28%)
stated that they would like to see reform carried out only after Palestinian
independence, compared to only 11% in the West Bank refugee camps, as
illustrated in Figure 10.20.
Figure 10-19: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority,
according to area
Figure 10-18: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority,
according to region
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According to poverty
It is also worth noting that the urgency of reforming the Palestinian Authority is almost
the same irrespective of respondents’ economic status. As can be discerned from
Figure 10.21, the poor as well as those who are economically better-off share the same
views about the need to reform the Palestinian Authority, with almost no difference
between them.
According to age
As is the case with other independent variables, all respondents from the various age
brackets agree on the need for reforming the Palestinian Authority. However, it seems
that more respondents falling in the middle-age and the older-age brackets want to
see reform of the Palestinian Authority than the younger generation. Whereas 68-69%
of respondents below the age of 34 want to see reform even before independence,
that number rises to 73-76% among respondents who are over 49 years of age, as
illustrated in Figure 10.22.
According to education
While Palestinians with varying levels of education have similar attitudes
towards the urgency of reforming the Palestinian Authority, it is evident that
more respondents with higher education would like to see reform in the
Palestinian Authority now rather than later, than do respondents with less
Figure 10-20: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority,
according to area of residence
Figure 10-21: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority,
according to poverty
Figure 10-22 Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority,
according to age
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education. Whereas 66% and 70%, respectively, of low- and medium-educated
respondents want reform now, the percentage is 75% among respondents with the
highest level of education, as illustrated in Figure 10.23.
According to trust in political factions
Not surprisingly, those trusting Hamas (the largest opposition faction) are more likely
than those trusting other factions to call for immediate reform. Seventy-eight percent
of Hamas supporters are demanding reform now, compared to the 67% of Fateh
supporters who say that reform should have priority (as discussed earlier, Fateh
supporters are just as concerned about corruption and nepotism as respondents
placing their trust in other political or religious factions).
According to the system of government Palestinians want Palestine to be modeled after
As might be expected, a large proportion of Palestinians who would like Palestine to
be modeled after a Western country (75%), believe that reforming the Palestinian
Authority is a priority, compared to only 65% among those preferring an Arab-style
system of government in Palestine. Seventy-eight percent of those preferring
a revival of the Islamic caliphate system in Palestine also say that reforming
the Palestinian Authority should be a priority. As illustrated in Figure 10.25,
below, reform is very important among those who would like to see a system
of government similar to that in Iran and Pakistan (Islamic, non-Arab states),
where 84% said that reform of the Palestinian Authority should be a priority.
Figure 10-23: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority,
according to educational attainment
Figure 10-24a: Attitudes towards the reform of the Palestinian Authority,
according to trust in political factions
     275
10.4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS PALESTINIAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
In the following pages an attempt will be made to assess the perceptions of the
Palestinian public vis-a-vis a set of questions related to the functioning of the munici-
pal councils, village councils, and refugee camp committees that are responsible for
basic services that have an effect on the lives of all citizens.
Nine questions were asked pertaining to local government. These questions centered
around three main themes:
 Knowledge of the activities of the local councils;
Attitudes towards the efficiency of the local councils; and
Perceptions about the independence of the local councils.
10.4.1 Attitudes towards the local councils
In general, the Palestinian public seems to have sufficient information about their local
councils. About 52% said that they have sufficient information about the activities of
their local councils. The fact that 66% of the respondents said that the local media
does not cover the activities of the local councils efficiently may explain the relatively
large number (48%) of respondents who said that they do not know about the activi-
ties of their municipal or village councils. As indicated in Figure 10-26, only 33% of
respondents think that the Palestinian media covers the activities of the local authori-
ties sufficiently.
Another possible explanation for the relative lack of knowledge about the activities of
the local authorities is the feeling among a large number of Palestinians that
they are unable to express their views and opinions about matters related to
their local authorities. Only 34% of the respondents said that they can
express their views to their respective local councils.
Figure 10-24b: Attitudes towards reform of the Palestinian Authority,
according to the most preferred model for Palestine
  276
As for the performance of the local councils in general, three questions were asked:
the first measured the respondents’ perception of local councils’ performance, the
second measured the extent to which respondents feel local councils represent their
interests to the Palestinian Authority, and the third question measured the public’s
perception of the allocation of municipal funds.
The respondents expressed mixed feelings about their local councils’ performance.
While a little over half (52%) said that their local councils perform well in serving their
communities they are entrusted to serve, only 40% said that the councils represent
them well to the Palestinian Authority and only 38% said that local funds are appropri-
ately allocated for the delivery of social services.
Another three questions were included in this study to gauge public perceptions about
the independence of local councils. The respondents express mixed feelings about the
relationship between the local authorities and the Palestinian Authority. Slightly less
than 50% of the respondents (47%) think that the PA allows their local councils ample
freedom to carry out their activities, and only 43% think that the PA consults with local
authorities about local affairs. On the other hand, 51% of the respondents believe that
their local authorities represent their interests more than the interests of the Palestinian
Authority.
The following will examine these three issues with respect to a number of independent
variables.
Knowledge about the work of the local councils
The analysis reveals that poverty and place of residence are the only inde-
pendent variables that have a significant relationship to the three questions
on the work of the councils. A quick look at Figure 10.26, shows that respon-
dents outside and inside West Bank refugee camps have more information
about the activities of the local councils than their counterparts in the Gaza
Strip. While 56% and 59% of respondents living outside and inside West
Figure 10-25: Attitudes about municipal and local councils
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Bank refugee camps respectively stated that they have enough information about the
local councils, a relatively lower 47% in the Gaza Strip both outside and inside refugee
camps.
The ability to express opinions about the work of the local councils is also perceived
more positively in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, particularly in West Bank non-
camp areas where 38% of the respondents there stated that the local councils provide
them with the opportunity to express their opinions. In the Gaza Strip outside camps,
the percentage is only 28%.
Respondents in the
Gaza Strip were more
positive than their
counterparts in the
West Bank concern-
ing media coverage
of the activities of the
local councils. This
may be explained by
Palestinian Authority-
funded TV coverage,
which broadcasts
local events from Gaza
more than it covers
West Bank local news.
Movement restrictions, discussed elsewhere in this report, are also comparatively
worse in the West Bank, which inhibits local journalists’ access.
Respondents above and below the poverty line also have differing perceptions of the
adequacy of information that they receive about the activities of local councils.
Whereas 58% of those above the poverty line state that they have sufficient informa-
tion about their municipal council, the percentage is respectively 48% among the
respondents who are below the poverty line and 47% among those who are classified
as hardship cases, as
illustrated in Figure
10.27.
On the other hand,
differences in respon-
dents’ stated ability to
express opinions
about the activities of
the local council are
not as pronounced
when examined by
poverty. The propor-
tion of respondents
above the poverty line
 Figure 10-26: Knowledge about the activities of the local
council, according to place of residence
Figure 10-27: Knowledge about local council
activities, according to poverty
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who said that they can
express their views
does not exceed 37%,
as compared to 30%
among respondents
below the poverty line
and 36% among
hardship cases.
Also, a minor differ-
ence was found in
respondents of varying economic levels with respect to their perception of media
coverage of local activities. Respondents above the poverty line are more likely to
believe that the local media sufficiently covers local activities (at 38%) than respon-
dents falling under the poverty line (at 26%) and hardship cases (33%).
When refugees and non-refugees are queried concerning their knowledge of local
council activities, 57% of non-refugee compared to 49% of refugee respondents feel
that they have sufficient information about local council activities. The difference
between the two is also significant concerning their perceptions about the ability to
express their opinions to the local council. As can be observed from Figure 10.28, 39%
of non-refugee respondents believe that they can express their opinion about the
activities of the local council, compared to a mere 29% among refugee respondents.
Respondents
from the West
Bank were also
more positive
about the role of
their municipal
councils than
their counter-
parts in the Gaza
Strip. A brief
examination of
Figure 10.29, shows that 56% of West Bank respondents said that they had enough
information about the local council activities, while 47% of Gaza Strip respondents
said the same. In addition to saying they were well-informed, West Bank residents
were more positive than respondents in the Gaza Strip about their ability to express
concerns to the local authorities. Whereas 37% of West Bank respondents answered
affirmatively when queried as to whether they can express their views to local coun-
cils, that same group in the Gaza Strip was only 28%. Further analysis of the data
shows that place of residence, whether city, refugee camp, or village, does not seem to
influence peoples’ perceptions about their ability to voice their opinion to the local
councils. Accordingly, the relationship between the local council and con-
stituents appears to be worse in the Gaza Strip than the West Bank, and this
problem is not related to the fact that more refugee camp residents reside in
the Gaza Strip.
Figure 10-29: Knowledge about local council
activities, according to region
Figure 10-28: Knowledge about local council
activities, according to refugee status
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Almost half the
population,
respondents who
said that they do
not trust any
political faction
and those
trusting Hamas
are the least to
know about the
activities of the
local councils. By
examining Table 10.7, it is clear that almost all respondents stating a preference for
one of the factions are more likely to feel that they have enough information about the
local councils than those who say they do not trust any organization. This convergence
is particularly marked among Fateh “supporters” where 58% said that they have
enough information about the work and activities of the local authorities.
It is interesting to
note that those
trusting Hamas are
the least positive
about their ability
to express their
concerns and
views to the local
councils. As can
be shown in Table
10.8, only 25% of
respondents
trusting Hamas said that they can voice their views to their respective local councils.
The same also applies to those trusting the PFLP, where only 26% of them said that
they are able to express their opinion to the local councils compared to 38% of
respondents trusting Fateh, and 39% of those trusting other secularist organizations.
When analyzing our data for the variables of gender and education, only the extent to
which respondents report having information about local council activities was
statistically significant. Differences were insignificant between males and females or
according to level of education on the ability to express opinions to the local council.
Figure 10.30 shows that males know more about local council activities than do
females.
 Figure 10-30:
Knowledge
about local
council
activities,
according to
gender and
education
 Table 10-7: Knowledge about local council activities, according to
trust in political factions
 Table 10-8: The ability of residents to express their
opinions regarding local council activities, according
to trust in political factions
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Not surprisingly, respondents with more education were more likely to say that they
were informed about the activities of the local councils. Whereas 58% of highly
educated respondents said they were well-informed, 49% of respondents with
medium education and 52% of respondents with low education said that they were
well-informed about local council activities.
10.4.2 Perceptions about the performance of local councils
The questions we asked respondents concerning the performance of local councils
were related to three concerns:
Local councils’ performance in serving the community;
Local councils’ representation of respondents interests with the PA; and
Appropriate allocation of municipal funds for social services.
Generally speaking, the data shows that West Bank respondents, whether they reside
in camps or outside camps, perceive the performance of their local councils more
positively than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. As indicated in Figure 10.31, 60%
and 61% of respondents outside and inside West Bank refugee camps, respectively,
stated that their local councils perform well in serving the community (45% of Gaza
Strip respondents living outside camps and 50% of Gaza Strip respondents living
inside refugee camps said that they were satisfied with the local council’s perfor-
mance).
This comparatively positive
attitude in the West Bank
towards the performance of
local councils is also reflected
in West Bankers’ perceptions
about the extent to which their
local councils represent
community interests with the
Palestinian Authority. Forty-five
percent of West Bank respon-
dents believe that their local
councils represent the
community’s interests well with
the Palestinian Authority, while
only 33% of Gaza Strip respondents outside refugee camps and 37% of Gaza Strip
respondents inside the camps said the same.
There were few marked differences according to place of residence concerning local
councils’ allocation of funds except among West Bank refugee camp respon-
dents where 49% said that funds were appropriately allocated, compared to
only 38% among West Bank non-refugee camp respondents, 33% among
Gaza Strip non-refugee camp respondents, and 36% among Gaza Strip
refugee camp respondents.
Figure 10-31: Perceptions about the
performance of local councils,
according to place of residence
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The three performance indicators utilized here in this study also varied according to
respondents’ refugee status. As indicated in Figure 10.32, below, refugees are more
positive than non-refugees about the performance of the local councils, with 49% of
them stating that the local councils’ performance is good, as compared to 38% among
non-refugee respondents.
While refugees perceive the general performance of local councils more positively
than do non-refugees, results of the two other questions concerning representation
and fund allocation show just the opposite. When asked if local councils represent the
communities’ interests well with the Palestinian Authority, 45% of non-refugees
answered affirmatively compared to 36% among refugee respondents. Similarly,
when queried about the appropriate allocation of local council funds, non-refugees
were again more positive than refugee respondents. While 41% of the former said that
funds were allocated appropriately, the percentage among refugee respondents
declined to 34%.
These differences of
opinion between
refugees and non-
refugees may be
explained by differ-
ences in opinion
between the West
Bank and the Gaza
Strip, where more
refugees live. As
illustrated below in
Figure 10.33, 56% of
West Bank respondents approve of the performance of the local councils compared to
50% in the Gaza Strip. While no difference can be seen between the two regions with
respect to perspectives on councils’ allocation of funds, West Bank respondents more
often believe that their local councils represent their interests with the Palestinian
Authority than do respondents residing in the Gaza Strip. While 45% of West Bank
respondents think that the local councils represent them well with the Palestinian
Authority, the proportion amongst Gaza Strip respondents is 34%.
Positive attitudes
towards the perfor-
mance of the local
councils are evidenced
more often among
Palestinians above the
poverty line than
among those below the
poverty line. As
illustrated in Figure
10.34, 59% of non-poor respondents think that the performance of the local
councils is good, and 48% of them think that their local councils represent
their communities’ interests well with the Palestinian Authority. This is a stark
Figure 10-32: Perceptions about the performance of local
councils, according to refugee status
Figure 10-33: Perceptions about the performance of local
councils, according to region of residence
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comparison
with poor
respondents
(not includ-
ing hardship
cases) of
whom 49%
positively
evaluate the
performance
of the local
councils, and only 35% think that their councils represent their interests well with the
Palestinian Authority.
While no marked
differences were
observed between
residents of different
areas and their
attitudes towards
performance of the
local councils, but
village residents
appeared generally more positive about the manner that their council represents them
to the Palestinian Authority than respondents residing in cities and refugee camps. As
shown in Figure 10.35, 46% of village residents think that their village council repre-
sents them well to the Palestinian Authority, compared to only 37% among city
respondents and 39% among refugee camp respondents.
Although there
is a relationship
between
attitudes
towards local
council perfor-
mance and
factional trust,
Figure 10.36,
below, shows
that when it
comes to
attitudes
towards local
authorities’
per-
for-
mance, Fateh “supporters” are more positive about the local councils than
other respondents, but otherwise, there are few variances. The same also
applies to respondents’ perceptions about the extent to which local councils
represent their interests with the Palestinian Authority. Whereas 49% of Fateh
Figure 10-34: Perceptions about the performance of local
councils, according to poverty
Figure 10-35: Perceptions about the performance of local
councils, according to area of residence
Figure 10-36: Perceptions about the performance of local councils,
according to trust in political factions
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supporters were pleased with the local councils’ representation of their interests with
the PA, only 33% of Hamas “supporters”, 32% of Islamic Jihad “supporters”, 33% of
PFLP “supporters” and 30% of those who place their trust in other secular organiza-
tions like the People’s Party, FIDA, and the DFLP were similarly positive.
10.4.3 Independence of local councils
Three questions were asked to measure perceptions about the independence of the
local councils:
The extent to which the Palestinian Authority provides local councils with freedom
to conduct their activities;
The extent to which the Palestinian Authority consults with local councils about
local affairs;
The extent to which local councils represent the Palestinian Authority more than
the communities they serve.
Generally speaking, village respondents are more positive about the independence of
their local councils than are city and refugee camp respondents. As indicated in Figure
10.37, below, approximately half of respondents in villages think that the Palestinian
Authority provides their village councils with the freedom to conduct their affairs freely
and also that the Palestinian Authority consults with their councils on local matters.
Among city and refugee camp residents, however, perceptions are slightly more
negative.
The most negative perceptions about the independence of local councils are ex-
pressed primarily by city residents, particularly, concerning the extent to which their
local councils put residents’ interests before that of the Palestinian Authority. As also
illustrated in Figure 10.37, 56% of respondents living in cities believe that their local
councils place the interests of the Palestinian Authority first, compared to only 42% of
respondents from villages, and 40% of refugee camp respondents.
Figure 10-37: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according
to area of residence
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Differences in perceptions regarding the independence of local councils are also
manifested according to respondents’ place of residence. Figure 10.38 shows that
respondents living outside West Bank refugee camps believe that their local councils
are more independent than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. However, whereas
54% of West Bank non-camp residents said that the Palestinian Authority provides
local councils with the freedom to conduct their activities, this percentage is only 38%
among West Bank refugee camp residents.
The same phenomenon is reflected in the issue regarding whether the Palestinian
Authority consults with local councils. Although 51% of non-camp dwellers said the
PA consults with local authorities, only 37% of West Bank refugee camp residents said
the same.
Regarding
whether the
local councils
put the
interests of
the Palestin-
ian Authority
before the
interests of
their constitu-
encies, it is
interesting to
note that non-
camp respon-
dents in both
the West Bank
and Gaza Strip are more likely than their counterparts in the refugee camps to believe
that the local authorities put the interests of the Palestinian Authority before the interest
of their citizens. Whereas 50% of West Bank non-refugee camp residents and 51% of
Gaza Strip non-refugee camp respondents think that the local councils are more
interested in accommodating the Palestinian Authority than their respective communi-
ties, the same opinion is expressed by 32% of refugee camp respondents in the West
Bank and 42% of refugee camps respondents in the Gaza Strip.
From the above it is possible to argue that West Bankers are general more positive
than Gazans regarding the independence of the local councils. As indicated in Figure
10.39, below, West
Bank respondents
seem to have a more
positive perception of
local authorities’
indepen-
dence from
the Palestin-
ian Authority
and about
the role the
Figure 10-38: Perceptions about the independence of local authori-
ties, according to place of residence
Figure 10-39: Perceptions about the independence of local
authorities, according to region
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PA plays in consulting with the local council on local matters. No difference, however,
exists between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with respect to whether local
councils better represent the interests of their communities or the interests of the
Palestinian Authority.
Respondents above the poverty line are more prone to believe that the Palestinian
Authority does not provide the local councils with the freedom to conduct activities
than, for example, respondents who are hardship cases. As indicated in Figure 10.40,
below, 45% of the respondents above the poverty line think that the PA enables local
councils to carry out their activities freely, as compared with 52% of respondents who
are hardship cases.
While the percent-
age of those who
strongly agree and
agree that local
authorities are
independent is
almost the same
among the various
economic sectors,
according to our
survey, it is notewor-
thy that 20% of
hardship cases intensely believe that their local authorities put the interests of the
Palestinian Authority before the interests of the communities they serve, as compared
to only 6% of respondents who are above the poverty line.
When examining
refugee and non-
refugee attitudes on
the local authorities’
independence from
the Palestinian
Authority, it appears
that, as illustrated in
Figure 10.41, non-
refugees are more
likely than refugees to believe that local councils are independent. Similarly, non-
refugees (47%) more often than refugees (39%) believe that the PA consults with local
councils on local matters.
While non-refugees are more often positive about the independence of local authori-
ties, their responses concerning the interests that are prioritized by the local council
show that non-refugees and refugees are of much the same opinion.
When examining views on local councils’ independence according to the
educational level of respondents, results show that despite that more respon-
dents with low education think that the Palestinian Authority provides the
local councils freedom to conduct their activities, their response to whether
Figure 10-40: Perceptions about the independence of local
authorities, according to poverty level
Figure 10-41: Perceptions about the independence of local
authorities, according to refugee status
  286
the local councils represent the PA’s interests more than their own was more pro-
nounced. Seventeen percent said that they strongly agree with this statement, while
20% strongly disagreed, as indicated in Figure 10.42.
Not surprisingly, those trusting Fateh are more positive about the independence of
local authorities. This positive attitude, however, is not indicative of strong disagree-
ment with respondents who place their trust in other factions. Results pertaining to the
ability of local councils to conduct their duties freely were the same irrespec-
tive of which faction the respondents trust. What Fateh “supporters” express
more often (47%) is the belief that the PA does consult with local authorities.
Figure 10-42: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities,
according to level of education
Figure 10-43: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities,
according to trust in political factions
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10.5 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE
PALESTINIAN STATE
It has been reported through various surveys that the Palestinian public prefers to
have an Islamic-style state in Palestine. However, references to an “Islamic state” are
rather vague. Some may interpret “Islamic state” to be one modeled after Iran, others
may reference Saudi Arabia, and still others may think of an Islamic state as one
following the principles of Islam where corruption does not exist, justice is universal,
and tolerance is a main concern.
In this survey, we believed that gauging Palestinians’ preference as to what system of
government they would like the future Palestinian state to adopt would be best
measured by asking which country in the world they would like Palestine to emulate.
The question was an open-ended question and the respondents were able to choose
any country they preferred the future Palestine to emulate. This question will also be
examined according to the same set of independent variables used previously in this
study.
10.5.1 According to the
general public
As shown in Table 10.9,
respondents referred to
58 different countries and
entities in answering this
question. Egypt and
Saudi Arabia were those
most cited, at 9% each,
followed by France (8%),
the USA (7%), Jordan
(7%), Iran (7%), and the
Islamic caliphate system
(7%). Interestingly, 6% of
respondents said they
would like Palestine to be
modeled after Israel.
The above list of coun-
tries was classified into
six different categories in order to allow for practical analysis:
Arab states
Western states
Israel
Islamic caliphate
Islamic non-Arab states
Communist countries
Others
 Table 10-9: Preferred country for Palestine
to be modeled after
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After the countries were categorized into the above mentioned classifications, we
found that 44% of the respondents said that they would like Palestine to be modeled
after an Arab government, 31% said they would like Palestine to emulate a “Western”
system of government, 10% cited Islamic non-Arab states, 7% preferred a system
based on the Islamic caliphate, and 2% preferred communist countries.
It is noteworthy that the countries that have immediate proximity to Palestine (Jordan,
Egypt, and Israel), or that are often visited by Palestinians (like Saudi Arabia which is
visited for pilgrimage and for work) are cited frequently by respondents. In-depth
analysis of the data showed, for example, that 76% of those who selected Jordan were
from the West Bank which borders Jordan and 60% of those who chose Egypt were
from the Gaza Strip bordering Egypt. As for those who preferred Saudi Arabia, 57%
were from the Gaza Strip, compared to 41% from among West Bank respondents.
According to region and place of residence
No significant difference is evident between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with
respect to whether the future Palestine should emulate Arab states or western states.
The main difference of note seems to be in East Jerusalem, where more Jerusalem
respondents chose western states as their model, as indicated in Figure 10.45.
When the data was
examined according to
place of residence, Gaza
Strip refugee camp
residents were less likely
to prefer a Western-style
model for Palestine.
While 22% of
respondents
there cited a
western
government,
Figure 10-44: System of government for Palestine to be modeled after
Figure 10-45: Model country for Palestine to
emulate, according to region and place of residence
     289
the percentage of respondents who cited western governments in West Bank refugee
camps was 32%.
According to poverty and employment
It is rather striking to see the differences in chosen model for Palestine between the
various economic strata. As illustrated in Figure 10.46, those above the poverty line
most often
preferred the
model of the
western-style
government.
Whereas 40% of
respondents
above the poverty
line said they
would like Pales-
tine to imitate a
western system of
government, 32%
of respondents
above the poverty
line preferred an
Arab state model. Conversely, the proportion of those below the poverty line (23%)
and hardship cases (22%) who preferred a western system was dramatically lower.
When the data was analyzed according to respondents’ employment situation, it was
also interesting to note that more fully employed Palestinians prefer western over Arab
systems of government for Palestine. While 41% of the fully-employed prefer a
western-style system for Palestine, 36% of the fully-employed prefer an Arab system.
Those not fully employed are more likely to prefer an Arab system.
According to age and education
The type of system Palestinians prefer for Palestine also varies by age, and more so by
respondents’ educational level. As illustrated in Figure 10.47, the preference for an
Arab-style system of
government is higher
among the older genera-
tion than among younger
respondents. Whereas, for
example, 49% of respon-
dents above 50-years-old
said that they would like
Palestine to be modeled
after an Arab government,
38% of respondents 18 to
24-years-old preferred the
Arab state model.
Figure 10-46: Model country for Palestine to emulate,
according to poverty and employment
Figure 10-47: Model country for Palestine to
emulate, according to age and education
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When respondents’ preferences for the state which Palestine should emulate are
analyzed by their level of education, the differences are rather striking. While only
17% of the respondents with the lowest education said that they prefer a western-style
state in Palestine, the percentage of those who have the highest level of education and
said the same was 38%. Respondents with medium levels of education are in between
these two poles, as illustrated below. Thus, one can argue that respondents with more
education are more likely to prefer that Palestine adopt a western-style system of
government.
According to leadership and factional trust
When preference towards a system of government was cross-checked with trust in
specific factions, the results showed that often those who prefer an Islamic system of
government also trust religious factions. As shown in Figure 10.48, below, respondents
who would like the caliphate system to be adopted in Palestine were mainly respon-
dents who also said they trust Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Even respondents who cite
non-Arab
Islamic states
such as Iran as
their model
were also from
among those
who stated that
they trust
religious
factions most.
Having said
that, it is inter-
esting to note is
that a significant
proportion of
respondents
trusting Hamas
and Islamic
Jihad mentioned
a western
system as their model for Palestine. Almost one-quarter of respondent trusting Islamic
Jihad, for example, said that they would like Palestine to follow a system of government
modeled after Western states.
Very few respondents trusting Fateh, on the other hand, mentioned non-Arab Islamic
states or an Islamic system of government based on the Islamic caliphate. The major-
ity of Fateh “supporters” (54%) cited one of the Arab governments as the model they
would like Palestine to follow.
The type of government Palestinians would like to see implemented also
correlates with the leader they trust most. When examining model preference
according to those trusting Arafat compared to, for example, those trusting
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, it is evident that the preference for a Western-style
system is significantly higher among those trusting Arafat than among those
Figure 10-48: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to
most trusted leader and faction
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trusting Yassin. Whereas 34% of those trusting Arafat said they would like Palestine to
be modeled after one of the Western countries, the proportion among respondents
trusting Yassin was exactly half that number.
10.6 TRUST IN MEDIA
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been exposed to various
sources of information before and after the Oslo process. Although the Palestinian
media was restricted by the Israeli military censor prior to (and in some cases after
Oslo), the strong and diverse Palestinian NGO community was active in disseminating
information, along with the various Palestinian political and religious factions.
In the aftermath of Oslo, however, the OPT witnessed an influx of various other sources
of information. Some were due to the relative flexibility of the new Palestinian Press
Law which, on the one hand allowed for the establishment of private TV and radio
stations and, on the other hand, did not have any clauses concerning the need to send
material to a sensor, as was the case when Israel was in total control of all of the
Occupied Palestinian Territories.
In addition to the internet, the establishment of a number of Arab satellite channels
also proved to be a new source of information that challenged the formal Arab TV
stations widely watched in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These satellite channels
focused on various issues that were unique not only to the Arab world in general, but
also to the OPT. Some were news-oriented, others were entertainment-based, and
some had a religious orientation.
In the following pages the Palestinian perception towards the various sources of
information available to them will be examined. The information available in this
section is based on a question addressed to the respondents concerning their most
trustworthy source of information. The analysis will also make use of the independent
variables discussed earlier.
10.6.1 According to the general public
Al-Jazeera satellite channel is the single most trusted source of information among the
Palestinian public, with almost 37% citing the Qatar-based network. As illustrated in
Figure 10.49, below, 24% of Palestinians cited Palestinian media (Palestinian radio and
television and the three Palestinian newspapers). Trust in political factions or religious
Figure 10-49: The source of information Palestinians trust most
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institutions as a source of information is only cited by 4% of the respondents, and only
3% named their relatives and friends as the most trusted source for information.
The Hezbollah-run satellite television station Al-Manar is trusted by 17% of respon-
dents, the newly-established Al-Arrabyiah is trusted by 7%, while Abu Dhabi satellite
channel is cited by 6%. Al-Hurra, the television station that was established by the
United States to “foster democracy,” is barely mentioned by respondents.
According to region
Palestinian public radio and TV stations are more widely trusted in the Gaza Strip than
in the West Bank. As indicated in Table 10-10, 21% of Gaza respondents trust Palestin-
ian radio and TV compared to 13% in the West Bank. On the other hand, West Bank
respondents are more likely to trust the Palestinian print press than do Gazans. While
12% of West
Bankers trust
the three
main daily
newspapers:
Al-Quds, Al-
Ayyam, and
Al-Hayat,
this percent-
age is only
4% in the
Gaza Strip.
These apparent differences could be attributed to the fact that, while the three main
daily newspapers in the OPT are published in the West Bank and Jerusalem, Palestin-
ian television broadcasts from the Gaza Strip.
Al-Jazeera satellite channel remains the single most-trusted source of information in
the three main areas of the OPT - the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip -
although the channel is significantly strong in East Jerusalem, where 44% of respon-
dents selected it as the most trustworthy.
10.6.2  Most important source of information
 According to area of residence
Refugee camp respondents seem to trust Palestinian radio and TV more than city or
village residents. As shown in Table 11, 20% of refugee camp residents chose radio
and television as their most important source, as compared to 13% of respondents in
cities and 14% of respondents in villages. Again, Al-Jazeera remains the single most
important source of information irrespective of the area of residence.
 According to place of residence
Although Palestinian radio and TV seem to be more important among refugee
camp residents, further analysis reveals that trust in Palestinian public radio
and TV in refugee camps is primarily seen in the Gaza Strip (24% of respon-
dents) as compared to only 9% in West Bank refugee camps. What is inter-
esting to note, however, is that 53% of West Bank refugee camp respondents
said that they trust Al-Jazeera, compared to only 29% of Gaza Strip refugee
camp residents. While one may argue that this could be due to the availabil-
 Table 10-10: Most important source of information
according to area of residence
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ity of satellite dishes in
the households, the data
shows that, in fact, more
Gaza refugee camp
residents have satellite
access in their house-
holds than do respon-
dents in the West Bank
refugee camps.
Whereas 67% of the
former said that their
households have
satellite dishes, the
percentage is 63% in
the latter.
According to poverty
Trust in Palestinian radio and TV is very low among respondents above the poverty line
than among respondents that are economically disadvantaged. As indicated in Table
10.12, only 8% of the respondents that are above the poverty line said that they trust
Palestinian TV and
radio, compared to
17% of respondents
below the poverty line
and 22% of respon-
dents that are
hardship cases.
Although the lower
availability of satellite
dishes in households
of hardship cases
might explain this
tendency, it is not clear why this is the case for households that fall below the poverty
line given the fact that 67% of those households have satellite dishes.
According to age
Age does not seem to
influence which
sources of informa-
tion are most impor-
tant to respondents.
An examination of
Table 10.13 shows
only minor differ-
ences according to
age. Interestingly,
however, is that the
tiny percentage of
respondents who named Al-Hurra as the television station that they trust
most were among those above the age of 50.
 Table 10-11: Most important source of information
according to place of residence
 Table 10-12: Most important source of information
according to poverty
 Table 10-13: Most important source of information
according to age
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According to
education
The level of education
of respondents seems
to correlate more than
age with the various
important sources of
information. Only 9%
of respondents with
the highest level of
education get their
information from Palestinian TV and radio stations as compared to 30% among
respondents with low levels of education. In contrast, 40% of respondents with high
levels of education trust Al-Jazeera as compared to 33% of respondents with low
levels of education.
According to trust in
political factions
Al-Jazeera is the most
important source of
information for
respondents trusting
all of the various
political factions.
Having said that,
however, Al-Manar
satellite station is also
important for respon-
dents who trust
Hamas and Islamic
Jihad. As indicated in
Table 10.15, 23% of
respondents trusting Islamic Jihad and 21% of respondents trusting Hamas report that
Al-Manar is their most important source. Only 11% of respondents placing their trust
in Fateh cited Al-Manar as their most important source of information.
In one final question concern-
ing media, respondents were
asked if the US-run Al-Hurra
satellite channel is intended to
foster democracy in the Arab
world. Interestingly, the
majority of respondents
reported that they had not
heard of the channel.
Of those who had,
42% said that the
station was not intended to foster democracy, as compared with a mere 6%
who said that yes, the station was intended to foster democracy. Clearly the
channel has not made much of an impact among Palestinians surveyed.
 Table 10-14: Most important source of information,
according to trust in political factions
 Table 15: Most important source of information, according
to levels of education
Figure 10-50: Attitudes towards Al-Hurra TV
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